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Chapter IV
CLAIMS RELATED TO THE LAW OF THE
SEA (LOS)

S

ince World War II, States have attempted to negotiate multilateral agreements to delimit boundaries and use of the Earth's oceans and seas. There
have been successes and failures. In 1958 four treaties-the High Seas, Continental Shelf, Territorial Sea and Fishery Conventions-were signed at the Geneva
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and are now in force for ratifying States. l
Two years later attempts to delimit the territorial sea failed at Geneva. 2 In 1982 another agreement, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention), a
comprehensive treaty covering subjects of the 1958 conventions and other principles, e.g., environmental protection, discussed in Chapter VI, was signed at
Montego Bay, Jamaica after nearly a decade of negotiations; several principal actors, including the United States, elected not to sign due to problems with the Convention's deep seabed mining provisions. The LOS Convention is now in force,
but not for the United States and an increasingly smaller number of countries. 3
Besides the LOS conventions, many other agreements, e.g., the ICAO Convention,4 impact LOS boundaries and ocean usage, not to mention State practice, the
research of scholars,S and occasional judicial and arbitral decisions.
This Chapter analyzes LOS issues relating to the Tanker War under three principal topics: the relationship among the law of the UN Charter, the LOS and the
law of armed conflict (LOAC), discussed in Part A. Part A also discusses issues related to treaty interpretation in these contexts. Part B analyzes LOS issues related
to oceans use, and Part C discusses the status of vessels (merchantmen, warships,
etc.) plying the oceans. A conclusion relates these claims to Tanker War issues in
each Part, and a general conclusion, Part D, summarizes Tanker War LOS issues.
Part A. The Charter, the LOS, and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
The rule for the relationship between the law of the UN Charter as a treaty and
the LOS as stated in treaties is simple. The Charter prevails. 6 Similarly, to the extent that Charter norms or other norms have jus cogens status, these rules also prevail? If an LOS norm is stated in a treaty, in custom or in general principles, and
there is a conflicting customary or general principles norm parallelling the Charter as a treaty, the analysis is less clear. If traditional modes of thinking about
sources ofinternationallaw apply, a balancing process among these norms must be
undertaken; it is conceivable that a non-Charter norm might prevail. 8 In terms of
competition between the Charter and the LOS, however, this is largely a theoretical
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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issue, except insofar as the right of self-defense, other Charter norms, or mandatory decisions of the UN Security Council might supersede LOS treaty norms. 9

1. The LOS and the LOAC
The relationship between the LOS and the LOAC and its component, the law of
naval warfare (LONW), is somewhat clear but less well known. 10 Chapter III has
discussed them in a context of general principles of UN Charter law and principles
of treaty interpretation. ll They are repeated here for convenience in interpreting
the law of the sea.
The 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions include clauses, sometimes overlooked in
analysis or commentary, stating that rights under these agreements are subject to
"other rules ofinternationallaw" as well as terms in the particular treaty. 12 For example, LOS Convention, art. 87(1), which declares high seas freedoms, also says,
"Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules ofinternationallaw." Four conclusions can be stated.
First, an overwhelming majority of commentators, including the International
Law Commission, a UN General Assembly agency of international law experts,13
state that the other rules clauses in the LOS Conventions refer to the LOAC,14
which includes the law of naval warfare. Therefore, provisions such as LOS Convention, art. 88, state a truism: The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes,15
but high seas usage can be subject to the law of armed conflict, when Article 87(I)'s
other rules clause is read with Article 88. As in the 1958 conventions,
That provision does not preclude... use of the high seas by naval forces. Their use for
aggressive purposes, which would... violat[ e] ... Article 2(4) of the [UN] Charter... ,
is forbidden as well by Article 88 [of the Convention]. See also LOS Convention,
Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and p[er]forming their duties
under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use of force in violation of the
Charter.1 6
This analysis is buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no other treaty can
supersede the CharterP Thus the peaceful purposes language in Article 88 and
other LOS Convention provisions cannot override Charter norms, e.g., Article
2(4), but also those in Article 51, i.e., the inherent right ofindividual and collective
self-defense. 18
Second, there is no indication that the 1958 or 1982 LOS Convention drafters
thought the other rules clauses referred to anything else, e.g., to a customary law of
the environment. As discussed in Chapter VI, international environmental law
was a gleam in academics' and futurists' eyes when the 1958 Conventions were
signed; there was only a patchwork of international agreements touching the subject. 19 There is no indication the International Law Commission, which drafted
the 1958 treaties, considered environmental protection. By contrast, there was an
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established body oflaw, discussed in Chapter V, dealing with armed conflict situations, including naval warfare, at the time. Since the 1982 LOS Convention carried
over the same language, it must be presumed that the same meaning attaches to the
other rules clauses.
Third, e.g., other agreements dealing with protection of the maritime environment include clauses exempting, or partially exempting their application during
armed conflict or similar situations. Some speak of war, 20 others of armed conflict
or a need to protect vital national interests. 21 This includes the NAFTA.22 This
tends to confirm the view ofapplying the law ofarmed conflict as a separate body of
law in appropriate situations. To the extent that treaties dealing with the maritime
environment do not have such clauses,23 such agreements must be read in the light
of the LOS Conventions, which include such provisions. And to the extent that the
1958 LOS Conventions recite customary norms, and such is the case with the High
Seas Convention,24 applying the LOAC as a separate body oflaw in appropriate situations as a customary norm must also be considered with LOAC treaties and
other sources 25 when analyzing these issues.
Fourth, principles of the law of treaties, e.g., impossibility of performance;26
fundamental change of circumstances;27 desuetude, or lack of use of a treaty for a
considerable time;28 or war, the last applying only to parties to a conflict;29 may
suspend operation of international agreements during a conflict or other, similar
emergency situations, or may terminate them. Outbreak of hostilities does not suspend or terminate humanitarian conventions or treaties governing neutrality designed to apply during armed conflict, however. 30 The other side of the coin is
pacta sunt servanda,31 i.e., that treaties should be observed; a manifestation of this is
that States signing treaties should not behave so as to defeat the treaties' object and
purpose. 32 The often amorphous law of treaty succession33 must be considered,
particularly for older agreements, including those stating the LOAC, to the exten t
that those treaties are not part of customary law today. If these agreements restate
custom, and are subject to treaty succession principles with respect to a particular
country, that country is doubly bound. 34
The conclusion is inescapable that the other rules clauses of the 1958 Conventions, provisions carried forward into the 1982 LOS Convention, mean that the
LOS conventions' terms are subject to the LOAC, of which the law of naval warfare is a part. Since the High Seas Convention is generally considered a restatement
of customary law,35 its other rules clauses are part of the customary law governing
oceans law during armed conflict. Moreover, since many States consider the LOS
Convention's navigational articles, which often copy 1958 conventions' terms,
customary law,36 and since the navigational articles include other rules clauses,
the case is strong that the LOS is governed by two bodies of rules: (1) the LOS as
stated in the conventions, custom and subordinate treaties, etc., in non-armed conflict situations; (2) the LOAC, including the LONW, where LOAC rules apply.
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Iraq's claim that the Kuwait Regional Convention and its Protocol did not apply when it struck the Nowruz oil facilities 37 was without basis in law. Although
the Convention might have been suspended between the belligerents, it continued
to apply to relations between Iran, Iraq and third States, the latter of whom were
not parties to the conflict, i.e., belligerents. 38 To the extent the Nowruz attack resulted in damage, including environmental harm, to States not party to the conflict, Iraq violated the Regional Convention and perhaps other environmental
norms. 39 Iraq might have claimed the Convention was suspended because of impossibility of performance,40 or maybe fundamental change of circumstances,41
but Iraq did not make these assertions.

2. Relationship o/the 1982 LOS Convention and Other LOS-Related Treaties
Besides general rules of treaty construction applying to all international agreements,42 the 1982 LOS Convention has special rules for its relationship as a treaty
with the 1958 conventions and other treaties dealing with LOS issues.
For those States that are or become parties,43 the 1982 LOS Convention will replace the 1958 conventions.44 Article 311(2), the general supersession provision
for the LOS Convention, declares that the Convention does not alter existing
rights "which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention" and
which do not affect enjoyment of other parties' rights or performance of their obligations under the Convention. 45 States may also conclude agreements modifying
or suspending operations of the LOS Convention, provided that the suspension or
modification is not incompatible with effective execution of the object and purpose of the LOS Convention or its basic principles and do not affect enjoyment of
other States' rights or performance of their obligations under the LOS Convention. States that intend to conclude such an agreement must notify other LOS
Convention parties of their intentions and the modification or suspension for
which it provides. 46 Rules for non-suspendable straits transit passage, and nonsuspension of innocent passage in some straits,47 are examples of LOS Convention
provisions that no single State may undercut. Article 311(3) forbids two or more
States bordering a strait from trying to suspend straits transit or innocent passage,
as provided by the Convention, through a treaty, an example of treaty action the
LOS Convention forbids.
The LOS Convention declares for its environmental norms in Part XII, which
states many principles of maritime environmental law:
1. The provisions of this Part are without prejudice to the specific obligations
assumed by States under special conventions and agreements concluded previously
which relate to the protection and preservation of the marine environment and to
agreements which may be concluded in furtherance of the general principles set forth
in this Convention.
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2. Specific obligations assumed by States under special conventions, with respect
to the protection and preservation of the marine environment, should be carried out

in a manner consistent with the general principles and objectives of this
Convention. 48

This is a lex specialis, i.e. a special rule, for the LOS Convention, Part XII, the principal source for maritime environmental protection standards,49 which the LOS
Convention allows for this and other articles varying its basic rules. 50 The rule for
no suspension of innocent passage for certain straits, e.g., those between the high
seas and a foreign State's territorial sea,51 as distinguished from general innocent
passage rules allowing suspension under certain circumstances,52 is another example of lex specialis.
As in the case of the Charter, there is the possibility that a parallel but contradictory custom53 or other source oflaw may develop alongside treaty-based norms. 54
The developing customary norm might be the same as, and thereby strengthen,
the treaty norm. 55 Ifin opposition, custom can weaken or dislodge a treaty norm. 56
However, no treaty, and probably no custom, can supersede the Charter, mandatory norms developed under it,57 orjus cogens norms. 58

3. The 1982 LOS Convention and the Tanker War
Bahrain and Iraq ratified the LOS Convention in 1985, and Kuwait in 1986;
many other countries, e.g., France and the UAE, were signatories, but other States
with prominent roles in the Tanker War,e.g., the United Kingdom and the United
States, were not signatories or parties during the Tanker War. 59 Thus for some
States there was an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the LOS Convention during at least part of the Tanker War. 60 These countries also had the duty
to comply with customary norms, perhaps restated in the 1982 LOS Convention or
the 1958 LOS conventions. Others were bound by the 1958 LOS conventions, e.g.,
the United Kingdom and the United States.61 These countries also had the obligation to comply with customary norms, perhaps restated in the 1958 conventions or
the LOS Convention. Still other countries were not party to any LOS treaty; however, they were bound by customary rules the 1958 and 1982 conventions restate. 62
Most Persian Gulf coastal States were in the latter category. The ensuing analysis
proceeds by analyzing and comparing the 1958 and 1982 LOS conventions as
treaty law, to the extent that they applied as such, and seeks to supply customary
rules where these are in accordance with or differ from the conventional law.

Part B. Claims to Oceans Use
Because most armed conflicts in which merchant ships are involved have occurred on the high seas,63 we begin64 by examining merchant ships' and warships'
status on the "great common.,,65 This method takes the perspective of all seafarers
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except those who sailed from Persian Gulf ports. Mariners, whether aboard merchant vessels or men of war, that approach the Gulffrom the Indian Ocean must
traverse the high seas before they encounter special regimes, e.g., straits passage,
the continental shelf, the contiguous zone, or the territorial sea. It is an analysis of
derogation from the general to the specific, in terms of applicable law.

1. Trends in Claims to Ocean Usages on the High Seas
According to the High Seas Convention, the high seas include all parts of the sea
(including subsurface water) not included in States' territorial or internal waters. 66 Beyond these broad exclusions, the LOS Convention, Article 88 says that
the "high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes," which, as analyzed above,
does not mean that navies cannot operate on the high seas. Stated as a positive rule,
States may conduct naval operations on the high seas, subject to other LOS limitations, discussed below. Under Article 2(4) of the Charter, no State may use the high
seas for aggressive purposes; this is in essence a cardinal principle of the Charter,
along with the Article 51 inherent right to self-defense. 67 LOS Convention, Article 89 declares: "No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to
its sovereignty." The LOS conventions declare that every State may sail ships on
the high seas under its flag,68 and list certain rights, among others, with respect to
the high seas: 69
1.
2.
3.
4.

freedom of navigation;
freedom of overflight/o
freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;71
freedom of fishing; 72
5. freedom to build artificial islands and other installations permitted by
internationallaw;73
6. freedom to conduct scientific research.74
Both agreements say all States must exercise these rights with reasonable, or due,
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of high seas rights?5 The
LOS Convention adds that high seas users must have due regard for others' rights
in those parts of the sea-bed ocean floor and subsoil beyond national jurisdictional
limits, i.e., beyond the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf?6 All States,
whether landlocked or not, may sail ships flying their flag on the high seas. Warships and government ships on noncommercial service enjoy complete immunity
on the high seas from other than the flag State?7
The clear trend, since the triumph of Hugo Grotius,78 open seas theory over
John Selden's closed sea concept,79 has been for freedom of navigation, particularly the high seas. Another pattern ofclaims since Grotius' era has been, however,
limitation of that right. Succeeding Parts of this Chapter examine trends in these
limitations, looking landward.
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2. Trends in Claims of Restrictions on High Seas Rights: From Fisheries to the

EEZ
One class of claims on merchant vessels' and warships' rights to navigation on
the high seas deals with coastal States' assertions to competence over belts of the
high seas outward from the territorial sea for exclusive fishing rights. At first subject to conflicting claims, if not outright violence on the high seas, the issue has
been largely resolved by treaties in many areas of the world. Historically the Gulf
has been a primary source for pearls and there are offshore fishing areas. 80 More recently, agreements have attempted to regulate offshore fishing areas. 81 The US experience with fishing issues may point toward problems and solutions for the Gulf
and its seaward fishing zones and EEZs in particular. "[T]he fishery question has
been the focal point of the whole problem of territorial waters from its very beginning."S2 Riesenfeld wrote this in 1942; today doubtless he would amend this analysis to include EEZ-related claims.

a. From Fishery Claims to Sovereignty Claims to the EEZ Concept. The oldest
claims for offshore use of the high seas surface and water column involve fishing,
and from these carne assertions of rights in offshore fishing zones, the continental
shelf, and EEZs. However, ocean fishing "has never been an unfettered right,,,83
and, as will be seen, neither have continental shelf or EEZ claims. Although more
of historical interest in some respects, fishing rights claims analysis develops this
thesis, and this sub-Part starts by examining fishing rights claims in US practice.
The Treaty of Paris ending the American Revolution gave US fisherman access
to the Grand Banks, other fishing areas off Newfoundland, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Newfoundland coasts and other coasts off British North America. S4
France also had fishing rights in the area. ss These rights were not considered cession ofterritory;86 therefore, no navigation rights were impaired. An 1818 British-US convention confirmed and refined fishing rights and liberties,87 and this
process continued in 1854.88 The Treaty of Washington, in effect 1873-85, again
confirmed these rights and approved reciprocal rights in US waters. 89 In 1906
British-US notes relating to purse seining off Newfoundland were exchanged;90
this modus vivendi continued into 1912.91 A 1908 bilateral treaty, providing for an
International Fisheries Commission, resulted in authority for restricted halibut
and lobster fishing in territorial waters. 92
In 1909 the two countries agreed to submit issues related to fishing in waters
northeast of the United States to arbitration. 93 The Permanent Court of Arbitration decided in Britain's favor with respect to regulating the fishing industry
subject to the 1818 Convention94 but held US fishermen could hire crews of noninhabitants (i.e., Newfoundlanders). Although US fishermen had to report to local
authorities if they landed to dry or cure fish, they could fish in certain local
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Newfoundland and Magdalen Islands waters. 95 A tr~aty later recited procedual
rules and methods for future disputes that the Court had recommended. 96
British-US bilateral agreements of 1923, 1930 and 1937, Britain acting for Canada for the latter two, established a Pacific coast International Fisheries Commission and regulated Pacific high seas halibut fishing. 97 Similar 1930 and 1956
agreements later protected sockeye salmon. 98
In none of these fishing rights claims and counterclaims was there any assertion
of a right to regulate merchant ship or warship navigation except with respect to
taking fish. The same trend may be observed in claims to hunt seals in the North
Pacific and Arctic Oceans.
Russian ukases of 1799 and 1821 gave the Russian-American Company Bering
Sea whaling and fishing rights, along the northwest coast of America, and in other
seas northeast of Russia. Russia also asserted a right to forbid approaches to Russian lands closer than 100 miles. After British and US protests, Russia-US and
Britain-Russia treaties were ratified in 1824 and 1825.99 The Russia-US agreement
provided: "[I]n any part of the [Pacific] Ocean, ... Citizens or Subjects of the high
contracting Powers shall be neither disturbed nor restrained either in navigation,
or in fishing, or in resorting to the coasts upon points which may not already have
been occupied, for ... trading with the Natives," subject to certain exceptions. lOO
Reciprocal rights to fish and to trade with natives were given, except for sale offirearms, munitions of war and liquor. lOl The 1825 Britain-Russia treaty followed the
pattern. l02
The 1867 treaty selling Alaska to the United States ceded Russian land and water territory in North America, including the Aleutian Islands, to the United
States. l03 Although US legislation implementing the treaty would seem to have asserted dominion over the Bering Sea,104 an 1893 arbitral award held that only three
marine miles offshore were subject to US sovereignty, and that US high seas seizures of British ships in the Bering Sea violated those ships' right of navigation. !OS
The award established regulations for concurrent British-US jurisdiction over fur
seal fishing in Bering Sea high seas areas. l06 British and US legislation confirmed
the award's regulations in 1894. 107 Nothing in the award or a treaty establishing
the tribunal claimed to impair high seas navigation. 108
Other governments' reactions to the 1893 regulations were mixed, but the only
admitted claim of control related to seal fishing. l09 In 1894, a Russia-US modus vivendi confirmed reciprocal policing rights for regulating seal fishing. 110 In 1902,
pursuant to a protocol,l1l an arbitrator found for the United States in the Cape Hom
Pigeon case, where a Russian cruiser seized and detained a US-flag fishing vessel on
the high seas when the Russian naval commander "had been in error in his suspicions that the bark was engaged in an illicit pursuit, and the Russian Government offered to pay a proper indemnity .... 112 Similarly, in theJames Hamilton Lewis, C.H.
'White and Kate and Anna claims, where Russian seizures had been attempted on
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the high seas for possible illegal fishing in Russian territorial waters, the award
went to the United States. The arbitrator noted that absent a treaty there was no jurisdiction for Russian naval commanders to seize US-flag vessels. 113 The significance of these awards is that even as to seal fishing, which occurs when seals
migrate on the open sea, there was no claim to restrict freedom of navigation beyond a territorial sea without international agreement.
A 1911 Britain-Japan-Russia-US agreement, limiting North Pacific high seas
fur seal fishing, did not restrict navigation rights in these waters. 114 A decade later,
a treaty regularizing the Spitsbergen Archipelago's status under Norwegian sovereignty declared fishing and hunting rights 115 but imposed no limitations on freedom of navigation; its Article 3 assured "nationals of all. .. Parties equal liberty of
access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of
the territories; subject to the observance oflocallaws and regulations, they [might]
carryon ... maritime and commercial operations on a footing ofabsolute equality."
Transit rights were subject to Norwegian most-favored-nation treatment.11 6 Bilateral fishing agreements between the World Wars followed the same pattern of
limiting fishing operations while expressly not restricting the general freedom of
navigation or not mentioning it at al1.117
The 1931 and later multilateral conventions regulating whaling, although applying in territorial waters and on the high seas,118 imposed no limits on navigational use of these waters.
During the 1930's and until the outbreak of World War II, the United States expressed concern to Japan over depletion of Pacific salmon fisheries near Bristol
Bay, Alaska; initial proposed solutions included extension of the US traditional
three-mile territorial sea limit.11 9 During the war the United States considered
linking territorial sea expansion (and therefore possible restriction offreedom of
navigation) with limitations on fishing based on the continental shelf below the
water column. 120 Eventually the linkage idea was discarded,121 and a US Fisheries
Proclamation (September 28,1945) asserted national jurisdiction to establish fisheries conservation zones in high seas areas contiguous to US coasts, either for US
fishermen's exclusive use or by international agreement with other States, with assurance that the United States would recognize other States' proclamations on a
reciprocal basis. However, "[t]he character as high seas of the areas in which such
conservation zones [were] established and the right to their free and unimpeded
navigation [was] in no way thus affected.,,122
Despite these trends, three South American countries-Chile, Ecuador and
Peru (CEP States)-took a claim to possible assertion of a 200-mile fisheries zone a
step further, first by decrees in 1947 and 1950. 123 The August 18, 1952 Declaration
of Santiago on the Maritime Zone followed, proclaiming, "[E]ach [State] possesses
sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the area ofsea adjacent to the coast ofits own
country and extending not less than 200 nautical miles from the said coast." The
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Declaration added: "[It] shall not be construed as disregarding the necessary restrictions on the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction imposed by international
law to permit the innocent and inoffensive passage of vessels of all nations through
the zone ....,,124 In 1954 the CEP States formalized the Declaration with a Supplementary Agreement to consult to uphold the 200-mile territorial sea, including determining action to be taken if force were used against them. 125 The United States
protested the executive decrees,126 and a 1953 Ecuador-US agreement on fishery
relations noted "differences in views" on the territorial sea. 127 The international
response to these expansive claims was immediate and strong. An Ecuadoran proposal, similar to the Declaration, was subjected to such "sweeping modifications"
that its impact was negated at the 1954 Inter-American Conference.12 8 Negotiations in 1955 led nowhere, and the 200-mile Santiago Declaration territorial sea
belt, linked with fishing rights claims, remained in effect although protested by
the United States. 129 By 1958, however, the CEP States had agreed to separate the
territorial sea width and fishing control jurisdiction issues. Ecuador, e.g., continued to adhere to the 200-mile Declaration jurisdiction but asserted only a 12-mile
territorial sea. In 1966, however, Ecuador's presidential proclamation claimed a
200-mile territorial sea; the United States does not recognize this claim. Other
claims exceeding LOS Convention limits persist; these too have been protested. 130
The USSR, as successor to the tsarist regime with its propensity to claim wide
territorial sea jurisdiction through asserting fishing control,131 distinguished between territorial sea claims and fisheries regulation jurisdiction. A 1927 Soviet ordinance asserted a 12-mile defensive limit ofterritorial waters; a 1935 ordinance
claimed a 12-mile fishing regulation jurisdiction. 132 Repeating a pattern of an earlier agreement,133 the USSR concluded the Barents Sea Pact with the United
Kingdom in 1956, permitting fishing by UK vessels up to three miles from the
Barents Sea coast. 134 Following a decree restricting Sea of Okhotsk, western Bering Sea and other contiguous North Pacific waters salmon fishing,135 the USSR
signed a bilateral agreement with Japan to regulate salmon fishing in these waters. 136 As in the Barents Sea Pact, the treaty omitted territorial sea claims with a
right of excluding shipping.
Thus it was entirely consistent with customary international law that the 1958
Fishery Convention implicitly recognized an unimpeded right of navigation in
high seas areas potentially subject to fisheries conservation. Apart from treaty obligations, special interests and rights ofcoastal States, and special Convention provisions, all States have a right to fish on the high seas.137 States must adopt
provisions for their nationals who fish on the high seas, and must negotiate agreements with other users of high seas fisheries or arbitrate differences. Coastal States
are deemed to have special interests in areas off their shores. 138 This agreement
does not limit high seas navigation except insofar as fishing regulation is involved.
The High Seas Convention, proclaiming separate high seas navigation and fishing
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freedoms,139 confirms this principle. The Territorial Sea Convention declares
that passage is not innocent in the territorial sea if fishermen do not observe published coastal State regulations on territorial sea fishing. 140 Coastal States may
pass laws to prevent and punish infringement of customs, fiscal, or health regulations in their contiguous zone or territorial sea; these rules may also impact offshore fishing. 141
Decades after 1958 witnessed assertions of wider exclusive offshore fishing
zones, two Cod Wars between Iceland and the United Kingdom, and an ICI decision holding that custom had crystallized into allowing coastal States to claim an
exclusive 1Z-mile offshore fishing zone. 142 The 1976 US Fishery Conservation and
Management Act, declaring a regulatory regime for a ZOO-mile area from territorial
sea baselines and otherwise proclaiming a national right to regulate all but highly
migratory fish species, did not assert aright to regulate high seas navigation. 143 Although Title II provided for foreign fishing pursuant to existing or future agreements,l44 no later US treaty has impinged on general overflight or navigation
rights in fishing zones. In the Persian Gulf area, Iran proclaimed a 50-mile exclusive fishing zone in the Gulf of Oman and to the limits of its continental shelf
boundary in 1973. 145 The next year Saudi Arabia established an exclusive fishing
zone with median lines as boundaries with other countries. 146
The LOS Convention continues a theme of generally free navigation access to
high seas fishing areas, but largely in the context of a claimed EEZ. Allowing the
possibility of a ZOO-mile EEZ, the LOS Convention declares for general high seas
freedoms including navigation and overflight, subject to a coastal State's right to
explore and exploit natural resources of the water column, the seabed and subsoil;
to establish artificial islands, installations and structures; to scientific research;
and to protecting and preserving the coastal environment. 147 The LOS Convention EEZ is subject to the treaty's regime of peaceful uses of the high seas, invalidity of sovereignty claims for the high seas, navigation rights, status of ships, visit
and search, hot pursuit, rights to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and suppression of slavery, piracy, the drug traffic and unauthorized broadcasting, as well as
"other pertinent rules ofinternationallaw," i.e. the law of armed conflict. 148 As in
the Fishery Convention, States with competing interests must give due regard to
other States' interests. 149 This principle parallels the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case. ISO Although it has been argued that the LOS Convention does not allow military exercises in the EEZ, and some States have claimed a right to bar military activities,lSI it is submitted that the LOS Convention reference to high seas
freedoms includes a right to use an EEZ for military exercises, subject to due regard for coastal State interests. 152 Even those who argue against this position concede that the LOS Convention permits unimpeded EEZ overflight. 153
Islands capable of human habitation or economic life can have an EEZ, but
rocks, low-tide elevations and human-made offshore ~nstallations such as oil

252

The Tanker War

derricks, etc., cannot. IS4 In those cases the EEZ is measured from shore baselines.
A State's EEZ proclamation, while asserting regulatory rights over a ZOO-mile
band of the sea and its bottom, cannot claim a right to regulate navigation outside
the territorial sea. The presumption is that high seas freedoms prevail, subject to
requirements of due regard for coastal State jurisdiction and sovereignty validly
asserted, and, in appropriate situations, the LOAC, and in all cases the law of the
Charter. ISS High seas freedoms also prevail in high seas fishing areas as well, subject to principles of due regard for others' high seas freedoms and, in appropriate
situations, the LOAC, and in all cases the law of the Charter. IS6 The LOS Convention EEZ formula is customary law. IS7

b. Conclusions. Claims to use ocean resources, whether in the water column or on
the seabed, may have begun as attempts to encroach upon the great common of
high seas navigation rights. ISS Episodic proclamations have claimed sovereignty
since then. IS9 However, today international law firmly declares merchantmen's
and warships' rights to navigate those potentially resource-rich areas, subject to
coastal States' rights to regulate activity that might impair those resources, e.g., environmental damage, and subject to other limitations on high sea navigation, e.g.,
peaceful use. 160 Fishing zones and general EEZs are subject to high seas freedoms
for purposes of overflight and navigation by warships and merchant vessels alike.
Warships and merchantmen must, however, have due regard for coastal State interests in the EEZ.16I

c. High Seas Fisheries, EEZs, Pipelines, Freedoms ofNavigation and Overflight,
and the Tanker War. Among Persian Gulf States, Iran claimed a 50-mile fishery
zone off its coasts, subject to median line boundaries in the Gulf. Qatar proclaimed
a ZOO-mile fishery zone, and the UAE were among 80 States claiming an EEZ.162
However, Iran is among four States forbidding foreign military exercises in her
EEZ, a derogation unlawful under the LOS that the United States has protested.
(Iran asserted this claim in 1993; it is not relevant for this analysis.)163
Insofar as the high seas parts of Gulf fishery zones or EEZs are concerned, there
appears to be no record ofimpairment of usage by neutrals during the Tanker War.
Belligerents and neutrals alike owed neutrals due regard for those neutrals' exercise of EEZ or fishing zone rights. 164 To be sure, there is evidence of attacks on
dhows, i.e., possibly fishing vessels operating in a proclaimed zone, on offshore oil
facilities and on vessels that may have been servicing installations in a zone. 16S
Since these incidents are concerned as much with attacks on a ship engaged in navigation in the Gulf, analysis of the legitimacy of the attacks appears in Chapters III
and V. Iraq attacked Iranian offshore installations, including pumping stations
and other facilities. Iran attacked Iraqi facilities but also neutral countries' installations. 166 Insofar as these were a belligerent's attacks on its opponent, the LOAC
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applied through the LOS other rules clauses, by then a customary as well as a treaty
norm. On the other hand, attacks on neutrals' facilities were violations of the UN
Charter, art. 2(4).167 Chapter V discusses legitimacy of these attacks from an
LOAC perspective; Chapter VI examines them in the context of the law of the maritime environment. 168 Although pipelines necessarily led from the shores of Gulf
States, e.g., Kuwait and Iran, to these countries' offshore pumping stations, there
were no reports ofattacks on the pipelines or any other submarine pipelines during
the Tanker War.
The United States responded to Iranian attacks on US-flagged tankers by destroying Iranian offshore platforms that were a source of the attacks and which
may have been sites oflegitimate EEZ activity under the LOS.169 This was a legitimate act of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter; whether seen as ajus
cogens-protected right or as trumping the LOS.170 As explained in Chapter V, the
attacks were also proportional under the law of naval warfare; 171 since there apparently was no appreciable environmental damage resulting from the attacks, no
claim of environmental derogation was at stake. In Thus to the extent that the attacks might not have enjoyed primacy as ajus cogens norm of the inherent right to
self-defense or as a superior treaty norm under Charter Article 103, the United
States had a customary right to respond in self-defense under the law of naval warfare, which as part of the LOAC applied under the circumstances in derogation of
LOS norms through the other rules clauses of the LOS conventions, which are
now customary law as well. 173 In terms of behavior toward Gulf States not parties
to the conflict, i.e., those that had proclaimed neutrality, the United States and
other maritime powers that sent naval forces to the Gulf owed due regard for
coastal State operations and installations in proclaimed EEZs or fishing zones. 174
There is no evidence the United States or other powers did not show due regard for
proclaimed EEZs or fishing zones; i.e., there do not appear to have been LOS violations pertaining to fishing zones or EEZs.
When the United States and other neutral countries launched aircraft, fixedwing or helicopters, whether on training flights or to support protection of shipping, those aircraft were entitled to high seas freedom of overflight as long as due
regard 175 was given high seas freedoms and rights of neutrals and belligerents
alike. As between neutral air forces and other high seas users, neutral or belligeren t, the law of the sea governed, subject to the LOAC. 176 When Iran attacked those
aircraft, they or surface naval forces operating with them were entitled to respond
in proportional self-defense. l77
Neutral warships also had freedom of navigation on the high seas of the Gulf,
subject to their obligation to give due regard 178 to other countries' high seas rights
and freedoms, whether the other country was a neutral or a belligerent. As in the
case of high seas overflights, the LOS governed, subject to the LOAC. 179 When
neutral surface naval forces engaged in freedom of navigation or naval maneuvers
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(also legitimate under the law of the sea),180 were attacked, by fire from belligerents' aircraft or by belligerent surface naval forces, those surface naval forces
could respond immediately in proportional self-defense. Thus it was lawful for the
United States to attack Iranian aircraft, surface naval forces, and minelaying
forces, e.g., Iran Ajr, in self-defense. It was also lawful to remove mines laid in the
high seas as a self-defense measure. 181 Just because a neutral did not respond immediately in self-defense, as in the case of the Samuel B. Roberts, did not mean that
a right of response did not exist.
Belligerents also had rights of freedom of navigation and overflight. It was legi timate,e.g., for Iran to conduct naval exercises on the high seas, as well as in its territorial waters, with due regard for others' high seas rights and freedoms, but not in
the Strait of Hormuz so as to obstruct or block navigation. 182 It was legitimate for
both belligerents to exercise freedom of overflight, as long as they gave due
regard 183 for neutrals' high seas rights, on the way to attack targets of an opponent.
Belligerents' exercise of high seas freedoms, like the exercise of these freedoms by
neutrals, were qualified by the requirement that belligerence give due regard 1S4 for
neutrals' exercise of these freedoms. Belligerents' conduct under the LOS was also
qualified by the LOAC and other States' rights of proportional self-defense1S5
where it applied. 1S6 Thus Iran's Airbus had a right to overfly the Gulf as a civil airliner. US forces, engaged in a surface and air naval action with Iranian speedboats
at the time, were exercising a right of self-defense. If the U.S.S Vincennes honestly
(but mistakenly) believed the Airbus was an attacking Iranian aircraft, and that a
short-range surface-to-air missile was a proportional self-defense response, then
the tragic shootdown was legitimate under self-defense principles. US compensation to victims of the accident was made ex gratia, as was Iraqi compensation for the
Stark attack, i.e., there was no admission of fault by the United States. 1S7 (There is
nothing unusual about ex gratia payments; defendants in civil lawsuits include
such a clause in settlement agreements every day, to the effect that any payment or
other performance is not an admission of fault. Payment in either case does not admit liability,)

3. The Regime of the Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf
Claims relating to the offshore adjacent seabed and its subsoil began in the nineteenth century with assertions of national jurisdiction over subterranean mines;
these claims occasionally went beyond what a coastal State claimed for a territorial
sea. ISS Other early assertions of righ ts to the adjacent waters' seabed and subsoil related to claims to fishing rights, and these also sometimes went beyond territorial
sea..claims,lS9 Early writers disagreed as to whether the seabed surface beyond a
territorial sea was equivalent to the high seas or appurtenant to the adjacent land
and subject to effective occupation "subject only to no unreasonable interference
in the free use of the high seas above.,,190 Great Britain claimed prescriptive rights
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for offshore pearl fisheries near Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and in the Persian Gulf, and
there were Australian and Tunisian claims to offshore sedentery fisheries, partly
based on municipallaw. 191 The only known early treaty dividing a continental
shelf was the 1942 UK-Venezuela agreement for exploiting oil resources between
Trinidad and Venezuela in the Gulf ofParia. The parties disclaimed claims to high
seas rights or to passage or navigation rights. 192

a. Developments Since World War II. Contemporaneous with publishing a fisheries jurisdiction claim,193 the United States issued another executive proclamation
in 1945,194 asserting jurisdiction and control over natural resources of the subsoil
and seabed of the continental shelfbeneath the high seas off the United States. The
claim was subject to international agreements with adjacent nations "in accordance with equitable principles," and, equally importantly, the proclamation
unequivocally asserted, "The character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and their rightto free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected." Although national security had been advanced during World War II State
Department considerations of the proclamation,195 it asserted use and conservation of shelf natural resources and "self-protection compel[ling] the coastal nation
to keep close watch over activities off its shores ... necessary for utilization of these
resources" as rationales for the claim. 196 The US Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)197 and the Submerged Lands Act in 1953. 198
OCSLA specifically provides that the Act should not be construed to affect high
seas fishing and navigation rights. 199
A spate of continental shelf claims followed. 200 While most States followed the
US lead in not asserting jurisdictional rights over high seas areas to control navigational or passage rights, a handful did claim, or would seem to have claimed,
such: 201 Argentina;202 the CEP States, Chile,203 Ecuadol04 and Peru,205 culminating in the Declaration ofSantiago;206 EI Salvador;207 Honduras;208 Mexico. 209
In each of the latter cases the United States and other countries protested claims of
jurisdiction or right to regulate high seas freedoms, navigation or passage. 210 As
late as 1985 Chile and Ecuador asserted claims beyond 200 miles, which the United
States protested. 211
During the early postwar era, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, on behalf
of certain Persian Gulf sheikdoms, proclaimed sovereignty over offshore continental shelves but only for exploitation purposes. 212 In 1955 Iran proclaimed a
continental shelffor the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, but it did not purport to affect
superjacent waters or other States' installation of submarine cables. 213 Iraq also
claimed a continental shelf without a reservation like Iran's.214 Other Gulf States
(Bahrain, Dubai and Sharjah of the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar) had continental
shelf claims and negotiated boundary treaties for these rights. 215 Nevertheless, all
Gulf States-Bahrain (1949, when under UK protection; 1958,1971), Iran (1955,
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1958, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1974, 1975), Iraq (1957), Kuwait (1949, when under UK
protection; 1965,1968), Oman (1972,1974), Qatar (1949, when under UK protection; 1965,1969), Saudi Arabia (1949,1958,1965,1968), States of the UAE (1949,
when under UK protection; 1968,1969,1971, 1975)-have asserted offshore seabed rights by unilateral proclamation (e.g., those ofl949) or by agreement with opposite or adjacent countries. These treaty-defined areas end at an agreed meeting
line in mid-Gulf for the most part or extend the coastal boundary seaward. 216
The Continental Shelf Convention resolved definitional, dimensional and jurisdictional issues erupting after the US and other proclamations or treaties. 217
The shelf is defined as adjacent submarine seabed and subsoil outside the territorial sea, to a depth of200 meters or beyond that where superjacent waters' depth
permit natural resources exploitation. Islands can have a continental shelf. 21S
Agreements must determine opposite States' boundaries; absent a treaty, the
median line is the boundary, "unless another boundary is justified by special circumstances." Similarly, agreements were to determine adjacent States' shelf
boundaries, without which the line was to be "determined by... the principle of
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each State is measured.,,219 In 1965 the Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations accepted Convention principles. 220 The 1969 North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, however, concluded that the Convention's "special circumstances"
rules had not yet crystallized into custom, in a controversy not covered by the Convention-being not between adjacent or opposite States-and where one State was
not then a treaty party.221
Although a coastal State has sovereign rights to explore and exploit shelf natural resources, which include both living and non-living resources,222 "rights of the
coastal State... do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas,
or... the airspace above these waters.,,223 Article 5(a) underscores this, declaring:
"[E]xploration of the... shelf and the exploitation ofits natural resources must not
result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources of the sea[.]" Exploration or exploitation cannot interfere with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research whose results
will be published.224
Certain special continental shelf uses-submarine cables or pipelines, artificial
installations, tunnelling-are subject to special rules. 225 The High Seas Convention declares the rights to lay submarine cables and pipelines are high seas usage
rights, but that they are subject to the principle that these freedoms, and others recognized by general principles of international law, must be recognized by States
with "reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.,,226 This is also a customary rule of international law. 227 The
Convention says that a coastal State many not impede other States' submarine cable or pipeline laying, subject to the coastal State's rights to take reasonable
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measures for exploiting its continental shelf and exploitation of the shelfs natural
resources. 228 This is in effect a restatement of the High Seas Convention "reasonable regard" principle in the context of the continental shelf and pipelines or cables that might cross the shelf. Similarly, the Shelf Convention provides that
exploring the shelf or exploiting its resources "must not result in any unjustifiable
interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources of
the sea, nor result in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other
scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication."
"[I]nstallations or devices [permitted on the shelf], nor the safety zones around
them, may be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation.,,229 Subject to these limitations, coastal States may build, maintain or operate installations and other devices
necessary to explore and exploit their shelfs natural resources. Coastal States may
establish safety zones of up to 500 meters around these installations and devices
and take, within these zones, measures necessary for their protection. All ships
must respect these zones, which do not have the status of islands and therefore do
not have a territorial sea around them. Coastal States must give due notice ofinstallation construction and maintain permanent means to warn of their presence.
Abandoned or disused installations must be removed. 230
The LOS Convention made few changes relevant to high seas rights and freedoms issues. High seas navigation and other rights are not affected by a State's continental shelf declaration of sovereign rights to explore and exploit its shelf; the
superjacent water and air space are not affected, as in the Conventions, and a
coastal State cannot unduly interfere with these high seas rights and freedoms. 231
The 200 meter depth-exploitability criteria were changed to a flat 200 nautical mile
limit, the EEZ limit,232 or the continental margin, whichever is greater, with a
ma.'Ximum 350-mile seaward extension. 233 The seabed and subsoil formula remained the same. 234 Opposite and adjacent State claims must be resolved by
"agreement on the basis ofinternationallaw, as referred to in Article 38 of the [ICJ]
Statute... to achieve an equitable solution." (Disputes relating to treaties already
in force will be determined by the treaties' terms.) If there is no agreement, LOS
Convention dispute resolution procedures must be used. 235
Coastal State exploration and exploitation rights are the same under the LOS
Convention, and the same exploitable resources are listed.236 The 1958 treaty,
however, placed the burden on scientific research installations or equipment to
stay out of "established international shipping lanes" and to display appropriate
warning signals to ensure safety at sea. 237 Research must not "unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea ... and shall be duly respected in the course
of such uses.,,238 The LOS Convention sets forth a full range ofpotential claims relating to conservation, environmental control and research for all ocean areas;
these will be examined separately insofar as they pertain to Tanker War issues. 239
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As in the Shelf Convention, the LOS Convention provides for special uses of the
continental shelf: submarine cables and pipelines, artificial islands and similar
structures, drilling and tunneling. 240
In 1969 the ICJ had been reluctant to declare Continental Shelf Convention Articles 6(1) and 6(2) as declaring custom for shelfboundaries;241 by 1984, however, a
Court panel in the Gulf ofMaine case said the LOS Convention continental shelf
provisions could "be regarded as consonant at present with general international
law.,,242 The United States has protested a few States' legislation or proclamations,
e.g., Chile and Ecuador, that extend jurisdiction beyond LOS Convention limits.243

b. Conclusions. Thus, subject to obligations to avoid interfering unduly with shelf
exploration or exploitation, or to exercise safety at sea, the right of warships and
merchant vessels to navigate the high seas water column covering the continental
shelf continues unabated by the LOS Convention, whether binding as a treaty or
reflecting custom for nonparties, aberrations such as the Santiago Declaration,
unilateral pronouncements or perhaps some treaties 244 to the contrary notwithstanding. Moreover, there is nothing in the law of the sea conventions to bar a
coastal State from using its continental shelf for placing its military installations
there. First, since a proclaimed shelfis subject to the coastal State's sovereignty for
purposes of exploration and exploitation, the coastal State has the inherent right of
self-defense under the Charter to defend those interests. 24S Second, to the extent
that the LOAC, which includes the law of naval warfare, might apply to a situation,
those bodies of law are separate from the LOS.246 The relationship between
belligerents' operations in waters above a neutral's proclaimed continental shelf,
or to use a neutral's shelffor emplacement ofweapons directed against an opposing
belligerent, is more complex; this is analyzed in Chapter V.247
The Seabed Arms Control Treaty forbids placing nuclear weapons, or other
weapons of mass destruction, on the seabed and ocean floor beyond 12 miles from
the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. 248 The treaty does not define weapons of mass destruction, nor does it cover weapons in the water column,
as long as they are not tethered to the bottom, or other weapons, e.g., conventional
mines, that are not weapons of mass destruction. There are opposing positions on
the point, but the foregoing appears to be the better view. 249 From the LOS perspective, all the coastal State obtains with a proclaimed continental shelf is the
right to explore and exploit it for purposes stated in the law of the sea; the shelf is
not subject to an unlimited sovereignty claim. LOS freedoms apply to the water
column; in any event other States' Charter rights to self-defense and LOAC options
are separate from LOS principles.2SO The Treaty recognizes the difference by stating that its terms do not support or prejudice positions under the Territorial Sea
Convention and other aspects of the law of the sea. 2SI Those placing such devices
must have due regard for a coastal State's continental shelf rights, however. 2S2
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c. The Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf and the Tanker War. The Persian
Gulf is a relatively narrow, shallow body of water. 253 For all practical purposes,
there is no deep seabed in the sense of the Continental Shelf Convention or the
LOS Convention. There is no Area within the meaning of the LOS Convention.
Since it is a basin without any continental slope or deep seabed, theoretically the
Gulf has no continental shelf. 254 There are no reports of excessive claims with
respect to Gulf States' offshore sea floor claims. Disputes over offshore islands
continue, however. 255
Insofar as the high seas parts ofthese offshore areas (which in a sense can be considered continental shelves) are concerned, there appears to be no record of
belligerents' impairing usage by neutral coastal States during the Tanker War.
Belligerents and neutrals alike owed neutrals due regard for those neutrals' exercise ofcontinental shelfrights. 256 To be sure, there is evidence ofattacks on dhows,
i.e., possibly vessels operating above a proclaimed shelf, or other vessels that may
have been servicing installations on a shelf.257 Since these incidents are concerned
as much with attacks on a ship engaged in navigation in the Gulf, analysis of the legitimacy of the attacks appears in Chapters III and V. Iraq attacked Iranian offshore installations that may have been connected with shelf operations, including
pumping stations and other facilities. 258 Because these were attacks by a belligerent upon its opponent, the law of armed conflict applied through operation of the
LOS other rules clauses, by then a treaty and customary norm. 259 Chapter V discusses legitimacy of these attacks from an LOAC perspective, and Chapter VI examines them in the context of the developing law of the maritime environment. 260
The United States responded to Iranian attacks on US-flagged tankers by destroying Iranian offshore platforms that were a source of the attacks and which
may have been connected with shelf activities legitimate under the LOS.261 This
was a legitimate act ofself-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, whether seen as
ajus cogens-protected right or as trumping the LOS.262 As explained in Chapter V,
the attacks were also proportional under the law of naval warfare;263 since there
was no appreciable environmental damage resulting from the attacks, no environmental derogation claim was at stake. 264 Thus to the extent the attacks might not
have enjoyed primacy as exercise of a jus cogens norm of the inherent right of
self-defense or as a superior treaty norm under Article 103 of the Charter, the
United States had a customary right to respond in self-defense under the law of naval warfare, which as part of the LOAC applied under the circumstances in derogation of law of the sea norms through the other rules clauses of the LOS
conventions, which are now customary law as well. 265 In terms of behavior toward
Gulf States not parties to the conflict, i.e., those which had proclaimed neutrality,
the United States and other maritime powers that sent naval forces to the Gulf
owed due regard for their operations and installations in proclaimed continental
shelves. 266 There is no evidence that the United States or other powers did not do
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i.e., there appears to have been no violations of the law of the sea as it pertained
to continental shelves in the Gulf.

SO;

4. The Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
Commentators have traced States' claims to territorial seas from the Middle
Ages through the 1958 LOS conference, the 1958 conventions, the unsuccessful attempts to establish a limit in 1960 and thereafter. 267 Aside from examining general
claims patterns, with particular examination of the 1958 Conventions and 1982
LOS Convention, those waters will not be navigated again. This Part also reviews
principles of the contiguous zone. Claims going beyond the territorial seas, apart
from the contiguous zone, however measured and for whatever purpose, have been
addressed in previous parts, and that material will not be repeated here either.
a. Analysis: From a Three-Mile Rule to a Twelve-Mile Norm Under the 1982
LOS Convention. " ... [B]y 1926, the three-mile limit was in every sense a rule of
international law," according to the commentators. 268 However, even in the early
part of this century there were exceptions.
The trend had begun with Great Britain's Customs Consolidation Act of 1876,
which asserted a one-league belt ofwaters in which England claimed a right to visit
and search all vessels. 269 "Of all the factors influencing the growth of the threemile rule-treaties, laws, court decisions, and writings of the experts-the...
Act... probably went the furthest in establishing the three-mile limit as a rule in
the law of nations.,,270 (At the time, ofcourse, Brittania ruled the waves, not only in
terms of merchant fleet tonnage, but also because of the Royal Navy.) Two years
later Britain asserted criminal jurisdiction over only one league ofcoastal waters in
the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act. 271 The United States had claimed a
three-mile territorial sea in 1793, when US Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson
wrote the British and French ministers to the United States. 272 A year later Congress passed legislation asserting criminal jurisdiction; the United States had become the first country to formally claim three miles. 273 To be sure, the rest of the
nineteenth century saw conflicting claims that spilled over into the twentieth century,274 but by 1901 the United States had formally reaffirmed three miles as its
territorial sea. 275 Its short-lived Naval War Code ofl900 had similarly asserted a
three-mile limit for armed conflict situations. 276 Other States, bowing to British
diplomatic pressure, began to redefine their territorial belt as three miles. 277 Arbitrations and prewar treaties seemed to point the way to universal acceptance of the
norm. 278 However, before 1926 there remained substantial dissent. Hague Convention VIII (1907) forbade laying mines within three miles of a neutral's coast,
but the Second Hague Peace Conference failed to agree on a uniform general rule
for naval warfare situations.279 Just before and during World War I important
maritime powers, e.g., France, Italy, Russia, and other States asserted claims to

Law of the Sea

261

more than three miles. 280 And although the International Law Association had
modified its stance by 1924 to opt for a three-mile limit,281 the Institute ofInternational Law declared for the same limit but added that "International usage may
justify the recognition of an extent greater or less .... ,,282 In 1927 the influential
Harvard Research Draft supported a similar basic three-mile limit wi th an adjacent
band of the high seas subject to customs, navigation, health or police regulations,
"or for [a State's] immediate protection.,,283 The 1930 First Act of the League of
Nations Conference for the Codification ofInternational Law could not agree on a
limit. 284 Iran claimed a 6-mile territorial sea in 1934, recognizing a right of innocent passage for warships, including submarines navigating on the surface, except
for vessels in a state of war, in which case the law of maritime neutrality would apply. Iran also reserved the right to prohibit foreign ships from entering certain territorial waters, i.e., "closed zones," for national security reasons. 285
Bilateral agreements between the United States and its major trading partners,
1924-30, to assist in US national prohibition law enforcement, carefully divided
between those nations agreeing with the United States on the three-mile limit and
those which reserved their position on the issue. 286
After World War II certain Latin American States tried to fold claims for a wide
continental shelf and EEZ into a territorial sea of the same breadth; the claims
were protested. 287 The Soviet bloc and the People's Republic of China asserted
12-mile territorial sea claims during 1950-60.288 In 1951 the United Kingdom conceded Norway's historic claim to a four-mile limit in the Fisheries Case, which resolved a method of determining baselines. 289 In 1949 Saudi Arabia declared a
6-mile territorial sea as part of its sovereignty.290 In 1955 the Philippines, and in
1957Indonesia, asserted a 12-mile territorial belt around their archipelagoes. 291 In
1958 Saudi Arabia expanded its territorial sea claim to 12 miles.z92 The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention failed to settle on a limit for the territorial sea, but declares
coastal State sovereignty over the belt of coastal waters and airspace. 293 The next
year Iran claimed a 12-mile territorial sea.294
The Convention does, however, allow coastal States to declare a contiguous
zone of up to 12 miles, subject to opposite States' agreeing on a dividing line (in the
absence of which the median line from baselines forms the division), for: preventing infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or health regulations within
its territory or territorial sea, and for punishment of infringements of these regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. 295 The contiguous zone is
part of the high seas outside of the territorial sea under the Territorial Sea Convention. 296 Thus in the case of the United States, which had a 3-mile territorial sea in
1958, the outer 9 miles ofits 12-mile contiguous zone297 were high seas. The High
Seas Convention provides for a right of hot pursuit from the zone if coastal State
authorities have reason to believe a foreign ship has violated its customs, fiscal, immigration or health laws in the coastal State's territory or territorial sea. 298 Iran
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had proclaimed a 12-mile "zone of maritime supervision" when a 6-mile territorial
sea was claimed in 1934; the claim was amended in 1959 to assert a 12-mile territorial sea.299 Saudi Arabia had claimed a 6-mile contiguous zone for "maritime surveillance" relating to security, navigation and fiscal matters beyond its 6-mile
coastal sea in 1949; this was expanded to a 12-mile contiguous zone, coincident
with the Territorial Sea Convention limit, in 1958. However, just before the 1958
UN LOS Conference, Saudi Arabia expanded its contiguous zone to 18 miles and
its territorial sea to 12 miles. 300
The Convention establishes methods for measuring baselines for the territorial
sea,301 and declares rules for innocent passage through the territorial sea. All
States' ships enjoy a right ofinnocent passage through the territorial sea, subject to
the Convention's other principles. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for traversing that sea without entering internal waters, for proceeding to
internal waters, or for making for the high seas from internal waters. Passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only incident to ordinary navigation or if necessary because offorce majeure or distress. Passage is innocent "so long as it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." Such passage
must take place in conformity with the Convention and "other rules of internationallaw. " Foreign flag fishing vessel passage is not considered innocent if these
vessels do not observe published coastal State regulations designed to prevent
these vessels from fishing in the territorial sea. Submarines must navigate on the
surface and show their flag,302 unless a State consents to submerged transit; no
State has done so publicly.303 Aircraft do not have a right of innocent passage
above the territorial sea,304 unless allowed to do so by the coastal State; most
coastal States have agreed to allow commercial aircraft overflight, but not necessarily military or other State aircraft. 305 Coastal States may not hamper innocent
passage and must give appropriate publicity to dangers to navigation within their
territorial seas of which they have knowledge. 306 However, surface warships enjoy
a right of innocent passage. 307
Coastal States may act to prevent passage that is not innocent. For ships proceeding to internal waters, a coastal State may take necessary steps to prevent
breaches of conditions to which admission of those ships to those waters is subject.
Subject to a provision related to straits passage declaring that there can be no suspension of international straits passage, a coastal State may, without discrimination among foreign-flag vessels, suspend temporarily innocent passage of these
vessels in specified areas of its territorial sea if the suspension is necessary for protection of the coastal State's security, and only after the suspension has been published. 308 How long a temporary suspension may be imposed is not clear, but it
cannot be factually permanent. 309 Foreign-flag vessels in innocent passage must
conform to coastal State regulations enacted in conformity with the Convention
and "other rules of international law," as well as regulations relating to transport
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and navigation. 310 The Convention also provides for charges on merchant ships
and criminal and civil jurisdiction over merchantmen. 311 All of the foregoing applies to government ships operated for commercial purposes, and all but the civil
jurisdiction rules apply to government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. The Convention does not affect government ships' immunities enjoyed under the Convention or "other rules of internationallaw.,,312 If a warship does not
comply with a coastal State's regulations on territorial sea passage and disregards a
request for compliance, the coastal State may require that warship to leave the territorial sea. 313
A 1960 conference failed to resolve the issue of the width of the territorial sea;
debate centered around a 6 or 12-mile belt, and a compromise of a 6-mile territorial
sea coupled with a 6-mile fishing zone failed by one vote. 314 The 1965 Restatement
(Second) cautiously says that "A state does not violate the rights of another state by
setting the breadth of the territorial sea at three nautical miles,,,31S but otherwise
generally confirms Convention principles. 316 Whether the Iranian and Saudi
claims as ofl980 to 12-mile territorial seas were legitimate is debatable,317 but by
the end of the war they were in the clear majority.
The 1982 LOS Convention declares a 12-mile belt as the maximum claim over
which a coastal State may claim sovereignty, including its airspace, seabed and
subsoi1. 318 The LOS Convention adopts Territorial Sea Convention baselines
measuring methodology, adding provisions for low-tide elevations, mouths of
rivers and reefs, and states that offshore installations and artificial islands are not
permanent harbor works in determining baselines near ports. 319 The Restatement
(Third) takes the LOS Convention position on breadth of the territorial sea,320 noting that some countries, including the United States at that time (1987), might
claim less than 12 miles. 321
In 1958,9 of 75 coastal States had claimed a 12-mile territorial sea; 2 claimed
over 12, and 45 asserted the traditional3-mile limit. By 196526 of85 coastal States
claimed a 12-mile sea, 3 claimed over 12, and 32 claimed a 3-mile limit. A decade
later the figures were: ofl16 coastal nations, 54 claimed a 12-mile sea, 20 claimed
more than 12 miles, and only 28 clung to the 3-mile limit. Within a year of the beginning of the Tanker War (1980) the numbers were: of 131 coastal States, 76
claimed a 12-mile limit, 25 claimed more, and 23 held to a 3-mile limit. 322 This was
the trend as delegates began negotiating the 1982 LOS Convention in the Seventies. It continued as a trend as the Tanker War began in 1980.
Besides permitting a 12-mile territorial sea claim,323 the 1982 LOS Convention
copies the Territorial Sea Convention contiguous zone provisions; its breadth has
been expanded to 24 miles.324 The LOS Convention provides that at least the outer
12 miles of a declared contiguous zone are subject to high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight if a coastal State has declared a 12-mile territorial sea. If the littoral State has a territorial sea of less than 12 miles, it may declare a contiguous

264

The Tanker War

zone ofup to 24 miles, with the balance of the zone retaining high seas freedoms. 325
The coastal State's right of hot pursuit from its contiguous zone under the LOS
Convention follows High Sea Convention principles. 326 The LOS Convention
adds a new provision, permitting States to control traffic in archaeological or historical objects found at sea, stating a presumption that these objects' removal from
a contiguous zone without coastal State approval results in an infringement within
coastal State territory or territorial sea of its contiguous zone-related laws. 327
In 1983 the US Oceans Policy Statement recognized the rights of other States in
waters off their coasts, as reflected in the LOS Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, i.e., if a coastal State recognized the US' and other countries' rights and freedoms in the waters of the coastal State. The United States would exercise and assert
its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis consistent
with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention. The United States would
not acquiesce in other States' unilateral acts designed to restrict the international
community's rights and freedoms in navigation, overflight and other related high
seas uses. The United States continued to claim a 3-mile territorial sea, however.328 The result was that the United States would recognize other countries'
valid claims under the 1982 LOS Convention navigational articles. 329 In that year,
ofl39 coastal States, 79 claimed a 12-mile territorial sea, the number claiming over
12 miles had declined to 20, and those claiming a 3-mile limit stood at 25. 330 In
1987 the Restatement (Third) recognized a 12-mile territorial sea. 331 The next year
the United States claimed a 12-mile territorial sea in accordance with the LOS
Convention. 332
By 1989 the number of States claiming a 3-mile limit had declined to 10, among
them Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE; a decade later it was down to 4. By 1989 Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had joined the United States and 103 other States in
proclaiming a 12-mile territorial sea. 333 Whether a State was party to the LOS
Convention or not, and many 12-mile claimants were by 1997, it is fairly safe to say
the 12-mile limit had become a customary norm by the end of the Tanker War
(1988), and more certainly so a decade later. 334 A few countries-19 in 1989 and 15
in 1997-continued to assert territorial sea claims greater than 12 miles. 335 These
were the subject of US and others' diplomatic protests. 336
New rules for innocent passage was another major change between the Territorial Sea Convention and the LOS Convention. The basic right ofinnocent passage,
the meaning of passage, and the rule that submarines must navigate on the surface
unless there is coastal State consent that they remain submerged, remain the same,
as do rights of protection for the coastal State, principles for charges for traversing
the territorial sea and criminal and civil jurisdiction applicable to all ships, and the
statement that with certain exceptions in the treaty, the Convention does not affect
immunity of warships and government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. The rule-that if a warship does not comply with coastal State regulations
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on territorial sea passage and disregards a request for compliance made to it, a
coastal State may require that warship to leave the territorial sea-was also retained, the Convention adding that the offending war vessel must leave "immediately.,,337
Principal innovations in the LOS Convention deal with defining innocent passage; laws and regulations a coastal State may impose relating to innocent passage;
providing for sea lanes, traffic separation schemes, foreign nuclear-powered ships
and vessels carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances;
a coastal State's duties; definition of a warship; and flag State responsibilities for
damage caused by a warship or a government ship operated for non-commercial
purposes.
As in the Territorial Sea Convention, the LOS Convention declares that passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the coastal State's peace, good order or security. Such passage must take place in conformity with the Convention
"and with other rules of internationallaw,,,338 referring to the law of armed conflict. 339 The LOS Convention enumerates activities during passage considered
"prejudicial to the peace, good order or security" of the coastal State:
(a) any threat or use offorce against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter ofthe United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal
State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to
the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary [i.e., health] laws and regulations
of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to [the] Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other
facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 340

Most commentators say the list is exclusive. 341 As under the Territorial Sea Convention, submarines transiting the territorial sea must navigate on the surface and
show their ensign,342 and innocent passage does not include a right ofoverflight. 343
A coastal State may adopt regulations, in conformity with the Convention and
"other rules of international law," i.e., the LOAC,344 relating to innocent passage
through the territorial sea with respect to safety of navigation and regulation of
maritime traffic; protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities
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or installations; protection of cables and pipelines; conservation of the sea's living
resources; prevention of infringement of the coastal State's fisheries laws; preservation of the coastal State's environment and prevention, reduction and control of
pollution of the coastal State; marine scientific research and hydrographic
surveys; and prevention of infringement of the coastal State's customs, fiscal, immigration or health laws. These laws do not apply to foreign ship design, construction, manning or equipment unless the laws give effect to "generally accepted
international rules or standards." The coastal State must publicize these laws. Foreign ships in innocent passage must comply with these laws and all generally accepted international regulations relating to prevention of collisions at sea. 345 The
Convention list of regulations is "exhaustive and inclusive.,,346
The Convention allows coastal States to require foreign ships exercising the
right of innocent passage to use sea lanes and traffic separation schemes, where
necessary for navigational safety. Tankers, nuclear-powered vessels and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances or materials
may be required to confine their passage to these sea lanes. A coastal State must indicate these sea lanes and separation schemes on publicized charts. 347 Foreign nuclear-powered vessels and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or
noxious substances must carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for them by international agreements while in innocent passage. 348
The LOS Convention modified the coastal State's duties and obligations with
respect to innocent passage. Besides declaring that a coastal State may not hamper
innocent passage in form or fact, the Convention stated that in particular, in applying the Convention or regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, a
coastal State may not "Ca) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the
practical effect of denying or impairing... innocent passage; or (b) discriminate in
form or fact against ships of any State or against ships carrying cargoes to, from or
on behalf of any State." As in the 1958 Convention, a coastal State must publicize
any danger to navigation, of which it has knowledge, in its territorial sea. A coastal
State may suspend innocent passage temporarily in specified areas ofits territorial
sea if suspension is necessary for protecting its security. This suspension may take
effect only after it has been published.349
If a warship or other non-commercial government vessel does not comply with
legitimate coastal State regulation concerning innocent passage, the flag State
bears responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from this
non-compliance. 350
Despite Territorial Sea Convention and LOS Convention articles according a
right of warship unnanounced and unimpeded innocent passage, 351 as ofl989, 43
States, including Iran, claimed a right to control foreign-flag warship entry into
their territorial seas, requiring prior authorization or permission, prior notice, or
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limits on numbers present at one time. 352 Twenty-six States, including Iraq and
Oman, specifically recognized the right of warship innocent passage. 353
By 1996 57 States had claimed contiguous zones of 4 to 24 miles, including Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 354 Although the Congress considered in 1991-92 legislation to extend the US contiguous zone to 24
miles, it failed to pass. 355 In 1999, however, the United States proclaimed a 24-mile
contiguous zone, as reflected in the LOS Convention. The US proclamation stated
that high seas freedoms, e.g., of navigation and overflight, apply in the zone and
that the proclamation did not alter US or other States' rights and duties in the US
EEZ. 356 Two countries bordering the Persian Gulfwere among 18 States asserting
a right to include protecting national security interests; Iran did so in 1993 and
Saudi Arabia at some earlier date. The United States and other countries have protested most of these claims as not being wi thin righ ts permitted under the Terri torial Sea Convention or the LOS Convention.357 These general security claims
might be contrasted with the US defense zones of the early part of this century,
which limited or temporarily excluded navigation. 358 The latter, promulgated decades before standards were stated in the LOS conventions, would still pass muster
in most cases.
The rules for baselines determinations are virtually the same under the 1958
and 1982 conventions.359 However, the measurement of them has caused numerous diplomatic protests and US FON operations,360 the principal problem being
declarations of straight baselines under the Territorial Sea Convention and the
LOS Convention. 361 If a country claims a territorial sea and a contiguous zone or
other area, e.g., an EEZ, fishing zone or continental shelfbased on erroneous calculation of baselines pushing lines toward the high seas, the result may be that these
areas' outer boundaries will encroach on what should be high seas under the 1958
or 1982 conventions. There have been numerous cases where States have protested
erroneous assertions ofstraight baselines. 362 Ofover 75 States and their dependencies in a 1996 list, 4 countries bordering the Persian Gulf, Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, had baselines the United States considered miscalculated.
However, only those ofIran, Oman and Saudi Arabia were declared before or during the Tanker War. 363 Since the Persian Gulfis so narrow, its coastal States when
asserting claims to the continental shelf, etc., have been forced to divide sovereignty or jurisdiction among them,364 and the only issues related to erroneous
baseline claims involve territorial sea and contiguous zone claims that may be excessive. If these claims were excessive, the result could be that a Persian Gulf
coastal State might claim policing authority365 in a contiguous zone area that is
subject only to high seas law, such law perhaps being limited by legitimate EEZ,
continental shelf, etc., claims considerations.366 Similarly, a territorial sea claim
that extends too far into the high seas could result in claims by the coastal State of
improper activity in the disputed waters, with a counterclaim by the State of the
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flag of, e.g., a transiting warship that the area is high seas for navigational and other
purposes, although perhaps limited by legitimate continental shelf, etc., claims
considerations.
b. Conclusions. A US movement toward ratifying the 1982 LOS Convention may
mean that tangles of claims resulting from Territorial Sea Convention deficiencies
will gradually be eliminated. However, issues of warship innocent passage, excessive baseline claims, excessive territorial sea and contiguous zone claims and disputes over whether the LOS Convention lists of activities for declaring passage
prejudicial to coastal State peace, good order or security is exclusive, will continue
to fuel debate on the meaning of the LOS Convention as it applies to the territorial
sea and contiguous zone.
c. The Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, and the Tanker War. There were few
LOS issues related to territorial sea or contiguous zone passage during the Tanker
War. Although Iran purported to restrict the right of warship innocent passage in
her territorial sea, there is no record of any incidents arising during the Tanker
War; Iran's claim to assert national security as a basis for contiguous zone jurisdiction came over a decade after the conflict.367 There is no record of Saudi Arabia's
claim of national security for her contiguous zone368 figuring in the war. Although
many Persian Gulf States began the war with territorial seas ofless than 12 miles,
by the end of the conflict most had asserted a 12-mile belt as the 1982 LOS Convention and customary law allow, and two (Iraq, Oman) had explicitly said warships
were entitled to innocent passage like merchantmen. 369 Saudi Arabia proclaimed
a safety corridor through her and GCC States' territorial sea, presumably with
those States' authorization, to facilitate tanker traffic; there was nothing in the law
of the sea forbidding this. Indeed, the LOS Convention allows establishment ofsea
lanes and traffic separation schemes. Similarly, Iran was free under the LOS to direct coastal convoying ofits ships in its territorial sea as a means of controlling territorial sea traffic lanes and traffic separation. However, these convoys were
subject to Iraqi attack under the LOAC if they were carrying war-fighting or
war-sustaining goods, e.g., oi1.370
Two aspects ofIranian naval maneuvers deserve mention, however. When Iran
conducted naval maneuvers in Saudi territorial waters,371 Iran committed a clear
violation of the LOS Convention372 and a violation of the more general standard of
the Territorial Sea Convention, i.e., which forbids "Passage. : . prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State.,,373 Given the Iranian track record by then, these maneuvers were clearly prejudicial to Saudi Arabia under both
the LOS Convention and the Territorial Sea Convention. The maneuvers, depending on their nature, also may have violated the law of naval warfare,374 applicable under the other rules clauses of the Territorial Sea Convention and the LOS
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Convention. 375 On the other hand, to the extent that Iran proposed to conduct naval maneuvers in its own territorial sea, whether part of territorial waters permitted under the LOS or high seas included within an excessive claim due to
erroneous baseline claims,376 such military activity was allowable; its territorial
sea was under Iranian sovereignty.377 Only ifIran coupled these maneuvers with
closure of its territorial sea more than temporarily, without equal treatment of all
seafarers, or without notice378 was Iraq's protest379 justified. The record does not
show that any of this was the case. However, to the extent Iranian maneuvers may
have affected traffic through the Strait ofHormuz, which was nearby, different criteria, i.e., those for straits passage, were involved.380

s. Access to Ports, Roadsteads and Internal Waters
"Among writers, the better line of authority supports the view that as a point of
law, foreign merchant vessels in port are subject to the local jurisdiction.... On the
other hand, ... [other authorities] indicate that there are exemptions from the local
jurisdiction as a matter of right, and not merely as a matter of courtesy or comity.,,381 Similarly, territorial waters and ports are, "as a rule, open to men-of-war
as well as to merchantmen of all nations, provided they are not excluded by special
international treaties or special Municipal Laws of the littoral States.,,382 Nevertheless, "[t]he status of the waters in ports, harbors, roadsteads, and the mouths of
rivers is ... different from that of the waters of the maritime belt... ; for the former
are national or internal, and the latter territorial.,,383 While Oppenheim's treatise
made these statements before the LOS conventions were negotiated, they are still
true. Modern port facilities are much more complex today,384 but principles governing access to them are similar.
The ensuing analysis examines the general right of access to internal waters (a
collective term for ports, roadsteads, rivers and canals) for warships and merchant
vessels under the law of the sea. Particular claims for protection of values (e.g.,
power, through attempts to assert jurisdiction over ships) will be noted. The geographic arena for analysis ends, however, at the water's edge; no attempt will be
made to explore manipUlation of the wealth or other processes through devices
such as customs duties, or access to the land through immigration.

a. Analysis. Principles of relatively exclusive coastal State control of the territorial
sea apply to internal waters. They are part of the State's sovereign territory.385 Internal waters have been variously defined and titled,386 and in some cases national
legislation whose primary impact is from the sea, e.g., the US Inland Rules of the
Nautical Road,387 governing signals and lights for transiting US navigable waters,
may require compliance while in coastal State territorial seas. 388 The principal
concern here is the arena of port facilities, "a place where ships are in the habit of
coming for the purpose ofloading or unloading, embarking or disembarking;,,389
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roadsteads; and access to these, as through the territorial sea, internal waters and
navigable rivers. "Internal waters," for purposes of this study, are, as stated in the
Territorial Sea Convention, "Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the
territorial sea;,,390 this is also the 1982 LOS Convention definition. 391 Since the
outermost permanent harbor works forming an integral part ofa harbor system are
part of the coast,392 and the coast is the fundamental baseline,393 waters on the
other side of the line are internal waters. Roadsteads, if normally used for loading,
unloading and anchoring ships, and if wholly or partly outside the territorial sea's
outer limit, are included in the territorial sea. 394 Thus roadsteads within the
territorial sea and extending outward into the high seas create a jurisdictional
"bulge,,395 in favor of the littoral State. On the other hand, if a roadstead is partly
within territorial and internal waters, the baselines approach 396 operates to split it
into two parts. The LOS Convention adds that offshore installations and artificial
islands are not considered permanent harbor works 397 and therefore are not part of
the territorial sea. Since the baseline division for rivers flowing into the sea is a
straight line across the mouth,398 all landward river waters are internal in nature,
except rivers forming a boundary or rivers declared open to all traffic by treaty.399
The Shan aI-Arab is an example of such a waterway.400
Early nineteenth century State practice permitted receiving, during peacetime,
vessels of all countries into... ports, to whatever party belonging, and underwhatever
flag sailing, pirates excepted, requiring of them only the payment of the duties, and
obedience to the laws while under their jurisdiction without adverting to... whether
they had committed any violation of the allegiance or laws obligatory on them in the
countries to which they belonged,... in assuming such a flag, or in any other
respect.401

That is still the rule today.402

Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon restated the customary right of foreign warships to enter ports in time ofpeace unless local law closed the ports. 403 Customary
law once stated that during war enemy warships can be kept from ports by force,
e.g., blocking access by obstructions that result in also barring neutral merchant
traffic, but such obstructions should "be retained only as long as needed for belligerent purposes.,,404 If a channel for nonbelligerent shipping was left open, with
designated hours for travel, then customary principles would be satisfied.405 Today the LOS Convention allows closure of the territorial sea on a temporary basis,
without discrimination in form or fact among foreign ships, ifsuspension is necessary to protect a coastal State's security and if the coastal State publishes notice of
closure. 406 Territorial sea closure under these circumstances necessarily implicates closure of a port within the territorial sea and those on the internal waters
side of the line. 407 The coastal State and the flag State of a transiting warship or
merchantman retain their self-defense rights under these circumstances, the
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coastal State its territorial interests and the vessel's flag State its interests in the
ship.408
The 1982 Convention also follows prior rules in the 1965 Transit Trade Convention governing landlocked States, i.e., those countries that have no seacoast, the
Territorial Sea and High Seas Conventions,409 and the 1921 Freedom of Transit
Convention,410 and principles in the GATT, art. V.411 Landlocked States have
rights of access to and from the sea to exercise their rights under the law of the sea,
including transit through countries (transit States) whose territory a landlocked
State must use to access the sea. Landlocked and transit States must agree on terms
of transit through bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements.412 Landlocked
and transit States may agree upon overland pipelines in place of rail, road or water
transport.413 Vessels flying a landlocked State flag must be treated equally in maritime ports.414 Transit States, "in the exercise of their full sovereignty over their
territory,... have the right to take all measures necessary to ensure that the rights
and facilities provided for in this Part [of the LOS Convention] shall in no way infringe their legitimate interests.,,41S The Transit Trade Convention declares that
it does not prescribe belligerents' and neutrals' rights and duties during war, saying that it continues in force during wartime "so far as such rights and duties [of
belligerents and neutrals] permit." The Convention is also subject to the Charter. 416 The LOS Convention and the 1958 LOS conventions achieve the same result through application of the other rules clauses, which declare that the law of
armed conflict applies in certain situations.417 To the extent that Trade Transit
Convention, the LOS Convention and High Seas or Territorial Sea Convention
provisions coincide, they reinforce customary law on the subject of access oflandlocked States.418
The LOS Convention prevails over the Territorial Sea Convention for parties
to the LOS Convention;419 however, as noted above, many of its provisions are
similar to or identical with the 1958 Convention, and therefore should be given
similar or identical application. The LOS Convention also provides that it does
not alter States' rights and obligations arising from other treaties compatible with
it if they do not affect enjoyment of other States' rights and obligations under the
Convention,420 nor does the Convention affect international agreements expressly
permitted or preserved by it.421 Moreover, the LOS Convention must be considered in connection with other sources.422 Similarly, the Territorial Sea Convention does not affect treaties already in force423 and must be considered in
connection with custom and other sources. 424 Therefore, examination of past
trends in the law, with particular emphasis on US practice, is appropriate.
States have exercised the option stated in Schooner Exchange425 to limit entry of
foreign warships, particularly during times of crisis. In 1805, seven years before
Exchange, the US Congress authorized the Presidentto forbid entrance ofa foreign
armed vessel or its master upon proof that a trespass, tort or spoilation had been
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committed, or that vessels trading in US commerce had been interrupted or vexed.
The legislation expired in 1807.426 In that year President Thomas Jefferson excluded British vessels by proclamation because of the Chesapeake affair. 427 In 1820
Congress forbade warship entry into all but designated major commercial ports except in distress situations. The legislation expired two years later. 428 During the
Civil War President Abraham Lincoln directed that foreign warships would be
treated on the basis of reciprocity accorded US warships abroad. 429 (By 1878, however, the United States had declared an open-ports policy, reserving the right to
ask foreign warships to leave if the law of nations or US treaties required departure).430 Other States continued to claim exclusionary or regulatory rights,431 and
by 1909 the United States, through the Navy Department General Board, could except certain ports from warship visits. Otherwise, no permission was required. 432
Besides customary claims of merchant ships' right to enter another State's ports
to load or unload cargo, the United States and other nations have concluded bilateral agreements (for the United States, often in the form of peace, amity or friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties), usually guaranteeing reciprocal
rights. The first for the United States came in 1778 with France,433 and the trend
continued through the next two centuries. Warships were occasionally given access on the same terms as merchantmen. Often warships were not mentioned;
sometimes they were given restricted access. Coastal trading, i.e., cabotage, was
nearly always reserved for port State ships. Many agreements included most favored nation (MFN) clauses,434 which grants all favors granted to others in the
past or future, to other States.435 Other States have negotiated similar networks. 436
In some situations, e.g., China, entry was restricted to designated Chinese ports,
with nothing said about Chinese vessels trading in US ports.437 There is nothing
in the record of the latter treaties to indicate that these agreements restricted entry
for national security reasons; undoubtedly national policies of exclusion of foreigners generally, and foreignors' ideas, were behind the Asian exclusion policies.
If one accepts the view that these "many hundreds of bilateral treaties,,438 create a
customary right,439 then by the early twentieth century a right of entry founded in
custom existed, at least for merchantmen.440 The 1982 LOS Convention would exclude MFN clause applicability to agreements with landlocked States for goods
and people transiting countries to and from the sea.441
In 1898 an Institute ofInternational Law resolution had provided that "As a
general rule access to ports... is presumed to be open to foreign vessels.,,442 By
1928 the Institute had changed its resolution to read, "as a general rule access to
ports ... is open to foreign vessels.,,443 Lowe, citing the rapporteur for the Institute,
asserts the 1928 formulation was de lege ferenda. 444 Nonetheless, if the proposition
is accepted that the hundreds of bilateral agreements, and practice under them by
1928, amounted to custom, which under traditional analysis when coupled with a
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bilateral agreement between contending States overrides the secondary source of
publicists,445 then today there is a basic right of peacetime entry.
The 1923 Convention and Statute Concerning Regime of Maritime Ports provided for free and equal access of all vessels, public and private, to parties' ports,
subject to equality of usual port charges. 446 The Convention does not apply "to
warships or vessels performing police or administrative functions, or... exercising
any kind of public authority, or... vessels which for the time being are exclusively
employed for... Naval, Military or Air Forces of a State.,,447 The Convention also
does not apply to fishing vessels, their catch, or cabotage. 448 The Statute does not
require admitting passengers or goods where health, security or municipal laws
forbid such.449 States may suspend equality of treatment, but this is subject to
World Court review. 450 An "emergency affecting the safety of the State or the vital
interests of the country may, in exceptional cases, and for as short a period as
possible, involve a deviation from" equal treatment.451 Nor does the Convention
prescribe belligerents' and neutrals' wartime duties, although the Convention
"continue[s] in force in time of war so far as such rights and duties permit.,,452
These latter clauses are consistent with the LOS Convention and Territorial Sea
Convention suspension and their "other rules" clauses.453 If they are not, the LOS
Convention clause paramount454 or the later in time treaty construction rules455
would give primacy to the other rules clauses. The Ports Convention is also subject
to the Charter and the right of self-defense.456 By 1999, 42 States were party, including Iraq since 1929; treaty succession principles may move the total up.457
The 1921 Barcelona Convention and Statute Concerning Freedom ofTransit has
similar terms for vessel transit across the territory of its parties,458 which includes
the territorial sea and inland waters. As of 1999 there were 33 parties, none of
which bordered the Persian Gulf; many are also Ports Convention parties.459 The
Barcelona Convention is subject to the same considerations, e.g., the Charter, as
the Ports Convention.460
The 1963 Mar del Plata Convention pledges parties' best efforts "to prevent unnecessary delays to vessels, passengers, crews, cargo and baggage in [administering] laws relating to immigration, public health, customs and other provisions
relative to arrivals and departures of vessels.,,461 The OAS Inter-American Port
and Harbor Conference is charged with adopting standards and recommended
practice for signatory States.462 If a State cannot comply, it must notify the OAS
General Secretariat immediately.463 Although the Convention does not distinguish between merchant ships and warships, its language appears to relate more to
the former. No rules for suspension of territorial sea innocent passage, warships or
armed conflict are stated, but under principles of treaty interpretation applicable
to the Territorial Sea Convention and the LOS Convention, the latter's suspension
provisions and other rules principles, as a matter of custom and treaty law, apply.464 Likewise, the Charter applies in self-defense situations.465 Presently 12
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American States are party to this regional treaty, including the United States.466
To the extent its principles are consistent with the general LOS, the Convention
reinforces them. 467
The 1965 Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime Traffic repeats
Mar del Plata pledges468 but excludes warships and pleasure yachts from coverage. 469 Allowing better treatment under national law or other treaties, the Convention also permits "temporary measures ... necessary to preserve public morality,
order and security or to prevent the introduction or spread of diseases or pests affecting public health, animals or plants." Matters for which the Convention does
not provide are subject to nationallaws. 470 No specific provisions declare when
territorial sea innocent passage may be suspended, or the effect of armed conflict,
but under principles of treaty interpretation applicable to the Territorial Sea Convention and the LOS Convention, these rules as treaty and customary law apply.471 Likewise, the Charter applies in self-defense situations.472 Eighty States,
including Iran and Iraq, are party to the Convention, Iraq's accession dating from
1976.473 To the extent the Convention's principles are consistent with the general
LOS, they reinforce them. 474
The results of arbitral awards are consistent with LOS principles. The Saudi
Arabia-ARAMCO arbitration (1958) confirmed that "according to a great principle of public international law, the ports of every State must be open to foreign
merchant vessels and can only be closed when the vital interests of the State so require.,,475 The Kronprins GustafAdolf arbitration, considering Sweden-US bilateral agreements,476 noted the right of policing outbound wartime traffic stated in
the treaties derogated from a general right offree navigation to and from ports, also
recited in the bilaterals.477
In 1945 Hyde said that there was a corresponding obligation upon each maritime power not to deprive foreign vessels of commerce of access to all of its
ports. 478 Similarly, the Institute ofInternational Law returned to the subject in
1957, declared for free access of commercial vessels, save in exceptional circumstances "imposed by imperative reasons .... [I]t is consistent with general practice... to permit free access to ports and harbors by such vessels.,,479 Colomb os
thus aptly summarized competing claims for ports in 1967:
(i) in time of peace, commercial ports must be left open to international traffic. The
liberty of access to ports granted to foreign vessels implies their right to load and
unload their cargoes; embark and disembark their passengers.... Freedom for
foreign vessels to enterthe ports of a State implies the rightto load and unload goods;
(ii) no port can ever be shut against a foreign ship seeking shelter from tempest or
compelled to enter it in distress; (iii) purely militarypons may be closed to all foreign
warships or merchant vessels on the ground of justifiable precaution; (iv) entry of
ships of war even into commercial ports may be subjected to certain restrictions both
as regards the number of vessels allowed to enter and the length of their stay.480
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Whiteman took essentially the same position in 1965.481 TheRestatement (Second),
Foreign Relations said in 1965 that "In the case of vessels not in military service, the
ports of a state are open to their visit without any prior notification, except where
the state has expressly provided otherwise.,,482 For military vessels, the Restatement said "notification ofan in tended visit is customary. It is not necessary that the
coastal state expressly communicate... its consent to the visit. ... [T]hat it does not
expressly prohibit the visit is sufficient consent.,,483 Although comments and reporters' notes for these Restatement sections do not support these propositions, it is
clear the Restatement drafters saw a general right of entry under international law
for merchant ships and warships, subject to advance notice for the warship and a
right ofexclusion otherwise, presumably by international agreement or special notice from the littoral State, as in the case of quarantine for plague. O'Connell says
there is no general port access right, arguing that if a State opens its ports, it must
open them to all merchantmen, subject to usual rules pertaining to health, etc. A
State may close its port or ports but must do so as to all ships.484
The Restatement (Third) takes no clear position on warship entry: "In general,
maritime ports are open to foreign ships on condition of reciprocity,... but the
coastal state may temporarily suspend access in exceptional cases for imperative
reasons, such as the security of the state or public health.,,485 The reporters' note
does not mention warships, being content to say that "States may impose .. special
restrictions on certain categories ofships[,]" citing Convention on Liability ofOperators of Nuclear-Powered Ships and New Zealand's barring US nuclear-powered
ships, i.e., US warships, from its ports. 486 The likely Restatement position appears
to be that merchantmen have an unfettered right to enter foreign ports, subject to
principles of temporary closure for security and other reasons, and that there is a
presumption that warships may also enter but subject to permission from the
coastal State. (The Restatement (Third) is very clear, however, in saying that warships have a right ofinnocent passage,487 as distinguished from right of entry into
port without coastal State permission.)
Recent United States bilateral agreements involving some former Soviet bloc
States and the People's RepUblic of China (PRC) may evidence a trend toward less
open access. Agreements with the PRC, Poland and the former USSR all provide
for advance notice-24 hours to four days-with respect to any merchant vessel
wishing to enter port. 488 The agreements do not apply to warships or fishing vessels.489 By clear implication, permission to enter any party's port requires advance
notice and permission.
The PRC and USSR Agreements designate ports for entry in each country, the
PRC agreement stating that the list is subject to review. Notably absent from the
lists are major ports related to defense installations-e.g., in the former USSR,
Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok; in the United States for the former USSR,
Charleston, South Carolina; all Rhode Island ports; Norfolk, Virginia area; San
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Diego, California; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. However, some ports with nearby defense facilities are included: in the former USSR, Murmansk, Arkhangel'sk,
Odessa, Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), Yalta, among 40 ports open; in the
United States, Seattle and Newport, Rhode Island among ports open to the
PRC.490
These recent bilaterals reflect the present status of competing claims today for
voluntary access to ports. There is a general right of access to ports for merchant
ships to discharge or load cargo in time of peace. To the extent that the former
USSR-US and PRC-US bilateral agreements list ports and thereby deny merchant
vessels under their flags access to others without reason, the agreements could be
said to violate general international law. However, because these are bilateral treaties establishing special or local rules between States,491 affecting only them, there
is no violation of international law. Special State interests-e.g., quarantine to protect health, customs inspection to prevent smuggling, barring warships to ensure
national security-may override the general claim of access for reasonable periods
of time, and perhaps forever in the case of warships. For example, a quarantine exclusion could be imposed during the epidemic. Strict customs enforcement, during an actual or anticipated influx of illicit goods, might be required for years, e.g.,
in narcotics trafficking. Ships considered dangerous because of cargo (e.g., liquid
natural gas, LNG) or propulsion system (e.g., nuclear power), may be regulated as
to access. Ports might be barred to some or all foreign merchan t or war vessel traffic
because of national security concerns for greater or lesser periods of time, ranging
from an indeterminate period oflow-intensity conflict through defined periods of
actual war to a few hours needed for critical fleet or other evolutions. Relief
through access for vessels in distress or driven in byforce majeure remains a universal right with few, if any, restrictions.492
Thus voluntary access to ports by merchantmen stands as a right, with exceptions depending on temporary circumstances such as incidence of infectious disease necessitating quarantine precautions, or, in the situation of relative intensity
of security interests ranging from low-level conflict (e.g., the now-concluded Cold
War) to all-out protective exclusivity (e.g., for vital military installations or during
a hot war) for mili tary ships. However, the right offoreign-flag mili tary vessels to a
right of innocent passage, qualified as, e.g., in the case of submarines, as distinguished from port calls, remains a cardinal rule ofinternationallaw.493
Thus far voluntary port entry has been considered; international law also provides principles for entry in distress or due toforce majeure. As Colomb os stated in
his 1967 summary of principles on ports entry,494 a general claim of right of entry
for all vessels has been recognized for situations of entry in distress or due toforce
majeure. "If a ship is driven in by storm, carried in by mutineers, or seeks refuge for
vital repairs or provisioning, international customary law declares that the local
state shall not take advantage of its necessity," Jessup wrote in 1927.495

Law of the Sea

277

The customary claims developed through court decisions, at least as early as
1803 in England496 and 1809 in the United States.497 French courts applied a similar principle.498 By 1820 the principle had been echoed in US legislation.499 The
United States and other States began to include clauses in bilateral agreements, often FCN treaties with MFN clauses,500 as a further assertion of the unqualified
right of entry due toforce majeure or distress from the eighteenth century onward.
Early treaties often added enemy or piratical attacks as reasons to grant safe haven;
agreements frequently pledged repair facilities availability or return of pirateseized goods. SOI These treaties usually were the same as those permitting free or
qualified entry into ports, or were in agreements touching upon such rights. S02
The treaties did not discriminate against warships, and Schooner Exchange considered immunity of a French privateer, the Balaou, driven into Philadelphia by bad
weather. S03 Legal opinions within the British and US governments, instructions
to their representatives and diplomatic correspondence of the era, further confirm
that the bilaterals did, and do, articulate custom.S04 Nineteenth century arbitrations took the same position. 505 Current commentators also recognize the principle. S06
Ship and aircraft commanders have an obligation to assist those in danger of being
lost at sea. This long recognized duty... permits assistance entry into the territorial
sea or under certain circumstances aircraft without [coastal State permission] ... to
engage in bona fide efforts to render emergency assistance to those in danger or
distress at sea. This right applies only when the location of the danger or distress is
reasonably well known. It does not extend to entering the territorial sea or [its]
airspace to conduct a search. Efforts to render assistance must be undertaken in good
faith and not as a subterfuge.S07
Prudence would suggest notifying the coastal State if possible, perhaps through
national communications, and if the situation warrants and national notification
is not possible, notification by the entering vessel or aircraft. 50S

b. Conclusions. The Territorial Sea Convention and 1982 LOS Convention contributed little that is new to principles governing access to and from inland waters
and ports, etc. The principal points of change or difference are that States can use
their rights to temporarily suspend access to ports and inland waters through the
LOS conventions' provisions for temporary suspension of innocent passage
through the territorial sea,509 and there is a stated right of transit for landlocked
States to and from the sea, subject to agreement with transit States and those
State's rights to protect their "legitimate interests.,,510 The LOS conventions' provisions are subject to the LOAC, which includes the law of naval warfare, through
the other rules clauses in particular situations, whether the LOS conventions articulate treaty or custom based norms. 511 Other general treaty suspension doctrines, e.g., impossibility of performance, fundamental change of circumstances or
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armed conflict,512 might apply. UN Charter principles, e.g., the right of self-defense, which trump treaty and perhaps customary norms, might apply.513

c.TheTankerWarandAccesstoandJromInlandWatersandPorts.Iraqbecamea
de facto landlocked State early in the Tanker War, when Iran seized all ofits coasts
and effectively closed the Shatt al_Arab. 514 However, no obligations under the
LOS Convention 515 arose because of closure by armed conflict; the LOS Convention phrase "no sea-coast,,516 means no physical sea-coast. Thus although States
like Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey negotiated transport ofIraqi
goods, including Iraqi-originated oil to finance the war, through their territories
by road, air and pipeline means,517 there was no obligation under the law of the sea
to conclude these agreements. To the extentthat these materials contributed to the
Iraqi war effort, and the LOS might be deemed to have applied, the LOAC governed through the conventions' other rules clauses.51S Any LOAC obligation was
also subject to objection on grounds of treaty suspension: impossibility, fundamental change of circumstances and war. 519
On the other hand, Iran's attempts to disrupt neutral traffic to and from neutral
Gulfports 520 violated general LOS principles ofaccess to ports. Besides being a violation of UN Charter, Article 2(4) insofar as the attacks violated or threatened
neutrals' territorial integrity or political independence, the Security Council
passed a resolution condemning this action. 521 The resolution was thus supportive
of well-established law.
6. Passage Through International Straits: The Strait ofHormuz
.
A major Tanker War issue was passage through international straits,522 e.g., the
Strait ofHormuz, a choke point vital for transporting oil from the Persian Gulf. 523
This sub-Part examines straits passage under the law ofthe sea, with particular emphasis on that waterway.
Before the LOS Convention negotiations, the law of the sea was unsettled as to
rights governing straits passage. The Territorial Sea Convention provides that
"There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through
straits... used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and
another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state,,,524 thus tying
most straits passage to concepts of territorial sea innocent passage and declared
nonsuspendable by Convention Article 16(4) in most cases. 525 In 1965 theRestatement (Second), Foreign Relations declared that innocent passage in straits between
one high seas area and another high seas area "or the territorial sea ofanother state"
could not be suspended. 526
At the same time other LOS issues were emerging. For example, territorial sea
claims asserted sovereignty beyond the traditional three-mile limit;527 questions
arose as to the meaning of innocent passage under the Convention, particularly
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with respect to military aircraft and warships;528 States began claiming EEZs, for
which the 1958 Conventions stated no general rules;529 and States began asserting
special status for archipelagic waters. Broadened territorial sea claims by Iran and
the UAE, plus Iranian claims to Abu Musa and the Tunis and Iranian and Omani
baseline assertions, implicated the Strait of Hormuz during the Tanker War. 530
The law of the sea as stated in large part in the 1982 Convention responds to
these trends, recognizing six types of international straits and restoring the customary law of international straits: 531
(1) straits used for international navigation and not completely overlapped
by the territorial sea;
(2) straits used for international navigation connecting the high seas or an
EEZ with the territorial sea of another country;
(3) straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas
or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ;
(4) straits used for international navigation and connecting one part of the
high seas or an EEZ with another part of the high seas or an EEZ, where
the strait is formed by an island of the State bordering the strait and the
mainland of that State;
(5) straits used for international navigation and governed by treaties; or
(6) straits used for international navigation in archipelagic waters.
The Strait ofHormuz, connecting the Gulfwith the Indian Ocean, today is in category (3).532 To place the law governing the Strait ofHormuz in perspective, it may
be useful to examine briefly the principles governing other kinds of straits, i.e.,
Cases (1)-(2), (4)-(6).

a. Straits Connecting High Seas or EEZ Areas.
Case (1). If a strait connecting a high seas area or EEZ with another high seas
area or EEZ has a corridor of high seas completely through it, i.e., there is a band of
navigable water over which no coastal State has claimed a territorial sea throughout the strait, that band of water is subject to the high seas LOS regime. High seas
freedoms of overflight, navigation, etc., subject to high seas users' obligations to
observe due regard for others' exercise offreedom of the seas, apply.533 Nearly 50 of
these straits existed in 1989 because littoral countries had not claimed as much as
they might for their territorial seas under the LOS Convention,534 i.e., 12 miles or
24 miles at a strait's narrowest point if both coastal States claimed 12 miles. 535
Only 25 existed in 1997.536 The 1989 list included the Bahrain-Qatar Passage, and
perhaps waters around Abu Musa Island in the Gulf. 537 (Iran occupied Abu Musa
before the beginning of the Tanker War,538 and whether the island is considered
part of the UAE or Iran, there are enough waters around it and the Greater and
Lesser Tunbs to support claims of high seas passage around them, between either
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Iran or the UAE.)539 There are 60 straits where the narrowest passage is greater
than 24 miles, none of which are in the Gulf, except for the possibility of waters
around Abu Musa. 540 Case (1) might be resolved differently by a strict reading of
the Territorial Sea Convention and its nonsuspendable innocent passage regime
for all straits except those covered by prior treaty,541 with attendant problems of
defining innocent passage under the Convention. 542 The 1958 Conventions also
do not address EEZ issues. The LOS Convention resolves the Case (1) issue; if a
high seas route with similar convenience with respect to navigational and
hydrographical characteristics exists in the strait, straits passage special rules do
not apply. General rules for, e.g., freedom of navigation or overflight, apply.543 If
the high seas or EEZ corridor is not of similar convenience in navigational or hydrological characteristics, transit passage principles apply.544 Before expanded
territorial sea claims became admissible, the Strait of Hormuz would have fit
within Case (1); its narrowest breadth is about 22 miles. 545
Case (2). Where a strait connects high seas or EEZ waters with a coastal State's
territorial waters, the territorial sea innocent passage regime applies,546 except
that the right of innocent passage is not suspendable.547 The Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage is among these "dead-end" straits. 548 Here the LOS Convention coincides with the Territorial Sea Convention, except for the new LOS Convention
innocent passage definition and the 1958 Conventions' omission ofEEZ rules. 549
The innocent passage rules apply to straits connecting the high seas or an EEZ
with an historic bay.550
Case (4). Where a strait connects a part of the high seas or an EEZ and another
part of the high seas where an island of a coastal State and the coastal State's mainland forms the strait, the LOS Convention provides that territorial sea passage, i.e.
innocent passage, applies, if a route to the high seas or EEZ seaward of the island is
of equal convenience with regard to navigational and hydrographic characteristics. 551 As in Case 2 dead-end straits, passage through these straits cannot be suspended. 552 The 1958 Conventions give no clear response to this kind of claim;
presumably the Territorial Sea Convention's nonsuspendable innocent passage
regime applies. 553 There are no such straits in the Gulf. 554
Case (5). The LOS Convention exempts longstanding treaty regimes governing straits passage from treaty regimes; here the analysis is nearly the same under
the Territorial Sea Convention. It subjects its rules to all prior treaties; the LOS
Convention permits derogation only ifa treaty is longstanding. 555 Another kind of
treaty that might govern straits passage would be a more recent treaty that is compatible with the LOS Convention. 556 No straits treaties557 apply to the Gulf.
Case (6). The LOS Convention gives special rules for straits through archipelagic waters, which are substantially the same as innocent passage through international straits, except that archipelagic innocent passage is suspendable, while
straits innocent passage is nonsuspendable. 558 This situation might occur if a
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strait under prior law becomes encapsulated in an LOS Convention-permitted archipelago. There is no clear answer under the 1958 Conventions, but the Territorial Sea Convention general rule of nonsuspendable innocent passage in the
absence of treaties, of which there are none, may apply.559 There are no claimed archipelagos in the Gulf, and no island groups eligible for claims.560
Conclusions as to Cases (1)-(2), (4)-(6). The first and most important conclusion from the foregoing is that the Territorial Sea Convention, despite its omissions and ambiguities, when combined with the other 1958 Conventions'
principles, and the LOS Convention, state a general policy of relative freedom of
access through most straits, a high seas and EEZ regime in Case (1), straits through
which there is high seas passage; Cases (2) and (4), nonsuspendable innocent passage for dead-end straits and straits between an island and the mainland where
there is an alternate high seas route around the island; Case (6), transit passage
through archipelagic straits. For Case (5), straits governed by treaty regimes, the
result is virtually the same under the 1958 Conventions and the LOS Convention;
the treaty applies. The second is that the LOS Convention clarifies the law of
straits while recognizing LOS developments, e.g., the EEZ.561
Only Case (1), concerning the Bahrain-Qatar Passage and waters around Abu
Musa; Case (2), concerning the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage; and Case (3), the
StraitofHormuz; apply to the Gulf. There is no record ofclaims regarding restricting passage, etc., around Abu Musa or through the Passages. The Tanker War involved navigation and other passage through the Strait ofHormuz, and therefore
the question of transit passage under the law of the sea as stated in the LOS
Convention.
b. Passage Through the Strait oJHormuz. As a technical point oflaw, it is possible
to argue that two regimes governed passage through the Strait ofHormuz during
the 1980-88 Tanker War.

(i) High Seas Passage Through Hormuz? The Strait is about 22 miles wide at its
narrowest points. Ifa view is taken that the maximum territorial sea claim admissible under the LOS was three miles, the position of the United States until 1983,562
when the conflict had been raging for about three years, navigation, overflight,
warship activity, etc., within the Strait was subject to LOS high seas principles563
in the middle 16 miles of the Strait and territorial sea principles564 within the territorial seas ofIran, Oman and the UAE. Under this analysis, the Strait presented a
Case (1) scenario. 565 There is no record ofclaims to this effect. Analysis now examines passage under Case (3), passage from a high seas area or EEZ through a strait to
another high seas area or EEZ on the other end of a strait.
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(ii) Case (3): Strait ofHormuz Transit Passage and the Tanker War. If the Ter-

ritorial Sea Convention nonsuspendable innocent passage rule for straits used in
international navigation566 is combined with limitations on territorial sea innocent passage in the Convention, it is clear that a coastal State may not temporarily
suspend passage in a strait for security reasons as it might for territorial sea innocent passage. 567 Passage in either case does not mean entry into internal waters. 568
It does mean stopping and anchoring incident to ordinary navigation or if rendered necessary by force majeure or distress. 569
The general definition of innocent passage in the Territorial Sea Convention,
"Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the good order or security of
the coastal State,,,570 leaves open a question of whether innocent passage is totally
equated to straits passage under the Convention,571 and therefore whether transiting fishermen engaged in fishing that is not contrary to coastal State regulations
are in innocent passage. 572 The Convention also leaves open issues of whether
flight (particularly by military aircraft) through the strait, forbidden wi thout prior
permission under the general territorial sea innocent passage regime,573 or whether
transiting submarines must navigate on the surface and show their ensign unless
prior permission has been granted.574 There were also questions of whether weapons practice (no matter how innocuous, such as topside loading machine drills);
launching, landing or taking aboard aircraft (including, e.g., aircraft involved in
mail delivery or medical evacuation cases); launching, landing or taking aboard
any military device; or electronic interference with coastal State facilities (e.g.,
while tuning radars) could be conducted. 575 There can be issues related to jurisdiction over merchantmen, rules applying to State-owned commercial shipping, and
whether a coastal State can ask a transiting warship to leave the strait of the coastal
State for failure to comply with its otherwise legitimate territorial sea regulations. 576 Because the Territorial Sea Convention is subject to the law ofarmed conflict in situations where the LOAC applies,577 and to the right of self-defense,578
an anomolous result is that naval forces may transit a strait under those circumstances without regard to Convention rules. A further possible result is that strict
insistence on the Convention by a coastal State or third States could result in more
assertions of unnecessary claims under these principles, with attendant counterclaims of violations of the Charter579 or the law of naval warfare. 580 These are
hardly the kinds of results the Convention drafters contemplated. 581
For Case 3 straits, those used for international navigation and connecting a part
of the high seas or an EEZ with another part of the high seas or an EEZ and which
include most strategically important straits including Hormuz,582 the LOS Convention provides that all ships and aircraft enjoy a right of unimpeded transit
passage.583 Transit passage means exercise of the freedoms of navigation and overflight solely for continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of
the high seas or EEZ and another part of the high seas or EEZ. Continuous and
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expeditious transit includes strait passage to enter, leave or return from a country
bordering the strait, subject to that country's conditions for entry.584 Transit passage exists throughout the strait, including its approaches, and not just a territorial
sea overlapped area. 585 These approach areas are high seas or EEZ areas, for which
high seas freedoms app1y,586 and are therefore not subject to a territorial sea innocent passage or straits transit passage regime. Activity not an exercise of transit
passage is subject to other LOS Convention provisions,587 including the law of
armed conflict through the Convention's other rules clauses.588 The LOS Convention transit passage rules are also subjectto the Charter.589 During early LOS Convention negotiations Saudi Arabia advocated the rules eventually adopted; Iran
supported regulated passage and a special regime for the Gu1f. 590
While in transit passage, ships (including warships) and aircraft (including
military aircraft) must: proceed without delay through or over the strait; refrain
from activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and
expeditious transit unless they experienceforce majeure or distress; refrain from a
threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of straits-bordering States in violation of the Charter; and otherwise
comply with LOS Convention transit passage ru1es. 591 Ships in transit passage
must also comply with generally accepted SOLAS standards and international
regulations, procedures and practices for preventing, reducing and controlling
pollution from ships.592 Aircraft in transit passage must observe ICAO-established Rules of the Air as applicable to civil aircraft; State aircraft, e.g., military aircraft, "will normally comply" with these and will always operate with due regard
for aviation safety. They must monitor air control and distress frequencies assigned by the competent internationally designated air traffic control authority.593 There is, of course, unquestionably a right of warship transit through and
military aircraft overflight of these straits, unlike the rule against territorial sea
overflight where warships, like all vessels have innocent passage rights. 594 Oceanographic research or surveys cannot be conducted without bordering States' prior
authorization. 595 In terms of normal mode of transit under the LOS Convention,596 this means submarines and other undersea vehicles may transit submerged; for to day's submersibles, that is their normal operational mode. 597 Surface vessels may steam in formation, zig-zag, or deploy aircraft incident to normal
modes of operation; they may use, e.g., radar for navigation but not for attack. 598
They must not threaten bordering States' sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence. 599 There is no requirement of prior notification of intent to
exercise straits transit passage by aircraft or warships.600
Bordering States may designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation
schemes for straits if necessary to promote safe navigation and must publicize
these after approval by a competent international organization, i.e., IMO. Vessels
in transit passage must respect these lanes and schemes.601 Hormuz was among

· 284

The Tanker War

602
major straits subject to a traffic separation scheme during the Tanker War.
States bordering straits may prescribe rules relating to transit passage for safety of
navigation and regulating traffic; preventing, reducing and controlling pollution;
prevention of fishing and stowing fishing gear; loading or unloading goods, currency or persons in violation of a coastal State's customs, fiscal, immigration or
health laws, and must publicize them. 603 If a strait is bordered by two or more
countries, those countries may cooperate through agreements to establish naviga604
tional and pollution prevention, reduction or control devices.
However, these
rules may not discriminate in form or fact among foreign ships or in application
have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit
passage. This differs from territorial sea inn no cent passage, which can be suspended temporarily; rules for straits cannot stop transit passage, even temporarily.60S This principle applies to dangers to navigation that a coastal State must
publicize.606 Vessels in transit passage must comply with these rules, and the
country ofa State aircraft registered under its flag, or of a vessel registered under its
flag, bears international responsibility for loss or damage to coastal States from violating these rules. 607

c. Conclusions. During and before the Tanker War there were threats from Iran to
close the Strait. The United States and other countries rightly resisted these
claims, insisting on the right offreedom of transit through the Strait for all ships or
aircraft entering or leaving the Gulf. 608 Ifthe Strait had a strip ofhigh seas through
it (Case 1), under no circumstances could a coastal State lawfully close it.609 If the
Strait is considered underthe LOS Convention straits transit passage regime (Case
3), no coastal State could close it either. 610
Iran delivered a diplomatic note concerning transit of the Strait in 1987. The
United States asserted that the right of transit passage was a customary norm,611 a
correct interpretation.612 There were no other coastal State claims to limit warship
or military aircraft transit; under the LOS Convention regime, States bordering
straits may not limit passage of these platforms, which were entitled to transit the
Strait in their normal mode, subject to LOS Convention rules on transit passage,
which might include submarines transiting submerged and formation steaming
by surface combatants. Although the record is sparse as to exactly where warships
began escorting or convoying tankers, since this was also a normal mode of operation and a proper defensive measure, convoying, escorting or accompanying
through the Strait would have been permissible. 613 Iran's traffic management
scheme for the upper Gulf required merchant ship notification before coming
close to its ports.614 The LOS did not require prior notification of straits passage
byany merchantman, and certainly not by any warship or State aircraft;61S there is
no indication in the record that this was required, however. Strait of Hormuz
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traffic separation schemes did not figure in the war, except insofar as they may
have channeled shipping, making it easier to attack ships.
The belligerents attacked neutral-flag vessels in or near the Strait, including its
traffic separation schemes.616 It was permissible for warships to defend themselves, and to come to the aid of stricken merchantmen, under these circumstances.617 Thus it was lawful for the Vincennes and other US warships to defend
themselves from Iranian speedboat and air attacks. 618 It would also have been
proper for neutral navies, including those of Oman and the U AE, to remove mines
and conduct other mine countermeasures in the Strait, so long as they did not impede straits transit passage and, in the case of navies of States bordering the Strait,
giving adequate notice of their operations to remove these menaces to neutral navigation.619

Part C. Nationality of Ships, Cargo and Other Interests
Ownership, financing and use of merchant ships has been a complex business
for centuries. Ownership of cargo aboard vessels in bulk (e.g., oil, cement,
grain),620 break-bulk (e.g., bagged goods, crates), perhaps stowed on deck (e.g.
earth-moving equipment, railway locomotives),621 or containerized,622 and subject to freight charges or other liens, has become a complex business. This Part begins by examining transnational623 aspects ofship and cargo ownership and issues
arising during the Tanker War before proceeding to development of trends in
claims on the public international law plane.
Warships have always been under State registry, but even here lines can be less
than clear. Privateering, where States commission private vessels to attack enemy
shipping, was a practice that ended only in the mid-nineteenth century.624 Increasingly today, governments own or charter vessels that are merchant vessels in
appearance and use. Some, although seeming to be merchant ships in function,
serve warships as naval auxiliaries, e.g., tankers, cargo carriers, and refrigerator
ships.625 Still others serve military purposes, such as troopships, but may be controlled by a country's institutions other than its navy. Other government vessels
with a law enforcement mission may be operated by government departments
other than its navy, e.g., the US Coast Guard, or local governments may operate
craft like police or fire boats. In some cases these functions may be combined with
naval forces. Dividing lines can be far from bright, especially for States with minimal coasts or maritime forces. This Pan ends by examining these principles, with
analysis of the Tanker War "reflagging" debate.

1. Defining "Ships"
There is no general definition of "ship" in the law ofthe sea, even in the 1958
conventions and the LOS Convention. The 1962 amendments to the 1954 Oil Pollution Convention say that a ship is "any sea-going vessel of any type whatsoever,
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including floating craft, whether self-propelled or towed by another vessel, making a sea voyage," and the MARPOL 73/78 definition is similar: "a vessel of any
type whatsoever operating in the marine environment... includ[ing] hydrofoil
boats, air-cushion vehicles[ACVs], submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms.,,626 The 1986 Ship Registration Convention defines a ship as "any
self-propelled sea-going vessel used in international seaborne trade for the transport of goods, passengers, or both .... ,,627 Here the definition might be said to exclude warships, since they do not carry passengers or goods as a general rule. 628
General as they are, the 1962 and the MARPOL 73/78 definitions are more inclusive and have been accepted by most seafaring States,629 although MARPOL's
reference to fixed platforms might raise some seafarers' eyebrows. N ationallegislation occasionally supplies varying definitions, most of which are in accordance
with the Convention statement.630
Definition of a merchant ship under the law of the sea has fared similarly;631
there is no agreed definition except by way of exclusion: merchant ships are any
privately or publicly owned vessels that are not warships or are otherwise in government public service, e.g., police or fire boats and therefore entitled to sovereign
immunity, engaged in commercial activity.632 The law of naval warfare has much
to say about merchant ships and cargoes, but those principles apply in appropriate
situations through the LOS conventions' other rules clauses633 and will be analyzed for the Tanker War in Chapter V. 634

2. Ownership in Merchant Ships and Cargoes; Crews; Insurance
Individuals have owned ships since the earliest times; even today ownership of
pleasure boats, some of which may be as large as small commercial vessels, is likely
to be in an individual. Since one person might not be able to advance enough capital to buy and outfit a ship, a practice of joint venture, i.e., ownership of shares in
ships, perhaps for the voyage or longer, developed. 635 Some of British North
America's colonial charters reflect this kind of business relationship.636 Beginning in the nineteenth century, concurrent with evolving business forms on land,
the corporation came to be the dominant modality for vessel ownership.637 Even
command economies have used the corporate form, i.e., State-owned trading companies. 638 By the opposite token, free enterprise-based nations have owned and operated ships, usually through corporations. Countries with government-owed
shipping fleets included many Gulf States during the Tanker War: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE among them. 639 Vessels may travel independently as tramp steamers, picking up cargo at one port, discharging it at
destination, and picking up another cargo for a third port, etc., or along regular
routes as liners. Today most US shipping operates as liners, but many tramp
steamers still transit the oceans. 640 Shipping corporations may cluster in one of
over 350 liner conferences to set carriage rates for certain routes and manage
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sailings efficiently. This can result in noncompetitive pricing and competition between conference and non-conference shipping companies, however. Associations
of shipowners also may influence decisions, particularly those in the political
arena. 641 Corporations may own many ships; they may establish each vessel in a
subsidiary corporation for tax and liability minimization.642
A vessel owner may "rent" a ship to others through a "charter party" or charter. 643 An owner can charter only part of a ship,644 but usually an owner lets the
whole vessel by one of three methods: demise or bareboat charter, time charter, or
voyage charter. In a demise or bareboat charter, "the charterer takes over the ship,
lock, stock and barrel, and mans her with his own people.,,645 In a time charter, the
owner's people continue to work the ship, and the owner retains possession; the
charterer buys the vessel's carrying capacity for a fixed time to go anywhere. 646
The other non-demise arrangement, the voyage charter, is a contract for hire of the
ship for one or more voyages. It is probably the most common form. 647 Subchartering to another party, for part or all of the ship or the time, may occur unless prohibited by a charter party.648 Brokers in major maritime centers, e.g., London or New
York, carry on "fixture" of a ship under a charter far from the ship, its owner or the
charterer. Today an owner may telex or radio a vessel to give directions on its use
after a charter has been fIxed. 649
Today charters are standardized documents. Usually a nondemise charter includes a "safe ports" clause, allowing a master (an employee of the owner) the option of discharging the charterer's cargo at a port that is safe to enter. 650 For
example, if a charterer directs a masterto proceed to a port with a bar across the inlet, the master can refuse and go to another port; the owner can claim damages. 651
"Safe port" also means political dangers to the vessel's safety;652 development ofan
armed conflict situation can affect these private contracts. A safe port clause does
not apply after a vessel's arrival. However, ifa port becomes unsafe after a charterer
nominates it, the charterer must nominate another if that port is reasonable under
the circumstances. 653 Reasonable deviation is permitted in proceeding to a nominated port,654 and doctrines of frustration of performance or commercial impractability, perhaps caused by armed conflict or requisition clauses in the charter,
may end a charter.655 Governments may charter ships instead of requisitioning
them during wartime. 656 If government cargo is stowed on a vessel that carries privately held goods as well, there is the possibility of multiple ownership interests,
the vessel owner, the charterer, the sub charterers, and consignors and consignees
of the goods.
The holder of a mortgage or other financing device657 on a ship is another important ownership interest. Although nearly all maritime States have national legislation governing ship mortgages,658 many (but not the United States) are parties
to multilateral conventions establishing rules for ownership of mortgages by persons that are nationals of States other than that of the registry of the ship. 65~ Other

288

The Tanker War

provisions of national law may condition transfer of mortgage interests from a national of a registry State on mortgage registry State approval660 or accord lower lien
priorities for a foreign-owned ship mortgage, which may be given parity or near
parity with mortgages held by nationals of the ship of registry.661 A ship, registered in State A may be subject to a mortgage in State B whose trustee is a State C
national, with ownership in a State D corporation, whose shareholders may be nationals of States E, F, G, etc. When the possibility offleet mortgages 662-a security
interest in several vessels of different flags with a common owner-is contemplated, the issue becomes even more complex. When States guarantee or insure
ship financing, as the United States may under federallegislation,663 yet another
participant-this time a sovereign nation-may have potential interests. Under
these kinds offinancing arrangements, a vessel owner may appear to be in some respects a lessee (charterer in maritime terminology) and the financing institution
may appear to be the owner of the vessel. 664 Whatever the issues as to who are
proper owners, charterers or others who can limit liability under treaties or nationallaw,665 the variety offinancing arrangements add to the complexity of determining ownership interests under the Intervention Conventions666 and perhaps
issues of nationality of the ship for law of the sea issues. 667
Transnational arrangements for carriage of goods at sea are equally complex.668
While ordinarily a military commander or the commander's lawyer will not be
concerned with the nuances of these transactions, except incident to visit and
search, the following illustrates the complexity of trade by sea and the possible
multitude of private parties, and therefore the countries potentially involved.
Seller and buyer of goods sign a contract of sale.669 If the transaction is F.O.B.
(Free on Board), it may be either a shipment contract or a destination contract. If
the former, perhaps stated F.A.S. (Free Along Side a named vessel), a seller places
the cargo with a carrier at a designated point or ship; the buyer bears the risk during transit. (Doubtless a buyer will buy insurance.) If it is an F.O.B. destination
contract, the seller bears the risk of transit and tenders delivery at port of arrival.
The alternative, C.LF. (Cost, Insurance, Freight), obligates a seller to buy insurance and pay freight to the carrier; these are added to costs for the buyer's price at
destination.
The buyer may obtain a letter ofcredit from a bank, by which the bank promises
to honor the seller's draft if the buyer submits shipping documents for the goods,
i.e., the shipment's negotiable bill oflading, invoice and insurance contract. The
letter is forwarded through the seller's bank for payment on submission of the documents. 670 A buyer may have credit arrangements to finance the letter of credit or
to finance sale of the goods. Although these transactions are technically independen t of the sales con tract or the con tract of carriage, they are linked to the sales contract, and participants in letter of credit transactions-usually banks-also have
interests in safe, timely and orderly carriage of cargo on the seas. Today
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multimodal transportation using containers is very common, the result being that
many land-based companies under different ownerships (and therefore different
national interests) may be involved if goods do not arrive or arrive damaged,671
perhaps because of military action at sea.
Whether cargo is sent F.O.B. (perhaps F.A.S. for ocean transit), F.O.B. destination, or C.I.F., risk ofloss during shipment must fall on a shipper or a carrier. As
noted earlier in the context of direction of shipping,672 carriage of goods by sea involves many ownership interests regulated by the customary, treaty and national
law of admiralty. Most such arrangements are covered by the COGSA Convention
as supplemented by more recent treaties. 673 These standards may be incorporated
in a private contract, e.g., a charter party.674
Clauses in contracts of carriage or affreightment may affect ownership interests
in freight charges for transportation and hence ownership interests in transporting the goods. For situations related to armed conflict, these include fire, perils of
the sea, acts of war, acts of public enemies, arrest or restraint of princes (i.e., restraints by governments), seizure under legal process, riots or civil commotions,
saving life or property at sea, and deviation. 675 Although armed conflict may trigger invocation of the war exception, the peripheral impact of armed conflict may
cause ships to deviate from planned courses, or they may be tied up in port due to
departure restrictions or domestic unrest resulting from armed conflict, etc. Thus,
armed conflict can result in private parties' raising claims against other private
parties, all of which may hail from different countries, and governments in these
countries may hear from affected parties,676 who may urge measures affecting the
conflict, ranging from entry into the conflict to less coercive measures. The result
is that cargo interests or others, faced with a carrier claim of exemption under
COGSA, may look elsewhere, perhaps to their insurers, perhaps to the country that
allegedly caused them harm,677 but possibly to their governments for espousal,678
if the ultimate cause of their loss is cognizable and compensable under intern ationallaw. This was the basis of claims for the Stark and Vincennes attacks, although injury and death claims were primarily involved.679
Besides these claims related to cargo carriage, a ship owner is also concerned
with claims related to illness, injury or death of mariners aboard the ship. At the
least, an owner must pay maintenance, cure and wages; all States recognize the
principle that injured or sick merchant seamen are entitled to food and lodging,
medical services and unearned salary for the remainder of the voyage, plus burial
expense, if death, injury or illness occurs while enrolled as a seaman on a ship.680
States may accord other relief for injured seamen or mariners who die at sea.681 In
the United States and many industrialized countries, maritime workers (mariners,
shipyard employees, and stevedores who work the docks) are heavily unionized;
the unions themselves can be potent forces for claims involving members, as some
countries discovered during the Tanker War. 682
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Passengers and others involved in maritime-related business, e.g., oil platform
workers, may claim for injuries or death under maritime law, perhaps augmented
by nationallegislation.683 The same can happen when there is loss or damage to
civil aircraft. While these claimants might be content with claims against other
private parties who allegedly harm them, there is a possibility of claims against an
allegedly offending State or perhaps requests for espousal by their governments. 684
Overarching these primary claims is a potential for insurance coverage and
subrogation685 to an insured's claims, i.e., where an insurance company steps in an
insured party's shoes, a common procedure for property damage claims under US
law. Participants in the marine insurance field may be of entirely different nationalities than the insured ship owner, charterer or cargo interests. UK underwriters,
usually operating from Lloyd's syndicates,686 have dominated the field,687 but
other nationals or their companies may be involved.688 Reinsurance, where a reinsurer agrees to indemnify another insurance company against risks assumed by it
on insurance in favor of a third party,689 (e.g., vessel owner, charterer or cargo interests), may in troduce more potential claimants (a reinsurer as ul timate subrogee)
for a maritime law claim. Today three kinds of marine insurance are written. Hull
insurance covers a vessel or a fleet, ships' machinery and certain collision liabilities plus general average and salvage charges. 690 Cargo insurance protects a shipper. 691 Protection and indemnity (P & I) insurance covers nearly everything not
under a hull policy, including personal injury, illness and death of those aboard
ship; other collision liability; pollution liability; omnibus coverage for new risks
not within the express provisions in use. P & I is underwritten through "clubs" of
insurers, most of which are in the United Kingdom. UK P & I clubs have insured
about 65 percent of the world's shipping. 692 Although ownership interests can insure nearly everything, and can buy an "all risks" pOlicy,693 war risk insurance is
written separately because of the "free of capture and seizure" (F C & S) clause in
typical policies. Thus insureds must buy a separate policy and pay an additional
premium for war risk. 694
Obtaining insurance or writing it are voluntary acts. Owner interests can elect
to operate ships uninsured because of high premium costs, but they are foolish to
do so because of the high risk ofpersonal liability beyond the value of the vessel, assuming that the ship or cargo survives the mishap for imposition of maritime liens,
because of the possibility offailure of limitation ofliability. Insurers can elect to
charge relatively high premiums when the risks are high, e.g., projected transit of a
dangerous zone of the ocean,695 or choose not to write policies at all for certain
risks, e.g., war. Today all oceangoing vessels carry basic war risk insurance. The result has been that States have war risk insurance legislation for coverage ''whenever it appears ... that such insurance adequate for the needs of the water-borne
commerce of the United States cannot be obtained on reasonable terms and
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conditions from companies ...," as the US legislation has had it. 696 Recognizing
growing use of flags of convenience,697 legislation may permit coverage for these
vessels besides nationally registered ships; cargoes on both national-flag and flag
of convenience ships; and personal injury, death or detention of crews.698 Other
maritime risks may be covered as well. 699 The government may provide reinsurance coverage700 to spread commercial carrier risk. Private coverage, if available,
may continue.1° 1 The result is that governments may become subrogated to claims
caused by war situations besides their building and operating, chartering or requisitioning vessels during crisis.1°2

3. Nationality ofMerchant Vessels
The foregoing sub-Part has analyzed the plethora ofgovernment and private interests that may claim in transactions involving merchant ships. This sub-Part analyzes trends in claims to ships' nationality in international law. Jurisdiction over
such ships in, e.g., territorial waters, has been mentioned separately.1°3
Bilateral agreements, often in the form ofFCN treaties, of the late eighteenth
century, and continuing through the nineteenth into this century, provided for
mutual recognition of each State's ships as national vessels if the master produced
a passport, sea letter or other sufficient document issued by competent national authority.1° 4 Although early treaties stated this requirement as a wartime measure,
perhaps requiring periodic renewal of papers, later agreements were more general
and not so limited.1°S When bilateral treaties began to include MFN clauses to
grant each party the highest favor any other treaty partner of either held, the practice and necessity ofincluding sea letter clauses declined.1° 6 Occasional treaties recited requirements for these documents.1°7 In 1906 Moore said these papers
should be included: passport, sea letters, charts, bill of health, bill of sale or ownership certificate, manifest, charter party, bills of lading, and invoices.1° 8 A few
agreements also based vessels' nationality on the crew's composition and the master's nationality, perhaps with a statement that national recognition was sufficient.1°9 US Prohibition Era bilateral antismuggling treaties also infer a need for
ship's papers.7l OTo the extent these treaties had common or similar terms, it can
be argued that they point to establishing a customary norm for determining the nationality of a vesse1. 711 Treaty succession principles applied their terms to other
countries in some cases.7l2
Early admiralty cases upheld the presumptive validity of bills of sale or similar
documentation for vessels 7l3 and therefore the nationality of the ship.7l4 By the
mid-nineteenth century these papers were required to be aboard neutral ships.7lS
The flag, Moore wrote in 1906, was only "prima facie evidence, on the high seas,
that the nationality of the ship corresponds to that of the flag.,,7l6
In 1873 a Spanish man-of-war overtook S.S. Virginius on the high seas; Virginius
was accused of carrying arms and insurgents to Cuba, then a Spanish possession.7l 7
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Virginius had been registered fraudulently as a US vessel, as later investigation
showed; her real owners were Cubans resident in New York. 718 The United States
protested Virginius' seizure;719 Spain admitted an international law violation for
having taken the ship on the high seas while flying a US ensign and carrying US
registry papers. 720
In 1896 the International Law Institute adopted a recommendation that nationalities of captain and crew should not be criteria of a ship's nationality.721 The
1905 Montijo arbitration rejected the argument that a ship could not be considered
a US vessel because only a third of her crew was American, a violation of US law.
That was a domestic matter for the United States, the arbitrator ruled. 722 The Permanent Court of Arbitration in the 1905 Muscat Dhows Case held a State was free to
decide which ships could fly its flag and to prescribe rules for the privilege.723
"What that case reveals is that there is no unique connection between the national
identity of a ship for jurisdiction purposes and the flying of a flag." Even though
the dhows flew a French flag, they were Muscati manned and could be claimed as
Muscat vessels?24
Although bilateral treaties continued to provide for mutual recognition of
ships' papers to establish nationality,725 advent of flags of convenience-vessels
nominally registered under certain States' municipal legislation but beneficially
owned by other States' nationals-in the early twentieth century challenged the
basic principle ofexclusively national decision making as to which vessels could fly
a State's flag. 726 Adopting another State's flag was nothing new,727 but a general
practice came into vogue with attempts to evade Prohibition and in sale of US and
other flag vessels incident to World War I demobilization. 728
The 1927 Lotus Case reiterated the principle that a vessel has a nationality conferred on it by a State and is subject to the authority of the flag it flies. 729
Multilateral agreements following World War I began to vindicate establishing
nationality by ship's papers with the flag as a symbol. The 1928 Convention on Private International Law (Bustamante Code),730 1929 SOLAS,731 1930 Load Line
Convention732 and 1948 SOLAS733 echoed these principles. Given widespread acceptance in multilateral agreements, these principles began to reflect custom?34
In 1953 the US Supreme Court repeated the traditional national determination
principle:
Perhaps the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law relevant to our
problem is that which gives cardinal importance to the law of the flag. Each State
under international law may determine for itself the conditions on which it will grant
its nationality to a merchant ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and
acquiring authority over it. Nationality is evidenced to the world by the ship's papers
and its flag. The United States has firmly and successfully maintained that the
regularity and validity of a registration can be questioned only by the registering
State.735
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Two years later the Nottebolzm Case articulated the "genuine link" test for determining nationality for espousal purposes in a dual-national situation?36
The 1958 High Seas Convention repeats traditional principles that every State
may fix conditions for granting nationality to ships, registering them and granting
the right to fly its flag. Nodding to Nottebolzm, the Convention requires that a "genuine link" must exist between a ship and the State of registry; a State must exercise
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over its
flagged vessels. A State must issue documentation to vessels under its flag. Except
for bona fide transfers of ownership or registry changes, a ship may not shift flags in
port or on the high seas. Ships sailing under two or more States' flags may not assert them to any other State and may be assimilated to a Stateless vesse1.737
The ICJ, however, in rendering its advisory opinion on the Constitution of the
Maritime Safety Committee ofIMCO, stated that the phrase "largest ship-owning
nations" in the IMCO Convention meant registered tonnage, and not beneficially
owned tonnage,738 thereby supporting a view that registry, and not metaphysical
linkage, controls for purposes of nationality of ships.
Other multilateral agreements restate the familiar nationality rule, e.g., 1960
SOLAS, 739 1974 SOLAS,740 and marine pollution conventions; 741 they key State
responsibility to ships entitled to fly the flag, or in some cases ships operating under a party's authority, fundamentally the High Seas Convention rule. Commentators also recognized the principle of national decision making to determine a ship's
nationality?42 Boczek also claimed, "[T]he practice of registering ships has become universal and it is an established rule of international law that all maritime
States make registration a formal condition of their nationality, the only exception
being small craft... not intended for long-distance navigation." Issuing a document to evidence registration "is also universal.,,743 The Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime Traffic confirms this view?44
The 1982 LOS Convention follows the High Seas Convention's theme with additional requirements for flag States. The genuine link concept is preserved, togetherwith requirements for jurisdiction over administrative, technical and social
matters in vessels?45 The LOS Convention also requires registry of all vessels, except small craft, flying a State's flag,746 and mandates flag State responsibility for
safety at sea through adequate manning, construction and safety equipment, and
signalling to communicate and prevent collisions?47 If another State has clear
grounds to believe a flag State is not exercising proper jurisdiction and control
over a ship, the other State may report the facts to the flag State, which must investigate the matter and take appropriate action?48
The 1986 Ship Registration Convention749 elaborates on the LOS Convention.
Few States are party to it, but they include two Gulf States (Iraq, Oman), which ratified after the Tanker War?50 After declaring that ships have the State's nationality whose flag they are entitled to fly,75 1 the Convention requires that parties must
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have a competent, adequate national maritime administration to manage and control vessels flying their flags?52 Registration requirements are stated with particularity.753 Although the Registration Convention does not mention genuine link, it
lays down specific rules for nationality. First, a State's national laws may provide
for ownership rules, which must "include appropriate provisions for participation
by the State or its nationals as owners of ships flying its flag or in the ownership of
such ships and for the level of such participation." These laws must "be sufficient
to permit the flag State to exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control over ships
flying its flag.,,754 Alternatively, States may "observe the principle that a satisfactory part of the complement" of a ship be flag State nationals, domiciliaries or lawful permanent residents. This goal must be considered in the light of available
seafarers meeting the criterion, "sound and economically viable operation of [the
flag State's] ships," and other international agreements. This alternative must be
applied on a ship, company or fleet basis. 755 Other nationals may serve on a State's
ships, but its own nationals, domiciliaries or permanent residents should be given
opportunity for education and training in maritime work. 756
Under either alternative, a registry State must ensure that a shipowning company, or a subsidiary, is established "and/or has its principal place of business
within its territory in accordance with its laws and regulations." If a company is
not a flag State-established enterprise or does not have its principal place of bus iness there, a flag State national-either a natural or juridical person, e.g., a corporation-in a management or representative capacity must be available for legal
process. Moreover, a flag State must ensure that those accountable for or managing
a ship are financially responsible as to potential tort liability and crew wages?57
Registration and documentation requirements are detailed; there are provisions for bareboat charterers?58 The Convention encourages joint ventures to
enlarge developing States' national shipping industries759 and protecting laborsupplying nations' interests?60 IMO and other international organizations may
assist in implementation?61
Because oflow acceptance since 1986 and its emergence during the Tanker War,
the Registry Convention does not represent customary law. Its confirming LOS
Convention rules, which build on the High Seas Convention's,762 i.e., means that
although the LOS requires a genuine link between a registry State and a ship, registry details must be left to that country.
Few claims with respect to separate chartering interests763 have been asserted.
In 1921 the United States allowed US charter interests to fly the national ensign at
the masthead and a Chinese ensign at the stern, despite US Navy concerns about
identification. Chinese municipal law permitted the practice?64 This practice
would have tended to run afoul of High Seas Convention and LOS Convention
rules for single flags from ships?65 The Ship Registration Convention permits a
State to register a vessel bareboat chartered-in, for the time of the charter, and to
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allow the vessel to fly its flag.7 66 This would not have violated the rule against two
flags, for the chartered ship will be registered in only the chartering-in State.167
States may espouse charterer claims like other claims.768 The intervention
conventions769 require charter interests to be consulted ifpossible; certain limitation of liability treaties may equate some charterers with owners for private civilliability purposes,770 even as a charterer may be equated with an owner when cargo
interests claim for damage during transit.7 71

4. Warships; Other Public Vessels
The definition of a warship under the law of the sea and the law of naval warfare
are nearly identical today. Thus whether a warship operates under the LOS or the
LOAC, to which the LOS is subject under the other rules clauses of the LOS conventions or customary law,772 the analysis results are the same. The first definitions of warships were published in the law of naval warfare.
Hague VII, announcing rules for conversion of merchantmen into warships,
was the first general treaty to state rules that would apply to converted vessels:
•.. A merchant ship converted into a war-ship cannot have the rights and duties

accruing to such vessels unless it is placed under the direct authority, immediate
control and responsibility of the Power whose flag it flies .... Merchant ships [so]
converted... must bear the external marks which distinguish the war-ships of their
nationality.... [Its] commander must be in the service of the State and duly
commissioned by the competent authorities. His name must [be] on the list of the
officers of the fighting fleet .... The crew must be subject to military discipline.
Vessels so converted must observe the law and customs of war; belligerents must
announce conversion as soon as possible.773 The Convention, although all States
have not ratified it,774 restates customary law except perhaps as to where conversion must take place, 775 today a moot issue because of merchantmen's size and
complexity, which demands conversion in a shipyard and not on the high seas as
occurred with the C.S.S. Alabama during the Civil War. 776
The 1913 Oxford Manual of Naval War defined "War-ships [as] Constituting
part of the armed force of a belligerent State and, therefore, subject as such to the
laws of naval warfare... which, under the direction of a military commander and
manned by a military crew, carry legally the ensign and the pendant of the national
navy," plus ships converted as warships,777 the customary rule of that time.778
In 1916 the US Secretary of State published this definition of a warship:
A belligerent warship is any vessel which, under commission or orders of its
government imposing penalties or entitling it to prize money, is armed for the
purpose of seeking and capturing or destroying enemy property or hostile neutral
property on the seas. The size of the vessel, strength of armament, and its defensive or
offensive force are immaterial.779
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The 1930 London Naval Treaty did little to help definition. Although carefully
categorizing ships usually considered men of war, e.g., capital ships or battleships,
aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, minelayers, etc., including "special vessels,"
e.g., yachts, tenders, transports, depot ships, etc., as "naval combatant vessels,,780
did not clarify whether these were warships or not. The 1936 London Naval Treaty
categories for vessels usually considered warships was a second effort at particularity by again describing existing combatant vessels/81 naval auxiliaries were excluded from classification as men of war. 782 The 1936 Montreux Convention,
regulating Turkish Straits passage, followed this formula?83
Forty years and two World Wars involving major maritime conflict later, the
1958 High Seas Convention defined "warship" as
a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State and bearing the external marks
distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy List, and
manned by a crew... under regular naval discipline."784

This represents the customary rule?85 It is repeated, nearly verbatim, in the 1962
Convention on Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships,786 the 1972 INC SEA
Agreement787 and the 1977 Panama Canal neutrality treaty.788 Except for referring
to vessels "belonging to the armed forces of a State," thereby recognizing present
realities of unified armed services, e.g., the Canadian Forces, or that military services other than navies may operate warships (e.g., the US Coast Guard)?89 The
LOS Convention followed virtually the same language in 1982, but for all ocean areas?90 Nuclear and conventionally powered warships have identical status;791
there is no requirement that a warship be armed?92 Title to sunken or wrecked
warships and military aircraft remains in the State whose flag they flew?93 Under
the law of the sea, warships, wrecked, sunken or in service, enjoy sovereign immunityfrom authorities of States other than the flag State?94 In wartime situations, to
the extent the LOS continues to apply, e.g., between a belligerent and a neutral,
LOS immunity rules continue to apply, including title to sunken vessels or aircraft. On the other hand, operation of the other rules clauses795 as between
belligerents during war means that attacking and capturing an opponent's warship
or military aircraft vests title immediately in the captor. This includes wrecked or
sunken warships or aircraft if successfully recovered or otherwise brought into an
opponent's possession?96
Protocol I, Article 43(1), one of that treaty's few provisions applying to naval
warfare,797 is more general, applying to all armed forces but echoing the LOS
definition:
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist oforganized armed forces, groups and
units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its
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subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not
recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shaH be subject to an internal
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shaH enforce compliance with the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict.798

Undoubtedly the LOS Convention rule is a customary norm for the law of the sea
today.7 99 However, as Swarzenberger and others have pointed out,800 the LOS definition is subject to the LOS treaties' other rules clauses,80l the result being that in
the future the definition of a warship for law of naval warfare purposes may chart a
different course than the LOS definition. For example, States could invoke and
build gloss on Protocol I, art. 43, or apply Article 43 as a base for a customary norm
if they are not party to the Protocol, the present case forthe United States. For now,
however, the definitions have merged for the LOS and the LOAC. 802 The definite
trend of the law is that if a ship meets the LOS warship definition, regardless ofits
size, means of propulsion and armament or lack of it, it is a warship.
Although the LOS conventions have mentioned other ships owned or perhaps
operated under charter by or for States for public purposes,803 no definitional
claims have been asserted, beyond statements that they may be totally immune
from other States' jurisdiction on the high seas. 804 These issues should be differentiated from the law of naval auxiliaries, which applies during wartime. 805 On the
other hand, there were issues related to State-owned commercial vessels, e.g., tankers owned by governments such as Kuwait. In general the law of the sea applies the
same rules for these ships as for privately owned merchantmen. 806
The LOS Convention also provides that the genuine link and single-flag requirements do not prejudice the issue of vessels "employed on the official service
of the United Nations, its specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy
Agency, flying the flag of the organization." The High Seas Convention includes
similar provisions.807 Protocol I forbids flying the UN flag unless "authorized by
that Organization."SOS The UN flag has been flown on several occasions; when employed in peacekeeping operations, in practice it has been flown alone after agreements with the Host Country, i.e., the State supplying the platform(s) or unit(s).809
Protocol I also prohibits improper use of the red cross, red crescent, and red lion
and sun,810 the inference being that it can be used with ICRC permission and by
agreement of State(s) concerned.

5. Ocean Transit in Company; Warship Formation Steaming; Convoys
Although as a general rule, merchantmen of any size travel independently, albeit in the case of liners on predetermined paths through the seas, or on prescribed
routes, perhaps on the high seas as a matter of private initiative, or through straits
or the territorial sea at coastal State direction,811 small ships, e.g. fishing vessels,
may proceed in convoy for mutual assistance in case ofcasualties or heavy weather.
They may operate together for commercial purposes, e.g., fishing. 8IZ Warships
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may also steam independently, which is the usual situation in the case of submarines. However, for safety and mutual protection, warships may proceed in company, often in formation as ordered by the force commander. The law of the sea
does not restrict these freedoms of the seas, even in the case ofwarships steaming in
formation in straits,813 except that all oceans users must have due regard for others'
LOS rights. 814 By extension of this analysis, the law of the sea, as distinguished
from the law of armed conflict, applicable in certain situations through the LOS
other rules clauses,815 does not forbid or qualify the right of "mixed company" usage of the oceans, i.e., when merchant ships and warships travel together in convoys for reasons of safety816 and perhaps protection by the warship(s).817 Royal
N avywarships accompanied and attempted to protect UK flag trawlers fishing beyond the three-mile territorial sea limit off Iceland during the First Cod War,818
for example. Convoy principles in armed conflict situations are different, however.819

6. The Tanker War: Analysis
Even today the record is less than clear and full as to the identity of transnational claimants involved in the Tanker War. Civil litigation and government-espoused claims820 may proceed for years in the future. 821 It is certain, however, that
there were significant claims during the war. Merchant shipping losses, and the
deaths and injuries of merchant mariners, were the highest since World War II,822
there were claims arising from attacks by and on naval vessels, some of them defensive in nature,823 and the environment suffered. 824 There were also questions involving the nationality of ships.
The clear inference from the LOS conventions and customary law is that as
long as a new registry State has a genuine link to a vessel through compliance with
the new State's registry requirements for ship safety, etc., and there is ownership of
the vessel, perhaps beneficial ownership through corporate shares, in nationals of
the new registry State, LOS requirements are satisfied. The LOS leaves registration details to the new registry State. It may be presumed that reflagging Kuwaitiregistered tankers to US registry satisfied the LOS basic requirements. Proper US
registration procedures were followed, and US nationals served as masters. 825 It
was also appropriate for US and other navies to convoy, escort or accompany merchantmen, exercising a right of proportional self-defense if the merchant ships
were attacked or threatened with attack. 826
Neutrals also observed the rule of rescuing persons in danger of being lost at sea
when they picked up survivors of attacks on merchantmen or naval vessels (e.g.,
Iran Ajr), whether flying the same or another flag, people on offshore platforms, or
at least one aviator who went down at sea. (In many cases the record is silent on individual rescue efforts, but available sources indicate neutrals, including warships
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and merchant vessels, attempted to perform rescues commensurate with their
ships' safety, as the rule allows.)827
Late in the war Iran used speedboats to attack tankers and other ships exercising freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. These
boats apparently exercised in naval maneuvers. Crew surviving neutrals' self-defense responses were repatriated to Iran as the 1949 Geneva Conventions provide.
Presumably other speedboaters Iraq may have captured were treated as prisoners
of war and repatriated at the war's end. 828 It is not clear, from the available record,
whether these vessels met the customary definition of warships. 829 Although their
personnel were perhaps imbued with a spirit of suicide not unlike World War II
kamikaze and other pilots and midget submarine crew, the boats themselves appear
to have been warships.
On at least one occasion when the reflagged tankers were ready to leave Kuwait,
commercial tug crews refused to man tugs to accompany them. US Navy volunteers manned the tugs, which were equipped with minesweep gear.830 The record
is not clear whether the tugs met two standards of the definition of a warship, i.e.,
under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the United States, or
whether the tugs bore external marks distinguishing ships of the United States.
Probably the crews were under US military discipline. 831 Nor can it be determined
whether the tugs were government ships used for non-commercial purposes;832
they may have been privately owned but manned by military personnel, or they
may have been State-owned by Kuwait but operated for commercial towage. Ifprivately owned but crewed by military personnel of a nationality other than the
owner(s), this would make the tugs subject to the LOS genuine link principle. 833 If
owned by Kuwait, the issue is whether they were operated for commercial purposes or whether they were used for noncommercial purposes. The available record does not give an answer. The nature of the minesweep gear aboard the tugs is
not clear either; this is a law of naval warfare issue. 834 Based on the scanty record, it
may be presumed that it was admissible under international law to man the tugs
under the circumstances. If the tugs were commercial in nature, having a foreign
crew made no difference; merchantmen the world over sail with crews of mixed
nationalities. If the tugs were non-commercial, owned by Kuwait, it was the business of Kuwait to determine who would man them. The tugs did not become warships because they were operated by US Navy personnel, however.
Early in thewarit was proposed evacuating merchant ships trapped in the Shatt
aI-Arab under the UN or leRC flag. Iraq rejected this. 835 The UN flag proposal followed UN practice in seeking affected parties' agreement. 836 When this was not
forthcoming, the proposal died. The leRe flag proposal also required affected parties' agreement,837 and when this was not forthcoming, this proposal also died.
Merchant shipping losses,838 and claims arising from dislocations during the
war,839 were many. In many instances owners' losses were covered by insurance. 840
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There is always a possibility of government espousal,841 where the genuine link
issue842 will arise. Thus far there appear to be no such claims.
Although there were charter interests afloat in the Gulf during the Tanker War,
e.g., USSR tanker charters to Kuwait,843 there appear to have been no published
claims in connection with losses to charter interests. In many instances these may
have been subrogated to insurance carriers,844 although there is the possibility of
espousal for these claims as well. 845
Aside from possible subrogation claims in connection with pollution intervention or private claims, no separate iden tification of insurance claims with, or apart
from, the vessel have been noted. Insurance rates for war risk and other coverage
rose spectacularly during the war, predicated on shipping losses, which were the
heaviest since World War II. 846 Insurance and cargo claims usually follow the law
of the flag,847 although States may espouse nationals' claims here as in other situations. 848 National cargo preference legislation may direct that certain cargoes, e.g.,
military supplies, be carried only in vessels flagged under that State. 849 In that circumstance the flag of cargo and ship will coincide. The cabotage trade of most
States is restricted to carriage in national bottoms; this is often confirmed by treaties.850 Although it would not necessarily be true, in many cases nationality of the
ship and its cargo will coincide. This would be particularly true with respect to petroleum products, e.g., crude oil from Valdez, Alaska, bound for US refineries.
This might be contrasted with Persian Gulf oil lift, which was almost never in cabotage. Tanker convoys may have proceeded along the Saudi or Iranian coasts, but
these were not engaged in coastal trade, at least as far as the record shows. The oil
was for world trade. 851 Local oil shipments, e.g., from northern to southern Iran,
went by pipeline. 852
There seems to be no record of government-espoused853 claims for cargo or insurance interests. Nor does the record reveal the extent of claims by banks and
other holders of ship mortgages; since vessels are almost invariably mortgaged,
usually to the hilt, undoubtedly these claims figured in economic losses of the war
to the extent not covered by insurance. 854 As the record of claims after any crisis,
economic dislocation or war shows,855 there was and is potential for espousal of
these claims. 856
There was heavy loss oflife and injury to merchant seamen during the war from
belligerents' attacks on neutral shipping. 857 Others may have been injured or may
have died because ofIranian attacks on neutrals' offshore oil pumping facilities. 8S8
There were 290 deaths in the Vincennes-Airbus tragedy, and the United States
compensated victims' families. 859 There may have been deaths or injuries resulting from other mistaken defensive actions, e.g., the United States' firing on fishing
vessels or dhows. 860 There were deaths and personal injuries among the U.S.S.
Stark and U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts crews. 861 Other military personnel from neutral countries may have been hurt or may have died because of belligerents'
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war-related actions. There probably were deaths or injuries connected with US defensive attacks on oil platforms,862 and there were deaths or injuries connected
with US defensive attacks on IranAjr and other Iranian vessels or aircraft, notably
the speedboats. 863 In the Vincennes-Airbus and Stark cases, governments paid
compensation, the United States in the Vincennes incident and Iraq for Stark
deaths and injuries. 864 Transnational litigation may resolve other death and personal in jury claims, particularly for the merchant mariners, or parties may be compensated through espousal. 865 In many cases insurance may protect owners,
charterers, etc., from personal liability for these claims. 866 Governments may compensate their military personnel or their survivors under national law for active
service injury or death, and these sums might be added to espoused claims.
The record is sparse as to proceedings involving these claims, and their amount
and number, other than those involving Stark, Vincennes and the Rostum
platforms.

Part D. General Conclusions and Appraisal for the Law of the Sea
The Tanker War was a long conflict, eight years from the first shots and four
years of more intensive war at sea. It produced nearly every conceivable issue related to the law of the sea, the law ofarmed conflict, and law under the UN Charter.
Chapter III analyzed Charter law in the Tanker War, and Chapter V will discuss
LOAC issues.
The Tanker War began while LOS Convention negotiations were underway.
When the war ended in 1988, the ratification process was underway, but not
enough countries had ratified the treaty for it to be effective as an international
agreement. Some Tanker War participants had ratified the LOS Convention by
1988, however. For these States, there was an obligation not to defeat the treaty's
object and purpose besides their duties under customary law (which might include
customary rules restated in the LOS Convention) and perhaps the 1958 LOS conventions, if they were party to them. Other countries, e.g., the United Kingdom
and the United States, were not signatories or parties to the LOS Convention during the war but were parties to the 1958 LOS conventions. These countries were
also bound by the customary law of the sea, including custom restated in the LOS
Convention. Some States, including many Persian Gulf nations, were party to
none of the LOS conventions. Nevertheless, these countries were bound by the
customary law of the sea restated in the conventions, as well as other customary
norms. The Tanker War era, 1980-88, was a time of transition forthelaw of the sea,
requiring analysis of every issue under custom and five LOS conventions, in addition to other special LOS-related agreements.
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1. High Seas Freedoms: Navigation and Overflight
Neutral countries' warships and military aircraft, whether launched from aircraft carriers or the land, had freedom of navigation or overflight in the Gulf, subject to the LOS norms limiting those freedoms, e.g., due regard for others' exercise
of these high seas freedoms, and the LOAC when it applied. Similarly, belligerents
in their relations with neutrals had high seas freedoms of overflight and navigation, again subject to LOS norms limiting those freedoms, e.g., due regard for neutrals' exercise of high seas freedoms, and the LOAC when it applied. In all cases, as
between treaty-based norms and the U.N. Charter, the Charter prevailed. One example of this was the Airbus tragedy. Iranian aircraft had Gulf overflight rights,
but the United States had a right to respond (in this case, in error) in self-defense
when its warship appeared threatened by what was mistakenly perceived to be an
incoming Iranian military aircraft.
In terms ofcustomary LOS norms, the same principles were at stake, unless one
takes the view that a separate customary Charter-based norm at variance from
principles under the Charter was at issue, or that the customary Charter-based
norm had been elevated to jus cogens status and therefore prevailed over custom or
treaty-based rules. There is no evidence of claims involving these issues.
During the Tanker War belligerents interfered with neutrals' freedom ofnavigation through indiscriminate mining. Moreover, although it was an LOAC issue
because they chose to fire indiscriminately on neutral merchantmen or neutral
military aircraft in many instances, belligerents also violated neutrals' high seas
rights of freedom of navigation and overflight. It was proper under the law of
self-defense for neutral military forces (air, surface warships) to respond proportionally to attacks on warships, merchantmen flying the warship's flag, or (if requested, under a theory of informal self-defense) merchant ships flying other
neutrals' flags, if the merchant vessels had not acquired enemy character through,
e.g., carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining goods for the opposing belligerent
pursuant to that belligerent's direction or control as discussed in Chapter V.
Belligerents could announce and conduct naval maneuvers in Gulfhigh seas areas so long as they observed due regard for neutrals' high seas freedoms. Similarly,
neutrals could announce and conduct these maneuvers, so long as they observed
due regard for others' high seas freedoms, whether the other States were neutrals or
belligerents.

2. EEZs, Fishing and the Continental Shelf in the Persian Gulf
There appear to have been no claims of LOS violations regarding GulfEEZs,
fishing or continental shelf zones. (As a technical matter, the Gulf does not have a
continental shelfas defined in the law of the sea; there is no continental slope to the
deep abyss.) All States, neutral or belligerent, continued to have high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight through these areas claimed by neutrals, subject
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to limitations imposed by the LOS regime, e.g., due regard or the equivalent for
rights of coastal States in their EEZ, fishing or continental shelf operations. There
were one or two attacks by neutrals on neutral fishing vessels operating legitimately in these areas when these craft were mistaken for attacking belligerent
forces. As in the Airbus case, the response was in self-defense to a mistakenly perceived threat. The LOAC governed belligerents' attacks on an opponent's offshore
facilities, as analyzed in Chapter V. Belligerents' attacks on neutrals' offshore facilities were governed by Charter-based law, i.e., Article 2(4). Similarly, the US destruction of Iranian offshore platforms was a self-defense response to attacks
launched or directed from those and other platforms on innocent neutral
merchantmen.

3. The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in the Persian Gulf; Entry into
Neutral Ports
During the Eighties more and more States shifted from traditional three-mile
territorial sea claims to more expansive sovereignty claims, up to and beyond the
12-mile limit the LOS Convention would allow. There were also claims to offshore
contiguous zones. These claims in some cases exceeded LOS limits, in terms of
breadth (particularly under the 1958 Territorial Sea and similar customary regimes) and because of baselines declarations that did not always square with LOS
definitions. None of these claims figured in the sea war, however.
Territorial sea usage did, however. Iran could use its territorial sea as well as the
high seas for naval maneuvers. Iran could suspend territorial sea innocent passage
temporarily for security reasons in connection with these maneuvers. It could use
its territorial sea for coastal convoys of tankers under the LOS regime. (As Chapter
V will point out, the LOAC allowed attacks on its warships during these maneuvers and attacks on the convoys if they carried war-fighting or war-sustaining
goods.) However, Iran could not permanently bar territorial sea innocent passage,
even as it could not permanently bar transit passage through the Strait ofHormuz.
Saudi Arabia could legitimately proclaim territorial sea safety corridors to facilitate neutral tanker traffic. It was unlawful for Iran to use neutrals' territorial seas
for naval maneuvers; this was a violation of neutrals' territorial integrity under the
Charter, Article 2(4). It was also unlawful for belligerents to attack neutral ports or
attempt to frustrate entry into or egress from neutral ports, and the UN Security
Council was fully justified in denouncing this behavior. The LOS principle, which
is congruent with Article 2(4) and LOAC principles regarding neutrals, was
thereby strengthened and reinforced.
4. Passage Through the Strait ofHormuz
As noted, the Tanker War began while LOS Convention negotiation~ were
on-going. When the war ended in 1988, the ratification process was underway.
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During the Eighties more and more States shifted from traditional three-mile territorial sea claims to more expansive sovereignty claims, up to and beyond the
12-mile limit the LOS Convention would allow. This had important ramifications
for the law of straits passage. If three miles was all a coastal State could claim, the
Strait ofHormuz had a narrow band of high seas through which ocean traffic could
exercise freedoms of navigation and overflight under the 1958 LOS conventions'
high seas regime. On the other hand, if the LOS Convention territorial sea definition was the law and 12 miles could be claimed, the territorial seas ofIran and the
UAE could (and did) totally overlap, so that the LOS Convention straits transit
passage regime applied. Claims ofIraq and neutrals, e.g., the United States, that
Iran could not deny straits passage under either regime were well-founded in international law. This was one of the major victories of the Tanker Warin terms of the
law of the sea.
The war also pointed out one of the major weaknesses of the 1958 conventions,
confusion over straits passage, particularly if territorial seas of opposite States
overlap, which is now the situation for the Strait if, as most (including the United
States) believe, countries may legitimately claim a 12-mile territorial sea. Does the
territorial sea innocent passage regime, with its potential for temporary straits closure when a State bordering a strait like Hormuz asserts its security is threatened,
apply through the Territorial Sea Convention, or does the customary rule of unfettered straits passage apply? Given worldwide dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and
similar navigational needs for other straits (e.g., Bab el-Mandeb in the Red Sea,
through which tanker and other traffic may pass to transit the Suez Canal and serve
Mediterranean Europe and Africa and the rest of the Earth through the Straits of
Gibraltar), this remains a critical issue. Successful assertion of a straits passage regime, perhaps founded on the LOS Convention rules, was another critical victory
of the Tanker War for the law of the sea.

5. Merchantmen and Warships: Reflagging and Other Issues
The Tanker Warraised no countries' claims concerning the definition of a warship, although there was the possibility ofit with respect to the Iranian speedboats
and US crewing of tugs for at least one voyage of reflagged tankers from Kuwait.
The High Seas Convention defines warships in traditional terms; other of the 1958
conventions have no definitions, and 1958 convention parties must depend on customary rules, which are relatively well-established, for high seas situations. The
LOS Convention repairs this gap.
Reregistration, i.e., reflagging of the Kuwaiti tankers complied with the LOS
genuine link doctrine; for LOAC purposes, as Chapter V will point out, the flag of
the tanker was all that counted. The rejected proposal for reflagging neutral merchant ships trapped in the Shatt aI-Arab under the UN or Red Cross flag followed
LOS Convention principles; Iraq's refusal to allow this was within Iraq's rights.
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However, if the Security Council had decided to allow this under Charter Articles
25 and 48, the procedure would have been allowed.
Because of the complex business of today's international shipping, where ownership, cargo, insurance, financing and other interests may be spread among nationals and companies of many nations, there was, and remains, the potential for
espousal of claims related to damage to or destruction of ships and cargoes during
the war. None of these claims appear to have surfaced, however. No espoused
claims for deaths of or injuries to merchant mariners or other maritime workers
have appeared, but that potential for the future also exists. The United States settled death claims arising from the Airbus destruction by ex gratia payments, and
presumably similar settlements were made for deaths or injuries related to self-defense responses connected with Gulf shipping, e.g., the dhows and fishing boats.
Iraq settled claims arising from its mistaken attack on the U.S.S. Stark on the high
seas.

6. Final Thoughts
For most countries, the LOS Convention has become treaty law to serve, alongside customary rules often embedded in the Convention along with developing
customary norms, as a relatively stable legal regime for the oceans. That this Convention is needed is most apparent in several areas. The Convention restates and
thereby strengthens traditional rules, e.g., freedoms of high seas navigation and
overflight, vital to navies but also to merchant traffic and civil aviation. The Convention provides rules for new developments in the law of the sea since the 1958
treaties, e.g., the EEZ, which is not covered at all in those earlier conventions.
Rules for today's reality of a 12-mile territorial sea have crystallized. Knotty problems of straits passage are now closer to solution and will be solved through the
transit passage regime for watery isthmuses like the Strait ofHormuz. The same
warship definition will apply for all ocean areas.
Some countries, e.g., the United States, have thus far chosen not to ratify the
LOS Convention, even though a protocol, the Boat Agreement, revises what the
United States and other nations have perceived as weaknesses in the LOS Convention's deep sea mining provisions. These countries must depend on customary
norms, which can change through practice and acceptance as law, an example being the 12-mile territorial sea. Nonratifying countries' positions can be weakened,
despite the vehicle of protests of nonacquiescence, as worldwide practice changes
and more States accept the changes as law. If these countries, like the United
States, are 1958 LOS conventions parties, their position is less strong than if they
had not ratified these treaties, because opponents can argue that 1958 treaty
norms, e.g., the dangerously confusing straits passage principles, apply, and not
the customary norm restated in the LOS Convention or in general customary law.
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The final lesson from the Tanker War, as it applies to the law of the sea, is an argument for ratifying the 1982 LOS Convention. That Convention is not perfect
and may not cover all situations; no contract, no will, no statute, no treaty, no legal
document does or ever will. The straits passage and warship definition issues arising from the 1958 LOS conventions are two examples. It is hoped that nonratifying
countries will study the Tanker War record as it applies to the LOS and give serious consideration to ratifying the 1982 LOS Convention and its protocol. Ratification of these treaties, and observance of them, may help prevent future crises or
wars.
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40. Vienna Convention, art. 61; see also nn. II1.928, IV.26 and accompanying te.xt.
41. Vienna Convention, art. 62; see also nn. II1.929, IV.27 and accompanying te.xt.

42. See nn. II1.916-67, IV.6-36 and accompanying lext.
43. See nn. 1-3 and accompanying text.
44. LOS Convention, art. 311(1); see also 5 Nordquist 1111311.1-311.5, 311.11; Vienna Convention, art. 59; ILC
Report, n. III 192,252-53; McNAIRCh. 31; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 323; SINCLAIR 184. It has been argued that because
the 1958 conventions have no denunciation clauses, they cannot be denounced. See Lowe, The Command,..,~, n.
III.318, 120-21; Vienna Convention, art. 57; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 333; SINCLAIR 183-84. States' ratifying the LOS
Convention moots the issue.
45. LOS Convention, art. 311(2); see also 5 Nordquist 1111 311.1-311.8, 311.11; Vienna Convention, art. 30;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 323.
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46. LOS Convention, artS. 311(3)-311(4); see also 5 Nordquist ~~ 311.1-311.8, 311.11; Vienna Convention,artA1;
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 334(3) & cmts. b,c, r.n. 2,3.
47. LOS Convention, arts. 37-45; see also Part B.6.
48. LOS Convention, art. 237; see also nn. VI. 47-50 and accompanying texL
49. 4 Nordquist ~ 237.7(a); see also Jonathan I. Charney, The Marine Environment and Ihe 1982 Uniled Nalions
Convcnl/on on Ihe Law ofrhe Sea, 28 INT'LLAW. 879, 884 (1994).
50. LOS Convention, art. 311(5);seealso 5 Nordquist 11311.11; Vienna Convention,arL 30(2); 1 OPPENHEIM § 590,
at 1213; SINCLAIR 97-98. See nn. VI.90-184, 207·09 and accompanying text for analysis of the LOS Convention's
environmental protection standards.
51. LOS Convention, arL 45; see also Part B.6.
52. LOS Convention, arts. 17-32; see also PartB.4.
53. Vienna Convention, preamble, arts. 38,43; see also n. III.lO and accompanying texL
54. ICJ Statute, arts. 38(1), 59; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. III.lO and accompanying text.
55. Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 31·38, 91-135; Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 22.
56. Michael Akehurst, Cuslom as a Source of Internalional Law, 47 BYBIL 49-52 (1974). LOS Convention, arL
22(1) seems to anticipate this possibility with respect to proportionate anticipatory action to ward off p01lution
threats. Id., art. 310 provides:
Article 309 does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from making
declarations or Statements, however phrased or named, with a view, inreralia, to the harmonization ofits laws
and regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that such declarations or Statements do not
purport to exclude ono modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Convention in their application to the
State.

Id., art. 309 forbids reservations or exceptions to the Convention and is the reason for the Boat Agreement, n. 3, to
amend the Convention's Part XI. Such Statements, taken c01lectively, arguably could articulate custom apart from the
Convention. However, occasional presence of clear, contradictory authorizations for custom, e.g., id., art. 22(1), plus
the "obscurity and uncertainty" of arL 310's meaning, cf. 5 Nordquist 11310.5, indicate custom and other sources may
be considered alongside Convention norms.
57. UN Members must comply with Security Council decisions. UN Charter, arts. 25,48. These supersede treaty
obligations. !d., arL 103; Reisman, The Conslilulional, n. III.651, 87. The Council may recommend action or ca1l upon
States fornction pursuant to UN Charter, artS. 39-41; the General Assembly may recommend action underid., arts. 10,
14; these resolutions do not have decisions' binding force, but they may restate customary or treaty norms and
strengthen them. BAILEY & DAWS, n. III.657,chs. 3,6; BROWNLlE,INTERNATIONALLAW 699-700; CASTENADA, n. III.22,
ch. 3.;; GOODRICH., al. 111-14,141-45,207-11,334-37,614-17; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102, cmL g; 103(2)(3), cmt. c &
r.n. 2; SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAl., n. III.358, ch. 6; SIMI>IA 236·42, 270·87, 614-16, 618, 626-28, 631-35, 651,1118-25;
see also nn. m.10·11, IV.6-9 and accompanying texL
58. Vienna Convention, arts. 53, 64; see also n.Ill.10 and accompanying texL
59. Table ST1-1: Ralificalions oflhe 1982 UN Convention on Ihe Law oflhe Sea, NWP 9A Annotated, at 1·3.
60. Vienna Convention, art. 18; see also UN G.A. Res. 59a, 38 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 47, at48 (1983)(callingon a1l
Stales to refrain from actions undermining the 1982 LOS Convention); n. 32 and accompanying te.XL
61. By war's end Belgium, Byelorussia (Belarus), Denmark, Italy, Japan, Ukraine, USSR, the United Kingdom
and the United States were Territorial Sea Convention parties. Belgium, Byelorussia (Belarus), Denmark, FRG, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Ukraine, USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States were High Seas Convention parties.
Byelorussia (Belarus), Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, Ukraine, USSR, the United Kingdom and the United
Sl3tes were Continental Shelf Convention parties. Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, the United Kingdom
and the United States were Fishery Convention parties. 1989 TIF 309, 336·37; NWP 9A Annotated, Table STl·2:
Ratljical/ons of 1958 LOS Conventions. Treaty succession principles may bind former USSR republics. Symposium,
Trealy Succession; Walker, Integralion and Disintegralion.

62. Sec, e.g., High Seas Convention, preamble; nn.III.962·63 (LOS Convention navigational articles also restate
custom); sec also BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmL f.
63. To 3 certain extent the Tanker War was an e.xception. Iranian Silkworm missiles hit Kuwaiti vessels and ships
reflagged under the US ensign while in Kuwaiti territorial waters; there were armed conflict situations in Saudi and
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other Gulf States' territorial waters. See nn. 11.357 (mines in Kuwait, Om ani territorial seas), 365 (Iran naval
maneuvers in Saudi territorial sea), 379 (Iran's projected naval maneuvers in Strait ofHormuz, an international strait
less than 24 miles wide and including Iranian territorial waters), 394-402 (Iranian Silkworm missile attack on Kuwaiti
vessels, ships reflagged under US ensign in Kuwaiti territorial waters; attacks on Kuwaiti deepwater terminal); and
accompanying texL
64. Most commentators take an opposite tack. See, e.g., 1 BROWN; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, Part IVj
COLOMBOS; McDOUGAL & BURKE; NWP 9A Annotated, ch.l; NWP I-14M Annotated, ch. 1; 1-2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF
THE SEA; 1 OPPENHEIM, cbs. 5-6; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), Part V; 4 WHITEMAN.

65. See generally McDOUGAL & BURKE 730-33j 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 793-94.
66. Compare High Seas Convention, art.l,with LOS Convention, arL 86. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) ~1I21, cmL bj 45,
cmL a, accept this definition; see also 3 Nordquist 1I~ 86.1-86.1I(d).
67. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.958-61, IV.15-18 and accompanying text.
68. Compare High Seas Convention, arL 4, with LOS Convention, arL 90; see also 3 Nordquist 1111 90.1-90.8(d).
World War I's peace treaties settled the issue ofwhether landlocked States could register ships. Today itis a customary
rule. COLOMBOS § 312.
69. Compare High Seas Convention, arL 2,listing the first four, with LOS Convention, art. 87(1), adding freedoms
to build artificial islands and other similar installations, and to conduct scientific research; see also BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 233-37; McDOUGAL & BURKE 758; 3 Nordquist 1I1187.1-87.9(m); NWP I-14M Annotated 112.4.3;
NWP 9A Annotated 112.4.3; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 284-85; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 21 cmt. b.

70. This is consistent with ICAO Convention, arts. 1-3, limiting aircraft overflights to areas not in States'
territories, defining territory as a State's land mass and territorial waters. The two treaties are thus compatible with
Continental Shelf Convention, arL 3, and LOS Conventions, arL 78, stating that continental shelf rights do not
derogate from airspace rights. Thus aircraft may overfly international waters up to the outer limits of States' territorial
seas, however defined. For the latter, see Part B.3.
71. LOS Conventions, art. 87(a)(c) makes this subject to limitations in id., arts. 76-85 (continental shell).
Continental Shelf Convention, arL 4, takes a similar approach. See also LOS Conventions, arts. 51(2) (archipelagic
States), 112-15 (general terms); High Seas Convention, arts. 26-30 (same); Convention for Protection of Sub marine
Cables, Mar. 14, 1884; Declaration Respecting Interpretation ofArticles II and IV, Dec. 1, 1886; Final Protocol,]uly7,
1887,24 StaL 989, 25 id. 1424, considered customary law. See I BROWN 238, 256, 261-62, 315-17; McDOUGAL & BURKE
704-06,733-34,778-82,844-48; 3 Nordquist 111l87.9(e), 1I2.1-15.7(d); 2 O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 820-21; 1
OPPENHEIM §§ 310-11; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 521, cmL f & r.n. 4; Hague IV, Regulations, art. 54, forbids seizing or
cutting submarine cables connecting occupied territory with neutral territory "except in •.. absolute necessity."
Restoration and compensation are required after hostilities end. Compare OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL arL 54; see also
Pietro Verri, Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 329,335.
72. LOS Convention, arL 87(1)(e) limits this right, referring to id. arts. 116·20, dealing primarily with living
resources conservation, but also under id., arL 1I6(a), any "treaty obligations." The High Seas Convention has no
comparable qualifications, but Fishery Convention, arts. 1-4 limits high seas fishing. See also 3 Nordquist lI1187.9(g),
116.1-120.5(d); 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 327-47; REsTATEMENT (THlRD) § 521, cmt. e & r.n. 3.
73. LOS Convention, ~rL 87(1)(d) conditions this on observing continental shelfnorms in id., arts. 76·85. ld., arL
80, incorporates standards for artificial islands and other structures in id., arL 60 for the continental shelf; these follow
generally Continental Shelf Convention, arL 5 principles. See also 3 Nordquist 1187.9(1).
74. LOS Convention, art. 87(1)(1) conditions this on continental shelf norms in id., arts. 76-85, and marine
scientific research provisions, id., arts. 238·65. ld., arts. 259·60 provide for artificial scientific research installations;
id., art. 261 declares these installations "shall not constitute an obstacle to established international shipping routes."
/d., arL 262 provides for identification markings and "internationally agreed warning signals" to ensure safe sea and
air navigation. See also 3 Nordquist 11 87.9(h).

75. Compare, LOS Convention, art. 87(2), with High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also 3 Nordquist '!l87.9(k); NWP
I-14M Annotated 112.4.3; NWP 9A Annotated 112.4.3; 2 O'CONNELL,LAWOFTHESEA 796.99; I OPPENHEIM § 285,789;
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 521(3); Robertson, New LOS 273-74,286; Oxman, The Regime, n. III.956, 837-88.
76. LOS Convention, art. 87(2) must be read alongside the definition of theA rea, "thesea·bed and ocean floor and
subsoil. .. beyond the limits of national jurisdiction[.l" ld., art. 1(1). The territorial sea, defined in id., arL 3 as up to 12
miles off shore baselines; the contiguous zone, defined in id. art. 33 as up to 24 miles off shore; the continental shelf,
defined in id., art. 76 as up to 200 miles off shore or "the natural prolongation of [a State'slland territory to the outer
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edge of the continental margin, whichever is greater;" the EEZ, defined in id., as up to 200 miles off shore, all have
potential for claims of national jurisdiction, or sovereignty in the case of the territorial sea.

77. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 90, 95-96, 110(1) with High Seas Convention, arts. 4, 8-9. See also LOS
Convention, arts. 124-32, which expand on the High Seas Convention, arL 3 statement of rights for land-locked States.
See also 3 Nordquist \1\1 95.1-96.IO(d), 110.1-110.11(a) (longstanding rules for immunities); NWP I-14M Annotated \III
2.1.2-2.1.3 (same); NWP9AAnnotated 1111 2.1.2-2.1.3 (same); 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 289,292 (same); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §
522(1) (same); n. 68; Part B.2.
78. HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE
EAST INDIAN TRhDE (MARE LIBERUM) (Ralph van Deman Magoffin trans. 1916), discussed in SWARZTRhUBER 18-20.
79. JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM: SEU, DE DOMINIO MARIS [Of the Dominion or, Ownership of the Sea]
(Mnrchnmont Nedham trans. 1652, 1972 rep. cd.), discussed in SWARZTRhUBER 20-22.

80. See nn. 11.68,210, and accompanying te.XL

81. See nn. 84-118 and accompanying texL
82. STEFAN RIESENFELD,PROTECTION OF CoASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1942).
83. S. Doc. 103-39, n. 3, 6 Dispatch, Supp. No.1, at 27.
84. The treaty also stipulated landing rights for drying fish. Definitive Treaty of Peace, SepL 3, 1783, Gr.
BriL-US, nrL 3, 8 StaL 80, 82. See also 1 MOORE 767-70.
85. 1 MOORE 773.
86. It!. 774-76, quotingJohn Quincy Adams,Righi ofthe People ofthe United States to the Fishing Liberties-Effect of
War Upon Treaties and Treaty Stipulations-Peculiar Character of the Treaty of 1783, in id., The Duplicate Letters, The
Fisheries and the Mississippi 182,189-90, 194-96, 197 (1822).

87. Convention, OCL 20, 1818, Gr. BriL-US, arL 1,8 StaL 246. See also 1 MOORE 780-82; 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE
SEA 513-14.
88. Reciprocity Treaty, June 5,1854, Gr. BriL-US, arL 1, 10 Stat. 1089. See also 1 MOORE 792.
89. Treaty of Washington, May 8,1871, Gr. Brit.-US, arts. 18-20,33,17 StaL 863,869-70,874, modified by
Protocol,June 7,1873,18 id. 372; Exchange of Memorandums & Notes, Mar. 12-June 22, 1885, 1885 FRUS, T.S. No.
138-1.Seealso 1 MOORE799-810. Theunperfected TreatyofWashingron, Feb. 15, 1888,3 WIKTOR 119, tried to resolve
issues over US fishing vessels seizures in Canadian harbors and to grant Canada and Newfoundland reciprocal fishing
rights off the eastern United States. A parallel interim Fisheries Protocol, Feb. 18,1888,12 BEVANS 209, e.xpired in
1890. See also 1 MOORE 810-73.
90. Exchange of Notes, OCL 6 & 8, 1906, Gr. BriL-US, 12 BEVANS 279-82.
91. Exchange of Notes, SepL 4 & 6, 1907, Gr. BriL-US, id. 290-92; Exchange of Notes, July 15 & 23, 1908, Gr.
BriL-US, id. 317-18, T.S. No. 504; Exchange of Notes, July 22 & SepL 8, 1909, Gr. BriL-US, id. 339-40, T.S. No. 533.
The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Treaty,July 10, 1912, Gr. BriL-US, 37 StaL 1634, following the Permanent Court
of Arbitration award, regularized fishing procedures under British, Canadian or Newfoundland local laws.
92. Treaty on Fisheries in US & Canadian Waters, Apr. 11, 1908, Gr. Brit.-US, arts. 1-2,4,35 StaL 2000-01, as
implemented by Commission recommendations. 1 HACKWORTH 798-800.
93. Agreement on Arbitration of North Atlantic Coast Fisheries, Jan. 27,1909, Gr. BriL-US, 36 Stat. 2141, T.S.
No. 521; see also E.xchange of Notes, Jan. 27-Mar. 4, 1909, Gr. BriL-US, 12 BEVANS 335-38.

94. See n. 87 and accompanying te.XL
95. North Atlantic Fisheries (Gr. BriL v. US), 11 UNRlAA 167, 188-89, 193, 194, 195,202 (Perm. CL Arb. 1910).
It!. 195-200 defined measurement of "three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbours" in the 1818
Convention, n. 87; fishermen could not exercise treaty fishing rights and commercial privilege concurrently. It!. 202.

96. Compare id. 190-92 with Agreement on North Atlantic Coast Fisheries, July 20, 1912, Gr. BriL-US, 37 StaL
1634. See also Minutes of Conferences, Jan. 12, 1911, Gr. Brit.-US, Jan. 14,1911,12 BEVANS 350, 351.
97. Convention for Preservation ofthe Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean, Mar. 2,1923, Gr. Brit.-US,
arts. 1, 3,43 StaL 1841-42; Convention on Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean & Bering Sea, May 9,1930,
Can. -US, arts. 1, 3,47 id. 1872-73, implemented for the United States by Northern Pacific Halibut Act ofMay 2, 1932,
47 id. 142; Convention on Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean & Bering Sea, Jan. 29, 1937, arts. 1, 3, 50 id.
1351-52, implemented by Act ofJune 28,1938,50 it!. 325, 328. See also 1 HACKWORTH 801.

312

The Tanker War

98. Convention Concerning Sockeye Salmon Fisheries, May 26, 1930, Can. -US, arts. 1-2, SO Stat. 1355, amended
by Protocol, Dec. 28, 1956,8 UST 1057; the United States had claimed rights to regulate this fishing by legislation
since 1924.
99. 1 MOORE 890-92.
100. Convention, Apr. 17,1824, Russ.-US, an. 1,8 Stat. 302.

101. ld., arts. 4, 5, 8 Stat. 304.

102. Compare id., arts. 1,4,5,8 Stat. 302, 304, with Convention Concerning Limits of Respective Possessions on
NonhwestCoastofAmerica & Navigation of the Pacific Ocean, Feb. 16/28, 1825,ans.l, 7, 9, 75 CTS 95, 97, 99-100.
103. Treaty Concerning Cession of Russian Possessions in North America, Mar. 30, 1867, Russ.-US, art. 1,15 Stat.
539.
104. Act to Provide for Protection of Salmon Fisheries of Alaska, § 3,25 Stat. 1009.
105. Bering Sea Arbitration (US v. Gr. Brit.), 1 MOORE 910, 912-13 (1893), constituted pursuant to Convention
Submitting to Arbitration Questions Which Have Arisen Concerning jurisdictional Rights ofthe United States in
Waters of the Bering Sea, Feb. 29, 1892, Gr. Brit.-US, 27 Stat. 947 (Bering Sea Arbitration Convention); sec also 1
MOORE 893-945.
106. Bering Sea Arbitration, n. 105,914-16, implementing Bering Sea Arbitration Convention, n. 105, art. 7, 27
Stat. 950.
107. Act of Apr. 6, 1894 to Give Effect to Award Rendered by Tribunal of Arbitration Under Treaty between the
United States & Great Britain Concluded Feb. 29, 1892, for Submitting to Arbitration Certain Questions Concerning
Preservation of Fur Seals, 28 Stat. 52; see also 1 O'CONNEt.t., LAW OF THE SEA 522-23.
108. The same is true for Modus Vivendi on Fur Seal Fisheries in Bering Sea,june 15, 1891, Gr. Brit.-US,27 Stat.
980; Agreement for Articles for Insertion in Arbitration Agreement, Dec. 18,1891, Gr. Brit.-US, 12 BEVANS 217;
Convention for Extending Modus Vivendi on Fur Seal Fisheries in the Bering Sea, Apr. 18, 1892, Gr. Brit.-US, 27 Stat.
952. For history of the controversy leading to the award,see 1 MOORE 895-910. Convention for Settlement of Claims in
Virtue of the Convention of Feb. 29,1892, Feb. 8, 1896, Gr. Brit.-US, 29 Stat. 844, also advanced no claims to regulate
high seas navigation in the disputed fishery area.

109. See generally 1 MOORE 922-23.
UO. Modus Vivendi for Regulation of Fur Seal Fisheries in the Bering Sea & North Pacific Ocean, May 4,1894,
Russ.-US,28 Stat. 1202.
Ul. Protocol for Ship Claims, Sept. 8, 1900, Russ.-US, U BeVANS 1232.
112. Ship Claims Arbitration (US v. Russ.), 9 UNRIAA 51, 63-66, 1 MOORE 927,928 (1902). Although rendered in
the Permanent COUrt ofArbitration building, the award was nota Court decision because Protocolfor Ship Claims, n.
Ul, had been ratified before Hague Convention (I) for Pacific Settlement ofInternational Disputes, july 29, 1899,32
Stat. 1779, went into force. Ship Claims Arbitration 55 n.l.
113. Ship Claims Arbitration, n. U2, 66-78; see also 1 MOORE 928-29.
U4. Convention for Preservation & Protection of Fur Seals,july 7, 19U, art. 1,37 Stat. 1542, superseding Treaty
for Preservation & Protection of Fur Seals, Feb. 7, 19U, Gr. Brit.-US, art. 1, id. 1538, which had covered the same
subjectwithoutnavigationallimitations. Act ofAug. 24, 1912,37 Stat.499,500,implemented the 19U treaty. Sccalso 1
HACKWORTH 792-98.
U5. Treaty Relating to Spitsbergen, Feb. 9, 1920, arts. 1-2,43 Stat. 1892, 1894-95, 2 LNTS 7, 10.
U6. ld., art. 3,43 Stat. 1895, 2 LNTS U.
U7. See, e.g., 1 HACKWORTH 803.
U8. 1931 Whaling Regulation Convention, n. 19. Supplementary 1946 Whaling Regulation Convention and
Whaling Regulation Protocol, n.19, extending protected areas and forbidden whaling methods, also e.-:press no limits
on navigation.
U9. See generally 4 WHITEMAN 1096-97. The First Act of the Inter-American Specialized Conference on
Conservation of Natural Resources, Mar. 28,1956, noted disagreement on territorial sea breadth and coastal State
"special interest" in adjacent high seas but e.xpressed no opinion on matters for which no agreement was reached,
urging negotiations on these points. The United States disclaimed a State's right to unilaterally claim broad territorial
seas for exclusive jurisdiction over high seas fishing rights.ld. UU-B.
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120. See, e.g., Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 5, 1943,4
WHITEMAN 946·47; Roosevelt memorandum to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, June 9, 1943, id. 947; Assistant
Secretary of State Breckenridge Long memorandum to State Department Legal Adviser Green H. Hackworth,Mar. 8,
1944, rd. 949, the latter urging decoupling the concepts.
121. Sturgeon, memorandum of conference between US Departments of State and Interior representatives,July
15, 1944, id. 948·50; Sturgeon, internal memorandum for Department of State, July 19, 1944, id. 950. Foreign
governments were also consulted; they approved the approach. William W. Bishop, Summary Report on Department
Fisheries Commillec and Infonnal DlScussionswith Canada and Newfoundland, July 8, 1944, id. 951-52; Bishop & James C.
Dunn, Continental Shelf and Coastal Fisheries Policies, July 3, 1945, id. 953-54.
122. Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas,Proclamation
No. 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304,3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-48); see also 2 Nordquist ~ V.5.

123. Sec 4 WHITEMAN 794,797,800 for te.xts of the decrees. Ecuador claimed a 12-mile territorial sea and asserted
broad continental shelf rights.
124. Other provisions asserted 200·mile belts for islands and jurisdiction over the seabed and its subsoil. Treaties
to this effect were projected. Declaration of Santiago, Aug. 18, 1952,4 WHITEMAN 1089·90, MACCHESNEY 265-67.
125. Supplementary Agreement to Declaration of Sovereignty Over Maritime Zone of 200 Miles, Dec. 4, 1954,
MACCHESNEY 275-76. Other treaties dealt with programs to control fishing and hunting in the zone, permits and
neighboring States' accidental violations. See id. 276-82; see also 2 Nordquist ~ V.5.

126. Sec 4 WHITEMAN 796, 798, 800 for te.xts of the protests; see also 2 Nordquist ~ V.5.
127. Conference on U.S.-Ecuadoran FisheIY Relations, Apr. 14, 1953, art. 2(1),4 WHITEMAN 1092,1093,28 Bulletin
759 (1953).

128. See, e.g., Herman Phleger, Recent Developments Affecting the Regime of the High Seas, 32 Bulletin 934, 936-37
(1955),citinginteralia UN Secretariat,Memorandum on the Regime of the High Seas 47, UN Doc. NCN. 4/32 (1950);
Int'l Law Comm'n, Report Covering the Work ofIts Fifth Session, 1 June-14 August 1953, at 17, UN Doc. No. Af2456
(1953); US Delegation to Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources,
Memorandum on Certain Aspects of United States Policy Regarding Conservation of Resources of the Continental
Shelf and Marine Waters (1956), 4 WHITEMAN 959, 960; US Secretary of State Christian A. Herter instruction to US
Philippines Embassy, Jan. 31, 1958, id. 961-62.

129. Seegenera/ly4 WHITEMAN 1101-1110, 1198-1207.
130. Ecuador Foreign Minister Neftali Ponce Miranda press Statement, Sept. 28, 1963,4 id. 1207-08; MCRM
2-147; ROACH & SMITH 115.5.

131. See nn. 99-101 and accompanying te.xt.
132. Gene Glenn, The Su:edish-Soviet Territorial Sea Controversy in the Baltic, 50 AJIL 942, 944 (1956).
133. Secid.

134. Barents Sea Pact,May 25,1956, USSR-UK, 266 UNTS 210. The USSR terminated this in 1962.4 WHITEMAN
982.
135. USSR decree, Mar. 21,1956, id. 1021 (trans!.).
136. Treaty Concerning Fisheries on the High Seas in the North Pacific Ocean, May 14, 1956, J apan-USSR, 263
UNTS99.
137. Fishery Convention, art. 1(1).

138. Id., arts. 3-13. For background on id., see 4 WHITEMAN 963-77.
139. High Seas Convention, arts. 2(1)-2(2).
140. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(5); see also nn. 301-07 and accompanying text.
141. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24(1), see also nn. 295-300 and accompanying text.
142. FisheriesJurisdiction (FRGv. Ice., UK v. Ice.), 1974ICJ 1; 1 O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 530-42. In 1966
the United States claimed a 12-mile offshore fishing zone. Contiguous Fishery Zone Act, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat.
908. Pub. L. No. 88-308, 78 id. 194, replaced by Pub. L. No. 90-427, 82 id. 445, had prohibited foreign flag territorial sea
fishing.
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143. Fishing & Conservation Management Act ofl976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 101,90 Stat. 331,336, subsequently
amended (FCMA).
144. The Act also empowered the US Secretary of the Treasury to amend regulations underthe Act to conform to a
general LOS convention,e.g., the 1982 LOS Convention. FCMA, n.143, §§ 201-05,401,90 Stat. 337·46, 359.60, later
amended. E.g., Pub. L. No. 99·659, § 101,100 id. 3715, repealed FCMA § 401.
145. MACDoNALD 140-41, 146.

146. ld. 141,146-47.
147. LOS Convention, arts. 55·58(1). The Convention also provides for high seas fishing rights, subjecting them to
existing treaties, cooperation in achieving agreements on high seas fishing, and Convention rules for certain fish
stocks and conserving high seas living resources. ld., art. 116, incorporating id., arts. 63(2), 64-67, 118-20; compare
Fishery Convention, arts. 1-8, 13; see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 521, cmt. e; S. Doc.103-39, n.3, 6 Dispatch Supp.
No.1, at 27-28, listing treaties regulating or prohibiting high seas fishing. See also 2 Nordquist ~~ V.6-V.33,
55.1-58.lO(d), id. 116.1-116.9(g); Charney, Marine Environmenl, n. 49, 896-901.
148. LOS Convention, art. 58(2), incorporating id., arts. 88-115;seealso 2 Nordquist ~ 58.10(d); for analysis ofother
rules clauses,see nn. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying texL

149. Compare Fishery Convention, arL l(a)(b) wilh LOS Convention, arts. 56(2),58(3); see also 2 Nordquist 11
56.11(f), 58.10(e)-58.10(f); n. 75 and accompanying text.
150. Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1974ICJ 22, 29.
151. 2 Nordquist II 58.10(b) (Brazil, Cape Verde); Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318, 112-14 (same).
152. Ifhigh seas military exercises can be held pursuant to the LOS Convention, arts. 87-88, citing arts. 87-88 in id.,
art. 58, means exercises can be held in the EEZ subject to the due regard principle governing high seas navigation,
overflight, ele., and EEZ navigation, overflight, ele. Due regard's content, i.e., more care must be taken in the EEZ
because of nearby installations, ele., may be different and more exacting, but the shared use principle remains the
same. 2 Nordquist 1158.lO(c); NWP I-14M Annotated 1I1.5.2,at 1-20; NWP 9AAnnotated 111.5.2, at 1-21. See also n. 75
and accompanying te.-.:L Protests on claims to regulate the EEZ beyond LOS parameters have been lodged, e.g.,
Brazil's objection to EEZ use for military e.-.:ercises or maneuvers. NWP I-14M Annotated 111.5.2 n.51; NWP 9A
Annotated 111.5.2 n.49; ROACH & SMtIH 117.4.
153. Some countries have a different view. Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318, 114-15.
154. LOS Convention, arts. 60(8), 121; see also 2 Nordquist 1111 60.1-60.15(c), 60.15(k), 121.1-121.12(c); NWP
I-14M Annotated 111.5.2 n.52; NWP 9A Annotated 111.5.2 0.50.
155. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; LOS, arts. 58,87; High Seas Convention,arL 2; 1 BROWN 219;Robertson,New LOS

285; see also n. III.I0-11, 47-630, 916-18, 932-67, IV.6-36 and accompanying text.
156. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; LOS Convention, aIL 87; High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.I0-H,
47-630,916-18,932·67, IV.6-36 and accompanying text.
157. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary of Gulf of Maine (Can. v. US), 1984 IC] 246, 294; 1 BROWN 245; 2
Nordquist 11 V.33; NWP I-14M Annotated II 1.5.2 n.48; NWP 9A Annotated II 1.5.2 n.46; 1 OPPENHEIM § 329;
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 514,cmL a &r.n.I-3; ROACH & SMITH 117.2; butsee NWP I-14M Annotated 1I1.5.2n.48 Gapan's
1987 Statement, coastal State EEZ rights, jurisdiction "are yet to be established as principles of general international
law."); 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 570-79 (uncertainty, in 1982, whether draft LOS Convention EEZ terms
restated custom.) In 1983 the United States proclaimed a 200-mile EEZ, the largest EEZ on Earth. Presidential
Proclamation No. 5030, Mar. 10 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 10601 (1983); United Siaies Ocean Policy, n. 3; NWP I-14M
Annotated 111.5.2, 1-20-121.

158. See nn. 80-136 and accompanying text (fishery claims).
159. See nn. 123-30 and accompanying texL
160. LOS Convention, arL 88;see also nn. III.932-67,IV.10-25 and accompanying text (arL 88 analysis inconte.'(t of
"other rules" clauses, Charter law).
161. LOS Convention, art. 87(2), High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also n. 75 and accompanying text.
162. NWP 9A Annotated, Table STI-5; see also MAcDONALD 199-200.
163. ROACH & SMITH 11112.6, 14.2.1 at 413-14.
164. LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also n. 75 and accompanying text.

Law of the Sea

315

165. Sec nn. II.I78-80, 210-14, 21'1., 306, 309, 367,401-02,410-11,434,457 and accompanying text.
166. Sec nn. II. 178-80, 210-14, 272, 306, 309, 401-02, 434, 457 and accompanying text.
167. Sec nn.111.952-67 and accompanying text.
168. See Parts V.A, V.G.l, V.J.l, V.J.7, Chapter VI.
169. Sec nn. II.281, 393-99 and accompanying text.
170. UN Charter, arts. 51,103; see also nn.11I.lO-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
171. Sec Parts V.A, V.J.1.
172. Sec nn. 11. 393-99 and Chapter VI.

173. Sec nn. III. 952·67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
174. LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also n. 75 and accompanying text.
175. LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also n. 75 and accompanying text.
176. LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn.III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying
te.xt.
177. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.9-10, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
178. LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also n. 75 and accompanying te.xt.
179. LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn.1I1.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying
text.
180. LOS Convention, art. 88; see also nn. III.955-58, IV.15-18 and accompanying te.xt.
181. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103;seealso nn.11.250, 264, 354, 357, 359, 368,420, 430,III.I0-ll, 46·630, 916-18, 932-67,
IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
182. Sec nn. II.148, 216, 278, 303, 357, 379-81, 463 and accompanying text; Part B.6.
183. LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also n. 75 and accompanying text.
184. LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also n. 75 and accompanying text.
185. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.I0-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
186. LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn.11I.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying
te."t.
187. Sec nn.11.338-39, 459·69 and accompanying text.
188. Sec generally CoLOMBOS § 83; SWARZTRAUBER 97-99.
189. Sec generally SWARZTRAUBER 95-97.
190. Humphrey Waldock, The Legal Basis of Claims to the Continental Shelf, 36 GROTIUS SOCoy TRANS. 115,116-18
(1951). For other summarized views, see CoLOMBOS §§ 81-84; 1 O'CONNELL, LAw OF THE SEA 467-70; 1 OPPENHEIM §
314, 766·67; SWARZTRAUBER 165·69; 4 WHITEMAN 740-41; Josef L. Kunz, Continental Shelf and IntcrnatWnal Law:
Confusion andAbuse, 50 AJIL 828·30, 832 (1956). McDOUGAL & BURKE412, 662 reject a connection between exploiting
fisheries and mineral e."ploitation on the shelf.
191. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 US 69(1941) based jurisdiction on defendant's Florida citizenship, leaving open the
issue of whether Florida could regulate offshore sponge fishing beyond the three·mile sea limit the United States
recognized. CoLOMEOS §§ 81, 164,428; SWARZTRAUBER 96-97.
192. Treaty Relating to Submarine Areas of Gulfof Pari a, Feb. 26, 1942, UK-Venez., arts. 2, 6, 205 LNTS 121, 122,
124 implemented by UK Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria (anne."ation) Order in Council, Aug. 6, 1942, § 4,4
WHITEMAN 791, 792; see also COLOMBOS § 82; 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 470, 484; SWARZTRAUBER 160; 4 WHITEMAN
789,791. The Order supported lack of a claim based on custom. BROWNLlE,INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; see also COLOMBOS §
82; 1 O'CoNNELL 470, 473·75, 484.
193. Proclamation No. 2668, n. 122; see also SWARZTRAUBER 161·63.
194. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil & SeaBed of the Continental
Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945), 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943·48); see also 2 Nordquist ~~ V.5, V1.6;
SWARZTRAUBER 160·61.
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195. See, e.g., Eugene H. Dooman memorandum to William Phillips, June 15, 1945; William W. Bishop &
Dooman memorandum to US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes,July 3,1945,4 WHITEMAN 754·55; US Secretary of
the Interior Harold L. Ickes letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt,June9, 1943; Roosevelt letter to US Secretary of
State Cordell Hull, June 9, 1943, id. 946.
196. Proclamation No. 2667, n. 194.
197. Pub. L. No. 83·212,67 Stat. 462-71, now enacted as 43 USC §§ 1331-43, which has caused knotty private law
issues. See SCHOENBAUM § 1-9; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 23 r.n.I. Outer Continental Shelf Resources
Management Act of 1978,43 USC § 1801 (1994), amended and supplemented OCSLA.
198. Submerged Lands Act,43 USC §§ 1301-15 (1994), relinquishing US title to the continental shelf to the states
inside of the three·mile limit; see also SCHOENBAUM § 1-9 n.3.
199. OCSLA, § 3(b), 67 Stat. 462, since amended. This buttressed the customary norm. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5; 1 OPPENHELII § 10,26.
200. MAcDoNALD 115·16.
201. EdwinJ. Cosford,Jr., The ContinentaIShe/fandtheAIJuDhabiAward, 1 MCGILLL.J.109, 124(1953); Sorenson,
Law ofthe Sea, INTI. CoNCILIATION 195,226·27 (No. 520, 1958).
202. Argentina, Declaration Proclaiming Sovereignty Over the Epicontinental Sea & Continental Shelf, Decree
No. 14,708, Oct. 9, 1946,41 AJIL Supp.11 (1947); see also COLOMBOS § 87B,74; SWARZTMUBER 162·63.
203. Chile Presidential Decree, June 23, 1947,4 WHITEMAN 794·96; see also COLOMBOS § 87B, 74; SWARZTMUBER
164.
204. Ecuador Congressional Decree, Feb. 21, 1951, WHITEMAN 799·800.
205. Peru Presidential Decree No. 781, Aug. 1,1947, id. 797·98; see also COLOMBOS § 87B,74.
206. Declaration of Santiago on Maritime Zone, n. 124; see also Supplementary Convention to Declaration of
Santiago on Maritime Zone, MACCHESNEY 275; 1 OPPENHEIM § 315; SWARZTMUBER 165; nn. 123-30 and accompanying
text.
207. El Salvador Const., art. 7, 4 WHITEMAN 801·02; see also SWARZTMUBER 164·65.
208. Honduras Decree No. 25 Gan. 17,1951), discussed in 1 OPPENHEIM § 715 n.4.
209. Presidential Declaration with Respect to Continental Shelf, OCL 29, 1945, discussed in SWARZTMUBER
162·63; Mexican Presidential Decree, Feb. 25, 1949,4 WHITEMAN 803.
210. SWARZTMUBER 163; Cosford, n. 201, 124. US protests included US Ambassador James Bruce note to
Argentina Foreign Office,July 2,1948,4 WHITEMAN 794·94; US Ambassador Claude G. Bowers protest note to Chile
Foreign Relations Minister German Vergara Donoso,July 2, 1948,id. 796·97; US Ambassador Paul C. Daniels note to
Ecuador Ministry for Foreign Affairs, June 7, 1951, id. 800·01; US Charge d'Affaires ad interim de Lambert note to
Peru Foreign Affairs Minister Armando Revoredo I,July 2,1948, id. 798·99; US Ambassador George P. Shaw note to
Salvador Minister for Foreign Affairs Canessa, Dec. 12, 1950, id. 802.
211. ROACH & SMITH 118.5, 205·08.
212. Saudi Arabia, Territorial Waters of Saudi Arabia, Decree No. 6/4/5/3711, May 28, 1949, in 43 AJIL Surf. 154
(1949); COLOMBOS § 88; MACDONALD 115·16, 118·22 144·46, 199 (noting similarity of Saudi claim to US
proclamation); 1 O'CoNNELL, LAW Or THE SEA 473; Richard Young, Saudi Arabian Offshore Legislation, 43 AJIL 530
(1949).
213. COLOMBOS § 88A; MACDONALD 116, 119, 145.
214. COLOMBOS § 88A; MACDONALD 199.
215. Earlier disputes over land boundaries and islands clouded delimitation ofoffshore lines. MAcDONALD 116·17,

126·37,147·51,199·201; see also nn. II.50·51, 69.
216. MACDONALD 199·200; see also MCRM 2·37, 2·235 - 2.240, 2-283, 2·352 - 2·356, 2·387 - 2·388, 2-437 ·2·526,
2·526 - 2·528.
217. 4 WHITEMAN 814·42 is an anthology of continental shelf definitions issues through 1965.
218. Continental Shelf Convention, arL 1; see also 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 714-23.
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219. Continental ShelfConvention, arts. 6(1),6(2); see also 2 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTIlE SEA 684-727; 1 OPPENHEIM §§
322-23. Convention shelf definitions do not necessarily coincide with geological definitions. NWP I-14M Annotated
111.6 n. 56; NWP 9A Annotated 111.6 n.54; 1 OPPENHEIM § 316.See 1 O'CONNELLCh.12 for geological analysis. National
laws may vary from both;see, e.g., id. 492-98. To the extent national definitions vary from custom or treaty obligations,
they are inadmissible under international law. Vienna Convention, art. 46; Nottebohm (Liech. v. GuaL), 1955 ICJ 4,
20-21; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 35-36; 1 OPPENHEIM § 21; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 311(3).
220. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 23.
221. North Sea Continental Shelf(FRGv. Den., FRGv. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 38, 53; see also 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF
THE SEA 480-82; 2 iri 690,699-703,705-08; 1 OPPENHEIM § 324; Wolfgang Friedmann, The North Sea Continental Shelf
Cascs-A Critique, 64 AJIL 229 (70).
222. Continental Shelf Convention, art. 2; see also 1 BROWN 255-56; 1 OPPENHEtM § 317; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §
515(1).
223. Continental Shelf Convention, art. 3; see also 1 BROWN 256; NWP 1-14 Annotated 111.6, at 1-23; NWP 9A
Annotated 111.6, at 1-24; 1 OPPENHEIM § 319; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 515(2).
224. Continental Shelf Convention, arL 5(a). Id., art. 5(8) requires coastal State consent for shelf research, which
should "not normal\y [be withheld] .••• if .•. submitted by a qualified institution" engaged in "purely scientific
research into the physical or biological characteristics of the ... shelf," if the coastal State can participate or be
represented in the research; see also 1 BROWN 256-57.
225. Continental Shelf Convention, arts. 4, 5(2)-5(7), 7.
226. High Seas Convention, arL 2.

227. Sec n. 75 and accompanying te.'(L
228. Continental Shelf Convention, arL 4.

229. lri, arts. 5(1), 5(6).
230. The coastal State must undertake al\ appropriate measures in the zones to protect the sea's living resources
from harmful agents. The Convention does not prejudice that State's right to tunnel to exploit the subsoil at any
depth.lri, arts. 5(2)·5(5), 5(7), 7. See also CoLOMBOS §§ 89-91; NWP 1·14 M Annotated 111.6; NWP 9A, Annotated 11
1.6; 1 OPPENHEIM § 321; SWARZTRAUBER 214.

231. Compare LOS Convention, arL 78, with Continental Shelf Convention, arL 3; see also 1 BROWN 258·59; 2
Nordquist IJIIVI.4, 78.1-78.8(d); NWP I-14M Annotated 1I1.6,at 1-23; NWP9AAnnotated 1I1.6,at 1·24; 10PPENHEtM
§ 319; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 515.
232. Compare LOS Convention, arL 57, with w., arL 76(1); see also 2 Nordquist '1111 57.8(a)·57.8(b), 76.1-76.18(b).
233. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 76(1), 76(2), 76(4)-76(6) with Continental Shelf Convention, art. 1; see also 1
OPPENHELI\ §§ 322·23. Although NWP 1·14M Annotated II 1.6 and NWP 9A Annotated II 1.6 declare this is a
customary norm for distance, Lowe, Commander's Handbook, n. III.318, 114, says itmaynot bethe case. 2 Nordquist 1111
76.18(a)·76.18(b) is neutral on the point. LOS Convention, arts. 76(7)·76(9), provide for publishing and approving
shelf claims by Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf, established in id., Annex II. See also 2 Nordquist '1111
76. 18(c), 76.18(e)·76.18(l).
234. Compare LOS Convention, arL 76(2), with Continental Shelf Convention, arL l(a).
235. Compare LOS Convention, arL 83(1)·83(2), 83(4), referring to id., arts. 279·99, with Continental Shelf
Convention, arts. 6(1), 6(2); see also Maritime Delimitation in Area between Greenland & Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.),
1993 ICJ 38, 59-60; Continental Shelf(Libya v.Malta), 1985 ICJ 18,43; Continental Shelf(Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 ICJ
18,43; North Sea Continental Shelf, n. 221; United Kingdom· France Continental Shelf(UK v. Fr.), 54 ILR 6 (Ct.
Arb. 1977); Delimitation of Maritime Boundary (Guinea v. Guinea·Bissau), 25 ILM 251, 272 (Ad Hoc Arb. 1985); 2
Nordquist 1111 83.1·83.19(c), 83.19(e); 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 480·82; 2 iri 685-714; 1 OPPENHEtM §§ 325-26.
Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning CompUlsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 26, 1958,450 UNTS 169, refers
disputes to the International Court of Justice butis not in force for the United States. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), Part V,
Introductory Note, at 4 n.3. United States Ocean Policy, n. 3, besides proclaiming a 200·mile EEZ, said the claim would
"provide jurisdiction for mineral resources out to 200 nautical miles that are not on the continental shelf." This claim
is consistent with customary law.
236. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 77(l)-77(3)with Continental Shelf Convention, art. 2; see also 2 Nordquist 1111
77.1-77.7(b).
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237. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 261-62 with Continental Shelf Convention, art. 5(1); see also 4 Nordquist Ii~
261.1-62.5.
238. Compare LOS Convention, art. 240(c) with Continental Shelf Convention, art. 5(1); sec also 4 Nordquist 1i~
240.1-40.8,240.9(c).

239. LOS Convention, arts. 192-265; Continental Shelf Convention, art. 24, calls upon States to draft regulations
to prevent sea pollution resulting from seabed and subsoil exploration and exploitation. See nn. VI.64, 110, 116-20 and
accompanying text.
240. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 60, 79-81,85 with Continental ShelfConvention, arts. 4, 5(2)-5(7), 7; see also 2
Nordquist 1I1160.1-60.15(m), 79.1-81.7(d), 85.1-85.6; 1 OPPENHELI\ § 320-21; n.215 and accompanying text. The Area is
the deep seabed beyond the continental shelf; its resources are declared the common heritage of mankind. LOS
Convention, arts. 136-37; see also BROWN 10,20,445-47; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 350-52; nn. VI.64, 116-17, 147-50 and
accompanying text. Because of the Persian Gulfs shallow depth, there is no Area beneath its waters. See nn. II.66-69
and accompanying text.

241. North Sea Continental Shelf, n. 221 and accompanying text.
242. Delimitation of Maritime Boundary of Gulf of Maine (US v. Can.), 1984 ICJ 246, 294; see also Continental
Shelf(Libya v. Malta), 1985 ICJ 13,55; 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OI'THE SEA 688-714; ROACH & SMITH 118.5; REsTATEMENT
(TH1RD),Introductol)' Note to Part V,S; id. § 515, cmt. b, say some LOS Convention provisions may be de lege/erenda,
e.g., LOS Convention, arts. 68, 77.
243. ROACH & SMITH 11 8.5.
244. See nn.123-30, 200-16 and accompanying text.
245. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.I0-H, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
246. LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying
text.
247. See nn. V.653, 659 and accompanying text; see also Parts V.G.2-V.G.3, V.J.6-V.J.7.

248. Seabed Arms Control Treaty,arts.I-2, incorporating by reference Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24(12-mile
limit for contiguous zone). As ofJanuary 1, 1998,99 States were party, albeit some with reservations,etc. TIF 445-46.
State succession principles may increase the number. Symposium, State Succession; Walker, Integration and
Disintegration. Given the number of parties, the treaty may be on the way toward recognition as a customary norm.
BROWNLlE,INTERNATIONALLAW5; 1 OPPENHELI\ § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmt. 4; see also n.III.I0and
accompanying texL
249. Accord, NWP I-14M Annotated 11 10.2.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11 10.2.2.1; see also 1 BROWN 243-44; 1
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 488 (divergence of views whether coastal State has exclusive use of its proclaimed
continental shelffor these purposes).

250. UN Charter, arts. 51,103; LOS Convention, arts. 78, 87(1); Continental Shelf Convention, art. 3; High Seas
Convention, art. 2. See nn. III.10-H, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-9, 10-25 and accompanying text.
251. Seabed Arms Control Treaty, art. 4.
252. LOS Convention, arts. 78-79(1), 87(1); Continental Shelf Convention, arts. 3-5(1); High Seas Convention, art.
2; see also nn. 75, 149-50, 152, 155-56 and accompanying text.
253. See nn. II.66-69 and accompanying text.

254. MACDONALD 119.
255. Id. 200; see also n. II.51 and accompanying text.
256. See n. 239 and accompanying text.
257. See nn. II.367, 410-11 and accompanying text.
258. See nn. 11.178-80, 210-14, 272, 306, 309, 401-02, 434, 457 and accompanying text.
259. See n. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text.

260. See Parts V.A, V.G.l, V.J.l, V.J.7, Chapter VI.
261. See nn. II.281, 393-99 and accompanying text.
262. Cf. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.I0-11, 916-18,lV.6-9 and accompanying text.
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263. See nn. V.21-28 and accompanying te.xt.
264. See generally Chapter VI.
265. See nn. 111.10-11,48·630,916-18,952·67, IV.6-25 and accompanying te.xt.
266. See nn. 75, 149-50,152,155-56,239 and accompanying text.
267. See CoLOMBOS §§ 95-106; PHILIP C. JESSUP, THELAWOFTERR1TORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 3-66
(1927); 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SU chs. 3-4; SWARZTRAuBERpassim for similar analysis through their publication
dates.
268. SWARZTRAUBER 130; accord, JESSUP, THE LAW, n.267, 66.
269. Customs Consolidation Act, 39 & 40 Vict., ch. 36, § 134. The Act also asserted other claims related to policing
smuggling.
270. SWARZTRAUBER 70; see also JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267,10-11, also citing Act of Aug. 20, 1853, 16 & 17Vict., ch.
107. Convention for Regulating Police of North Sea Fisheries, May 6, 1882, arts. 2, 3,160 CTS 219, 222, established a
three-mile zone for e.xc!usive fishing by coastal State nationals. Convention Respecting Free Navigation of the Suez
Canal, Oct. 29, 1888, an. 4, 171 CTS 241, 244 and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Treaty to Facilitate Construction of a
Ship Canal, Nov. 18,1901, Gr. Brit.-US, art. 3(5), 32 Stat. 1903, 1904, forbade hostilities within three miles of ports at
the ends of the Suez and Panama canals. Alleganean Claim (Gr. Brit. v. US),4 MOORE, ARBITRATIONS 4332, stated three
miles was the territorial limit recognized by international law. See also COLOMBOS § 106; JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267,
61-62; 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OJ'THE SEA 157.
271. Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, Oct. 16, 1878,41 & 42 Vict., ch. 73, §§ 2,7, superseding The Queen v.
Keyn, 2 Ex.D. 63 (1876). CoLOMBOS §105 notes the connection between the Acts.
272. US Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson letters to British Minister to the United States George Hammond,
French Minister to the United States Charles Genet, Nov. 8, 1793, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440·42
(Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1895).
273. Act ofJune 5, 1794, § 6, 1 Stat. 381, 384; see also NWP I-14M Annotated '111.4.1 n.32; NWP 9AAnnotated, '!I
1.4.1 n.30; SWARZTRAUBER 60.

274. See generally JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267, 9·66; SWARZTRAUBER 64-107.
275. Declaration of HerbertH. D. Price, U.S. Agent, in C. H. White Case (US v. Russ.), 9 UNRIAA 63, upon the US
Secretary of State's specific authority. Until 1988 the United States remained committed to three miles. US
DepartmentofState Public Notice 358, 37 Fed. Reg. 11906 Uune 15, 1972). See also The Delaware, 161 US 459 (1896);
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 US 240, 257-58 (1891) for contemporary judicial views; CoLOMBOS § 107; 1902
FRUS, App. C 440·61; SWARZTRAUBER 77-78, 92-95.
276. US Naval War Code, art. 2.

277. See SWARZTRAUBER 112-15.
278. [do 117-23, citing Convention for Preservation & Protection of Fur Seals, n.114, art. 5, 37 Stat. 1543; North
Atlantic Fisheries (Gr. Brit. v. US), n. 95, implemented by North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Treaty, n. 91, art. 2, 37 Stat.
1635.
279. Compare Hague VIII, art. 2, with Hague XIII, referring to "neutral waters;" see also Report to the Third
Commission oflhe Second Hague Peace Conference, Sept. 17, 1907, art. 2, in JAI>\ES BROWN SCOTT, THE REPORTS TO THE
HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, at 664 (1917). SWARZTRAUBER 116 says "This draft was essentially the British
version •••" The US Navy may have been more interested in a different rule than id. indicates; Naval War College,
International Law Topics and Discussions 1913, at 11 (1914), a draft for a Hague conference that never was because of
World War I, advocated a six-mile marginal sea. See JESSUP, THE LAw, n. 267, 56; see also Robertson, New LOS 274-77;
nn. V.60, 70-72 and accompanying te.xt.
280. Sce generally COLOMBOS § 157; 1 O'CoNNELL, LAW OFmE SEA 157; SWARZTRAUBER 123-25.
281. Report oflhe Neutrality Commillee, in International Law Association, Report of the Thirty-Third Conference
260 (1924), recommending Amended Draft Convenlion: Laws ofMarilimeJurisdiclion in Time ofPeace, id. 286. See also
CoLOMBOS § 114,103; SWARZTRAUBER 126.
282. Institute ofIntemational Law,Projet de reglement relalifa la mer terriloriole en lemps de paix, 34 ANNUAIRE 755
(1928); see also COLO.I\BOS § 114, 102-03; SWARZTRAUBER 127.
283. Harvard Research Draft, arts. 2, 3.
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284. Conference for Codification ofInternational Law, Final Act, B. Territorial Sea, Resolution, arts. 1-2,4-5
(1930),24 AjIL SuPP. 169, 183-85 (1930). COLOMBOS §§ 114-17; O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 158-59; SWARZTRAUBlR
131-38 describe events leading up to the Conference, illustrating divided opinion on the limit.
285. MACDoNALD 86.
286. Sixteen conventions were ratified: Belgium, Dec. 9, 1925,45 Stat. 2456,

n LNTS 171; Chile, May 27,1930,46

id. 2852, 133 LNTS 141; Cuba (with exchange ofnotes & memorandum ofunderstanding),Mar. 4, 1926,44id. 2395,61
LNTS 383; Denmark, May 29, 1924,43 id. 1809,27 LNTS 361; France,june 30,1924,45 id. 2403,61 LNTS 415;
Germany, May 19, 1924,43 id. 1815; Great Britain, jan. 23, 1924, id. 1761,27 LNTS 181; Greece, Apr. 25, 1928, 451d.
2736,91 LNTS 231; Italy, june 23, 1924,43id. 1844;Japan(withmemorandum ofunderstanding),May31, 1928,46Id.
2446,101 LNTS 63; Netherlands, Aug. 21,1924,44 id. 2013,33 LNTS 433; Norway, May 24,1924,43 id. 1772,26
LNTS 43; Panama, june 6, 1924,id. 1875,138 LNTS 397; Poland,june 30, 1930,46id. 2773, 108 LNTS 323; Spain,
Feb. 10, 1926,2,44 id. 2465,67 LNTS 131; Sweden, May 20,1924,43 id. 1830,29 LNTS 421. All are in force e:..:cept
those with Germany and Italy. TIF 22, 52, 66, n, 97,111,155,203,213,222,236,263,270, 304. JESSUP. THE LAW, n. 267,
56-57, in zeal for the three-mile limit, does not note the distinction, although several treaties leaving the issue open
were concluded by 1927.

287. See nn. 123-30,200-16 and accompanying text; see also COLOMBOS §§ 87, 88A; SWARZTRAUBER 162-65.
288. See SWARZTRAUBER 171-n.
289. Fisheries jurisdiction (UK v. Nor.), 1951 ICj 116, 119-21, 143; see also BROWN 24-26 (Fisheries jurisdiction
formula followed in Territorial Sea Convention, artA); COLOMBOS §§ 124-28A, 131, 134 (same); 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOF
THE SEA 199-206.
290. MACDoNALD 86-87.
291. Philippines Ministry of Foreign Affairs note to UN Secretary General, Dec. 12, 1955,4 WHITEMAN 282-83;
Republic of Indonesia, Announcement on Territorial Waters, Dec. 14, 1957, id. 284. The United States noted
non-acquiescience to the Philippines claim and protested the Indonesia AnnouncemenL ld. 283-85.
292. MACDoNALD 87-88.
293. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1-2, reaffirmed by LOS Convention, art. 2; see also 2 Nordquist ~~ II.l, II.3,
2.8(1); 1 OPPENHEtM § 187; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512 & cmts. a, b, r.n.l, 2.
294. The 12-mile claim was an amendment ofits 1934 assertion of a contiguous zone. MAcDONALD 88, 107; see also
nn. 300, 354 and accompanying text.
295. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 24, which is also the limit for emplacing nuclear weapons or weapons of mass
destruction, as stated in the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, arts. 1-2. See nn. 248-52 and accompanying text. To the
extent that States assert a right to punish offenses committed within the zone, as Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318,
112 says, this exceeds the scope of the Convention's granL However, States may arrest, try and punish persons who
commit offenses in the zone pursuant to jurisdictional bases other than the territorial principle, e.g., the protective
principle cited by id. n. 14 in United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938-39 (11th Cir. 1985). See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) §§ 402-04, 421-23.
296. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 24(1) ("In a zone of the high seas contiguous to the territorial sea •.• ").
297. The US contiguous zone was reasserted in US State Department Public Notice 358, n. 275. Most countries'
pre-Convention contiguous zone claims were part ofwidespread practice for protecting revenue and health interests.
See BROWN 128-30; 1 OPPENHEIM § 205. In 1999 the United States proclaimed a 24-mile contiguous zone. Proclamation
No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48701 (1999). See also n. 536 and accompanying text.
298. High Seas Convention, arL 23; see also BROWN 135-36; COLOMBOS §§ 171-79; NWP I-14M Annotated \I
3.11.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated '\13.9; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1075-93; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 cmL g;
Craig H. Allen,Doctrine ofHot Pursuit: A Functionallnterpretation Adaptable to Emerging Technologies and Practices, 20
ODIL 309 (1989) (analyzing LOS Convention rules); Susan Maidment,HistoricAspects ofthe Doctrine ofHot Pursuit, 46
BYBIL 365 (1972).
299. MACDONALD 100, 107.
300. Manley O. Hudson and Richard Young of the Harvard Law School, acting in private capacity, drafted the
1949 claim, noting regional practice for a 6-mile territorial sea.ld. 87-88, 100-07.
301. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-13; see also BROWN 24-26 (Territorial Sea Convention, arL 4 follows
Fisheries Jurisdiction, n. 289); COLOMBOS §§ 118-10, 134 (same); 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 170-235;
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SWARZTRAUBER 204-11; 4 WHITEMAN passim_ For discussion oflranian and Saudi baseline claims through 1959, see
MACDoNALD 92-98.
302. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14; its other rules clause refers to the LOAC.See nn. III.953-67, IV. 10-25 and
accompanying text. What is "prejudice" under the Convention, art. 14(4) was left to coastal State interpretation and
failed to limit prejudicial activities to those in which a foreign ship engaged while transiting the territorial sea. See also
1 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 294-97; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 45, cmts. fog; 48; itI. (THIRD) §§ 512, cmt. c & r.n.3-6;
513(1)-513(2) & cmts. a-c, e, f, r.n.1-2; Roma Sadurska, Foreign Submarines in Swedish Watm: The Erosion of an
International Norm, 10 YALE INTL L.J. 34 (1984). LOS Convention art. 19 tries to eliminate some subjective
interpretative difficulties that have arisen concerning the 1958 Convention innocent passage rules. NWP 9A
Annotated ~ 2.3.2.1 n.25. O'CONNELL does not rule out using force against a submerged transiting submarine but says
"every measure should be taken short of force to require the submarine to leave, as provided in Article 23 of the
[Territorial Sea Convention)." 1 O'CoNNELL 297. A coastal State retains a right of self-defense, including anticipatory
self-defense, under UN Charter, arts. 51, 103. See nn. III.lO-11, 48-630,916-18,952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying
te.xt. Sec also 2 Nordquist ~~ 19.1-19.11.
303. NWP I-14M Annotated ~ 2.3.2.4 n.33; NWP 9A Annotated

~

2.3.2.4 n.32.

304. 1 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 294 (right to e....cluderooted in treaty law, e.g., ICAO Convention, arts. 1, 3(c»;
NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.2.1; NWP9AAnnotated n.3.2.1;REsTATEMENT(SECOND) § 45,cmt. j;id. (THlRD)§ 513,
cmt. i & r.n.6.
305. Special agreements can give military and other State aircraft overflight or landing rights. REsTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 513, r.n.6, citing Chicago International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944,59 Stat. 1693, 84
UNTS 389, which does not cover military or State aircraft.
306. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 15.
307. Eight countries appended reservations to protect their claims that surface warship passage was subject to prior
notification or au thorization. Nevertheless, the weight ofauthority is that the Convention permits innocent passage of
warships without prior notice or authorization. BROWN 64-66; NWP I-14M Annotated ~ 2.3.2.4; NWP 9AAnnotated
112.3.2.4; 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 274-91 (customary trends, which apply to warship innocent passage under the
Convention; no evidence of State practice before very recent times of other than free, uncontested warship passage);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 49 (implication of coastal State waiver); id (THIRD) § 513, cmt. h & r.n.2; but see 1 OPPENHEIM
§ 201 (right doubtful). Saudi Arabia opposed warship innocent passage; Iran claimed warship passage required prior
authorization. MAcDONALD 170-71, 178.
308. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16; see also 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 297-98; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §
513(2) & cmts. b-c. For analysis of straits passage, see Part.B.6.
309. McDOUGAL & BURKE 592-93; NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.2.3 n.31; NWP 9A, Annotated II 2.3.2.3 n.30.
310. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 17; see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513(2) & cmts. b, c. Art. 17's other rules
clause refers to the LOAC; see nn. III.953-67, IV.1O-25 and accompanying te....t.
311. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 18-20; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 46-47; id. (Third) §§ 512, r.n. 5;
513(2) & cmt. c.
312. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 21-22. The other rules clause refers to the LOAC. See nn. III.953-67,
IV.10-25 and accompanying text.
313. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 23.
314. BROWN 44-45; COLOMBOS §§ 119-20A; l\iACDONALD 171; 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 161-64;
SWARZTRAUBER 214-18; 4 WHITEMAN 122-35; Powers & Hardy, n. 2, 70-71.
315. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 15(2); accord, COLOMBOS § 121, citing inter alia McDOUGAL & BURKE 562, asserting
two years later that the three-mile limit was the only common denominator.

316. Sea generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 11-15, citing Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-4, 6-12.
317. MACDONALD 90-91; see also nn. 299-300 and accompanying text.
318. LOS Convention, arts. 2-3; see also 2 Nordquist 1I'II2.1-3.8(e).

319. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 4-16, with Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3-13; see also BROWN 22-36; 2
Nordquist ~~ 4.1-16.8(e); NWP I-14M Annotated 111.3; NWP 9A Annotated 111.3; 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA
175-235; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 188-95; ROACH & SMITH '11'11 4.1-4.5. 2 O'CONNELL 842-47 notes the LOS Convention's
ambiguity on whether deepwater ports are artificial islands. The US Deepwater Port Act of 1974,33 USC §§ 1501,
1502(10), provide for them; see also NWP I-14M Annotated '111.4.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated 111.4.2.2.
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320. REsrATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 511(a) & cmL b; 512.

321. ld. § 511, r.nA.
322. In 1958 19 States claimed4to 11 miles; in 1965 24claimed4to 11 miles; in 197414 claimed 4 to 11 miles; in
19797 claimed 4 to 11 miles. Table AI-6: The Expansion ofTerritorial Sea Claims, in NWP I-14M Annotated, at 1·84;
Table 3: Territorial Sea Claims, in ROACH & SMITH 149; see also BROWN 45-50. Newly independent States claimed
12-mile limits, while many that had claimed 4 to 11 miles moved to 12 miles as the number of countries adhering to a
3-mile limit declined.
323. LOS Convention, art. 3; see also 1 OPPENHEIM § 196.

324. Compare LOS Convention, arL 33, with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24. REsTATI:.IIENT (SECOND) § 21
approves Territorial Sea Convention principles.
325. This analysis is derived from the LOS Convention. Compare id., arL 33(1) ("In a zone contiguous to its
territorial sea .•. ")with id., arL 24(2)("The ... zone may not extend beyond 24 ... miles from the baselines from which
..• the territorial sea is measured."). See also BROWN 129-35; 2 Nordquist §§ 33.1-33.8(i); 1 OPPENHEIM § 205;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 511(b) & cmt. k; 513 cmL f.

326. Compare LOS Convention, art. 111, with High Seas Convention, arL 23; see also BROWN 135-36; 2 Nordquist'
33.8(g); 3id. II' 111.1-11.9(i); NWP I-14M Annotated 113.11.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated , 3.9; REsTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 22; id. (THIRD) § 513 cmL g; Allen, n. 298; Maidment, n. 298; n. 298 and accompanying text.
327. LOS Convention, art. 303(2); see also BROWN 135; REsrATEMENT (THIRD) § 521 r.n.6; nn. VI.141-50 and
accompanying text. Article 303 also says its terms are also "without prejudice to other international agreements and
rules of international law regarding the protection ofobjects ofan archaeological and historical na ture," an example of
derogation permitted byarL 311(2) and the Convention's other rules clauses, which allow applying the LOAC in
appropriate situations. See nn. !II.953-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying texL
328. President Ronald Reagan, United States Oceans Policy, Mar. 10, 1983, 19 WEEKLY CO~IP. PRES. Doc. 383 (Mar.
14, 1983);seealsoBRoWN 50-51; NWP I-14M Annotated 111.2; NWP 9A Annotated II 1.2; REsrATEMENT(THIRD)§ 511
r.n.4; Mark B. Feldman & David Colson, The Maritime Boundaries ofthe United States, 75 AJIL 729, 730 (1981).
329. REsrATEMENT (THIRD), Part V,lntroductory Note 5; see also n. 328 and accompanying texL Five years later the
United States proclaimed a 12-mile territorial sea. Proclamation No. 5928, Territorial Sea of the United States, Dec.
27, 1988,54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1989); see also n. 332 and accompanying text.
330. Only 5 claimed 4 to 11 miles. Table 3: Territorial Sea Claims, in ROACH & SMITH 149.
331. REsrATEMENT (THIRD) § 511(a) & r.n.4.
332. Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, Dec. 27, 1988,54 Fed. Reg. 777 Gan. 9, 1989).
333. By 1997 Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE had joined 119 other States in proclaiming 12-mile territorial seas. NWP
I-14M Annotated, Table AI-5; NWP 9A Annotated, Table STI-5; see also BROWN 45-50.

334. Cf. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEL\\ § 10,28; REsrATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmL f.
335. NWP I-14M Annotated, TableAI-5 at 1-84; NWP 9AAnnotated, Table STl-5;seealso Table 6.1: Territorial
Sea Claims as at 1 June 1993, in BROWN 46-49.
336. ROACH & SMITH 1111 5.4-5.5.
337. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 14(5) omitted reference to foreign flag fishing ships, as did the straits
innocent passage rule in id., art.16(4). The 1982 LOS Convention, arL 20 also requires "other underwater vehicles" to
navigate on the surface and to show their flag. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 17-18, 20, 25-28, 30, 32 with Territorial
Sea Convention, arts. 14-15, 18-20,22(2),23; see also BROWN 51-53, 62-64; 2 Nordquist 111117.1-18.6(1), 20.1-20.7(c),
25.1-28.4(e), 30.1-30.6, 32.1-32.7(b); NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.2.1, 2.3.2.4; NWP 9AAnnoIated 11112.3.2.1,2.3.2.4;
1 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 294-97; PartB.5. Although LOS Convention, arL 30, like Territorial Sea Convention,
art. 23, limits a coastal State to requiring a submerged submarine to leave, and this might be the only step a coastal
State takes, that State also has self-defense and any LOACrights, the latter applying to the territorial sea through other
rules clauses in LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1), 21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2). UN
Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. !IUO-ll, 47-630, 914-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

338. Compare LOS Convention, arL 19(1) with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); see also 2 Nordquist \I
19.1O(a); 1 OPPENHEIM § 615; REsrATEMENT (THIRD) § 513(1) & cmL b, r.n.1.
339. See nn. III.952-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying texL
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340. Compare LOS Convention, arL 19(2) with Territorial Sea Convention, art. l4(5).
341. Compare Joint Statement with Uniform Attached Interpretation of Rules oflnternational Law Governing
Innocent Passage, Sept. 23, 1989, USSR-US, '113, in 28ILM 1444, 1446 (1989) Goint Interpretation)(listexhaustive); 2
Nordquist '11'11 19.2-19.9, 19.10(b)-19.11 (although negotiations may indicate list open-ended, Joint Interpretation
likely to be influential for view that list is e:..:haustive); NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.1 n.27 (arL 19[2] list exclusive);
NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.1 n.26 (same); F. David Froman, Uncharted Waters: Non-innocentPassageofWarships in the
TerritorialSea, 21 SANDIEGOL. REv. 625, 659 (1984)(same); RobertJ. Grammig,Comment, The YoronJimaSubmarine
Incident ofAugust 1980: A Swiet Violation of the Law of the Sea, 22 fuRV. INT"L L. J. 331, 340 (1981) (same); John R.
Stevenson & Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law ofthe Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69
AJIL 763, 771-72 (1975)(same)with BROWN 56-58 (taking no position); 2 Nordquist '1119.10(1) (diplomatic conference
criticism of list as being open-ended); 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 270 (list does not say these activities are the
"only" ones; art. 19(2)(1) so general as to comprehend anything); 1 OPPENHEIM § 199,616 ("possibly comprehensive
list"); Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318, 116 (list illustrative; erroneous citation ofNWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.1 as
agreeing with this point). REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 cmL b takes no position.
342. Compare LOS Convention, arL 20 with Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6); see also 1 OPPENHEIM § 201,620;
Sadurska, n. 302, 57; nn. 302, 337 and accompanying text.

343. 1 O'CoNNELL,LAWOFTHESEA 294 (citing inter alia ICAO Convention, arts. 1, 3(c»; NWP I-14M Annotated'll
2.3.2.1, at 2-9; NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.1, at 2-11; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 cmL i.

344. Sec nn. IIl.952-67, IV.IO-25 and accompanying texL
345. LOS Convention, arL 21; see also Joint Interpretation, n. 341, arts. 5-7, 28 ILM 1446-47; 2 Nordquist '11'11
21.1-21.12; NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.2.
346. NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.2 n.30; NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.2 n.29; see also BROWN 58-59 (no view); 1
OPPENHEIM § 198 (same); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 cmt. c (same).
347. In designating sea lanes and traffic separation schemes, a coastal State must consider competent international
organization recommendations, channels customarily used for international navigation, particular ships' and
channels' special characteristics, and traffic density. LOS Convention, art. 22. See also BROWN 59-61; 2 Nordquist '11'11
22.1-22.9; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 833-36, noting their usein straits and on the high seas; 1 OPPENHEIM § 200;
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 cmL d.
348. LOS Convention, arL 23; see also BROWN 60; 2 NORDQUIST '11'11 23.1-23.9; 1 OPPENHEIM § 200; REsTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 513 cmL d.
349. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 24-25 with Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14-16; see also BROWN 61; 2
Nordquist '11'1124.1-25.9; NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.2.3; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 198,200;
REsT.\TEMENT(THIRD) § 513 cmL C; 4 WHrrEMAN 379-86; n. 337 and accompanying text. The President of the United
States has authority to suspend innocent passage in US territorial waters. 50 USC § 191.

350. LOS Convention, art. 31; see also 2 Nordquist '11'II31.1-31.7(b).
351. Territorial Sea Convcntion,arL l4(1); LOS Convention, art. 17,confirmed by JointInterpretation,n. 341, '112,
28 ILM 1446; see also BROWN 64-66; 2 Nordquist 'II 17.9(b); NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.4; NWP 9A Annotated'll
2.3.2.4; 1 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 274-91; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513,cmt. h & r.n.2; Froman, n. 341,625; Bruce
Harlow,LegalAspects of Claims toJurisdiction in Coastal Waters, JAG J. 86 (Dec. 1969-Jan. 1970); Bernard H. Oxman,
The Regime, n. IlI.956, 854; but see 1 OPPENHEIM § 201 (expressing doubt as to the rule). See also nn. 337-50 and
accompanying te.XL
352. Table ST2-2: Nations Claiming a Right to Control Entry of Warships into Own Territorial Sea, in NWP 9A
Annotated, at 2-17; see also Froman,n. 341,651-55; Lowe, The Commander's, n.III.318, 119.1 O'CONNELL,LAWOFTHE
SEA 292-93 says the shift has been from a Cold War orientation to States wishing to demonstrate positions detached
from global sea power politics.
353. Table ST2-1: Nations Specifically Recognizing the Right ofInnocent Passage, in NWP 9A Annotated, at 2-12. The
US view is that surface warships possess the same innocent passage right as any vessel in the territorial sea, and that
right cannot be conditioned on prior notice or authorization of passage. NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.2.4 n.32; NWP
9A Annotated '112.3.2.4 n.31;accord, BROWN 66-72; 1 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 292-93; Froman,n. 341, 625; Harlow,
n. 351, 86; Oxman, The Regime, n. IlI.956, 854; see also nn. 337-50 and accompanying texL
354. All listed countries e.xcept Saudi Arabia, which claimed an l8-mile zone and a 12- mile territorial sea,
proclaimed a 24-mile zone. Table 7: States Claiming a Contiguous Zone Beyond the Territorial Sea, in ROACH & SMITH 164
n.7.
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355. ld. 164 n.7.
356. Presidential Proclamation No. 7219, n. 297, referring to Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, n. 157; sec also
nn. 157,297,329 and accompanying text.
357. The most egregious is Nonh Korea's 50·mile military maritime boundary. ROACH & SMITH ~ 6.2; sec also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 511 cmt. k (international law does not recognize coastal State assertions of special zones to
protect security or environment).
358. COLOMBOS § 170A, referring to Defensive Sea Areas, in 46 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL L.\W
DOCUMENTS 1948·49, at 157-68 (1950); Deferuive Sea Areas, in MACCHESNEY 603·04.

359. See nn. 301, 319 and accompanying text.
360. See generally ROACH & SMITH 114.6; Dennis Mansager, The U.S. Freedom ofNavigation Program: Policy,Proccdllre
and Future, LIBER A1.IICORUM ch.6.
361. LOS Convention, arL 5,7; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 3·4; see also BROWN 23; 2 Nordquist ~~ 5.1-5.4(d),
7.1-7.9(h); NWP I-14M Annotated 111.3.2; NWP 9A Annotated ~ 1.3.2; 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 170-218; 1
OPPENHEIM § 188; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 511 cmt.h; nn. 289, 301, 319, 359 and accompanying text.

362. See, e.g., Table 2: Claims Made UJ Slraiglu Baselines, ROACH & SMITH 114.6, at 77-81, with notation, "Absence of
protest or assertion should not be inferred as acceptance or rejection by the United States of the str.light baseline
claims." See also id. n.63, listing scholars' criticism of 17 States' claims.
363. Table 2, n. 362, in ROACH & SMITH 114.6,79-81.

364. See nn. II.66-69, IV.212-16 and accompanying texL
365. See nn. 296-300, 324-27 and accompanying texL
366. See nn. 80-157, 188-243 and accompanying text.
367. See n. 357 and accompanying text.
368. See nn. 300, 357 and accompanying te....:t.
369. See nn. 333, 353 and accompanying text.
370. LOS Convention, an. 22; see also nn. II.I03, 262, IV.347 and accompanying te....:t. See Parts V.B, V.C.3, V.C.5,
V.].I, V.J.3, for analysis ofIranian coastal convoying in the LOAC context.

371. See n. II.365 and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., LOS Convention, arts. 19(2)(a) (threat, use of force against coastal State sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence, or in any other manner violating principles of international law in the UN
Charter), 19(2)(b) (exercise, practice with weapons of any kind), 19(2)(1) (any other activity not having direct bearing
on passage); 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 293-94; see also nn. 338-43 and accompanying texL
373. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 16(4); see also nn. 338-43 and accompanying te....:t.

374. See generally Hague XIII; SAN RaIO MANUAL, '11'1115-16 & Commentaries; nn. V.485-92 and accompanying
text; Parts V.F.2, V.F.5, V.].6.
375. LOS Convention, ans. 2(3), 19(1),21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2); see also nn.
III. 953-67, IV.1O-25 and accompanying text.

376. See n. 363 and accompanying text.
377. LOS Convention,arL 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1; see also nn.293,318-21 and accompanying te....:L
378. LOS Convention, art. 25(3), adding weapons exercises; Territorial Sea Convention, art.16(3); see also 1
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 297-98; n. 349 and accompanying texL

379. See nn.II. 379-81 and accompanying texL
380. See Parts IV.B.6, IV.D.4, V.F.l, V.F.2, V.F.5, V.J.6.
381. 381. JESSUP 14445; see also COLOMBOS §§ 180·81; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 193,203; Memorandum of Frank Boas,
Attorney Adviser, US Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser(Sept.1957),reprinled in 4 WHITEMAN 259·61.
382. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM. INTERNATIONAL LAW § 449, 853 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); accord, COLOMBOS
§ 181; but see A. V. Lowe, The RighI ofEntry inlo Maritime Ports in InlernalionalLaw, 14 SAN DICGO L. ReV. 597-98 (1977).
383. 1 OPPENHEIM, n. 382,§ 190c; see also COLOMBOS § 181,177.
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384. Cf, WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. II.59, ch. 16 (US pOrlS).
385. LOS Convention, arts. 2(1), 8; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(1), 5(1).

386. Sec SWARZTRAUBER 4-6.
387. Inland Navigational Rules Act of 1980, 33 USC §§ 2001-38. In most countries COLREGS, i.e., treaties
governing high seas ship maneuvering and collision minimization principles, also apply to those countries' inland
waters. SCHOENBAUM § 12-2,716.
388. SCHOENBAUM § 12-2; SWARZTRAUBER 95, 239.
389. The Mowe, 1915 P. 1, 15 (Adm.); see also COLOMBOS § 180.
390. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 5(1); for baselines definitions,see id., arts. 3-4, 8, 11. REsTATEMENT (SECOND)

55 11-14 accepted the Convention definitions.
391. LOS Convention, arts. 2(1),5-8(1), 13-14, 16; see also BROWNch. 5; 2 NordquistIl1l2.1-2.8(f),5.1-8.6, 13.1-14.6,
16.1-16.8(e);NWP I-14M Annotated II 1.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 111.4.1; 1 OPPENHEIM § 171; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §
511, cmL e.
392. LOSConvention,arL 11; Territorial Sea Convention, arL 8; see also 2 Nordquist 1111 11.1-11.5 (d); 1 OPPENHEIM
§ 193.

393. LOS Convention, art. 5; Territorial Sea Convention, arL 3; see also 2 Nordquist 11115.1-5.4(d); 1 OPPENHEIM §
188; R&,.ATEMENT (SECOND) §14,acceptingTerritorial Sea Convention definitions; id. (THIRD) § 511 & cmte, r.n.2.
394. LOS Convention, arts. 12, 16; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 9; McDOUGAL & BURKE 423-27; 2 Nordquist 1111
12.1-12.4(c), 16.1-16.8(e); NWP I-14M Annotated 111.4.1; NWP9A Annotated 111.4.1; 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA
218-21; 1 OPPENHEL\I § 193; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 15, cmL c & r.n.3; id. (THIRD) § 511, cmL e & r.n.2.

395. Cf, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(l)(B) for an e.xample of a jurisdictional "bulge" in a private law conte.xt.
396. Sec nn. 390-91 and accompanying texL
397. LOS Convention, art. 11; see also 2 Nordquist 1111 11.l-11.5(d); 1 OPPENHEIM § 193.
398. LOS Convention, an. 9; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 13; see also 2 Nordquist 11119.1-9.5(e); 1 O'CONNELL,
LAW OF THE SEA 221-25; 1 OPPENHEIM § 189.
399. NWP I-14M Annotated 111.4.1; NWP9AAnnotated 111.4.1; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 176-77; 3 WHITEMAN 872-1075.
400. Sec nn. II.66-69 and accompanying te.XL

401. US SecretaryofStateJamesMonroe note to Spanish Minister Chevalier de Onis,Jan.19, 1815, 2 MOORE 269.
402. McDOUGAL & BURKE 99-100.
403. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 141 (1812).
404. 2 MOORE 270, citingid. 855-58, referring to the US' sealing Charleston harbor during the Civil War by sinking
blockships; China's sinking them during the 1884 China-France war, and Japan's near closure of Foochow harbor
during the China-Japan war.
405. 7 MOORE 855, 858.
406. LOS Convention, art. 25(3); compare Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); see also n. 349 and accompanying
text.
407. Sec Parts V.F.l, V.F.2, V.F.5, V.J.6 for LOAC analysis. The LOAC, which includes the LONW, applies
through the LOS conventions' other rules clauses, e.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1),31; Territorial Sea
Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2); see also nn. III.953-67, IV.10-25 and accompanying te.XL

408. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL
409. Compare LOS Convention, an. 124(1)(a), with Transit Trade Convention, arL l(a), which has 37 States parties.
TIF 458.Secalso McDOUGAL & BURKE 113; 3 Nordquist 1111 X.5, 124.1-24.8(f); 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHESEA 580-81; 1
OPPENHEIM § 240. The number may be higher because of treaty SUccession for the USSR and Yugoslavia. Symposium,
Slate Succcsswn; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.

410. Convention & Statute Concerning Freedom of Transit & Statute on Freedom of Transit, Apr. 20, 1921,7
LNTS 11 (Freedom of Transit Convention), which has 50 parties and perhaps more iftreaty succession principles
apply. For some States, however, the Transit Trade Convention or the LOS conventions may have superseded it in
parI. See generally 1999 UN Treaties 955; Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker,Integratwn and Disintegration.
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411. 3 Nordquist 11 X.5.

412. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 124(1)(b), 125 with Transit Trade Convention, arts. l(c), 2, 11-12; High Seas
Convention, art. 3; Freedom of Transit Convention, Statute, n. 410, arts 14,7 LNTS 27. LOS Convention, art. 17;
Territorial Sea Convention, art.I4(I) affirm a right of all ships, flagged under coastal or landlocked States, to
territorial sea innocent passage, thereby giving them ports access. A 1957 UN General Assembly resolution was an
impetus for the High Seas Convention provision. COLOMBOS § 200.

413. Compare LOS Convention, art. 124(2) with Transit Trade Convention, art. l(c).
414. Compare LOS Convention, art. 131 with Transit Trade Convention, Principles II-III, arL 2(1), and High Seas
Convention, art. 3(1); see also 3 Nordquist 1111131.1-31.7(e); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512 r.n.3.
415. Compare LOS Convention, art. 125(3) with Transit Trade Convention, arts. 11-12; Freedom of Transit
Convention, Statute, n. 410, art. 7, 7 LNTS 29.
416. Transit Trade Convention, arts. 13-14; see also Freedom of Transit Convention, Statute, n. 410, arts. 8·9,7
LNTS 29 (same; subject to League ofNations Covenant); UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51,103; nn. III.I0-ll,47-630, 916-18,
952-67,IV.6-25 and accompanying text.

417. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3),19(1),21(1),31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2),14(4), 17,22(2); Sec
also nn. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text.
418. BROWNLlE,INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmt. f. The High
Seas Convention, preamble, says it restates customary law, and most accept this; the LOS Convention navigational
articles are also widely thought to restate custom. See nn. 111.962-63 and accompanying te.XL
419. LOS Convention, art. 311(1); see also n. 44 and accompanying te.xt.
420. LOS Convention, art. 311(2); see also nn. 45-46 and accompanying text.
421. LOS Convention, art. 311(5); see also n. 50 and accompanying text.
422. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. IIUO and accompanying text.
423. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 25.
424. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also nn. 111.10 and accompanying te.xt.
425. Schooner Exchange, 11 US (2 Cranch) 145.
426. Act of Mar. 3, 1805, § 6,2 Stat. 339, 342.
427. US Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard letter to US Treasury Secretary Manning, May 28,1886,2 MOORE
718,720, referring to Proclamation of Nov. 19, 1807, 3 Am. St. Pap. 23 (1832).
428. Act of May 15, 1820,3 Stat. 597, designated Boston, Mass; Charleston, S.C.; Mobile, AI.; New London, Ct.;
New York City; Norfolk, Va.; Philadelphia; Portland, Me.; Smithville, N.C. See nn. 480, 492, 494-506 for analysis of
entry in distress.
429. President Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation of Apr. 11, 1865, 1865(1) FRUS 310.
430. Rev. Stat. §§ 2791, 5288 (1878).
431. See generally 2 MOORE 564-70 (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, South Australia, Venezuela, others).
432. Permission to enter Guam; Kiska Islands, Alaska; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Subic Bay, Philippines; Tortugas,
Fla.; and "actual limits ofany navy yards" was necessary and could be obtained from the Secrelary of the Navy through
diplomatic channels. US Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox Nov. 19, 1909 letter to Mr. Ekengren, Swedish Charge
d'Affaires, 2 HACKWORTH 416.
433. Treaty of Amity & Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, Fr.-US, arts. 34, 8 Stat. 12, 14,abrogated by Act ofjuly7, 1798, 1

id.578.
434. See, e.g., US treaties with Algiers, Sept. 5, 1795, arts. 2,10,8 Stat.133-34, superseded, June 30-July 5,1815, arts.
9, 12,id. 224,225; renewed and modified,Dec. 22-23, 1816,arts. 9, 12,id. 244,245; Argentina, July 20, 1853,arts. 24, 10
Stat. 1001, 1002;July27, 1853,art.2,id.1005, 1006; Austria, Aug. 27, 1829, arts. 1, 7-8,8 id. 398, 399400; June 19, 1928,
art. 7,47id.1876, 1881; Belgium, Nov. 10, 1845, arts. 1,6, 8 id. 606,608,superseded,July 17, 1858, arts. 1,5, 12id.1043,
104546; superseded Mar. 8, 1875, arts. 1,4, 19id. 628,630; partially terminated Feb. 21, 1961, 14 UST 1284,480UNTS
149; Bolivia,May 13, 1858,art.3, 12 Stat. 1003, 1004; Brazil, Dec. 12, 1828, arts. 34, 8 id. 390-91; Brunei,June23, 1850,
artS. 2, 7,10 id. 909-10; Bulgaria, Apr. 15,1974, art. 48, 26 UST 687, 717; Central American Federation, Dec. 5, 1825,
arts. 34, 6, 8 Stat. 322-24; Chile, May 16, 1832, arts. 34, id. 434-35; Colombia, Oct. 3, 1824, arts. 34, id. 306·08,
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superseded Dec. 12, 1846,arts. 3-7, 9id. 881,882-84; Congo, Jan. 24, 1891,am. 1,6, 27 id. 926,927,930; Costa Rica,July
10, 1851,art.2, 10id. 916,917; Danzig, Mar. 9, 1934,48id. 1680; Denmark, Apr. 25, 1826, art. 2, 8 id. 340; Oct. 1, 1951,
art. 2, 12 UST 908, 910,421 UNTS 105, 108; Dominican Republic, Feb. 8, 1867, arts. 3,7, 15 StaL 473, 475, 477;
Ecuador,June 13, 1839,arts. 3, 7,81d. 534,536; Egypt, Nov. 16, 1884,arL 1,24id.1004, 1005; ElSalvador,Jan. 2, 1850,
arts. 3,7,10 uJ. 891-92; superseded Dee. 6,1870, arts. 3,7,18 id. 725,726,728; Estonia, Dec. 23, 1925, arts. 1,7,44 id.
2379,2381; Ethiopia, art. 14,4 UST 2134, 2145, 206 UNTS 41, 76; Fiji,June 10, 1840, arL 2,7 BEVANS 684; Finland,
Feb. 13, 1934, arL 6,49 Stat. 2659, 2663,152 LNTS 45, 50, modified by protocols of Dee. 4,1952,4 UST 2047, 205
UNTS 149 & July 1, 1991, TIAS - - ; France, Feb. 6, 1778, arts. 3-4, 8 Stat. 14; renewed, SepL 30, 1800, art. 6, id. 178,
180; superseded June 24, 1822,id. 278; modified,July 17, 1919,41 id. 1723; modified, Nov. 25, 1959, 11 UST2398,401
UNTS 75; Germany, Dec. 8, 1923,art. 7,44StaL 2132,2137; terminatedJune3, 1935,art.l,49id. 3258; reinstated June
3,1953, art. 1, 5 UST 1939, 1941, 253 UNTS 89, 90; partially terminated OCL 29, 1954,arL 20 & Protocol II 20, 7 id. 1839,
1860,1908,273 UNTS 3, 26, 44; Great Britain, Nov. 19, 1794, arts. 3, 12-14,8 StaL 116, 117, 122-24, modified May 4,
1796,ld.130,July3, 1815, arts. 1,3,id. 228.29,continuedAug. 6, 1827,arL l,id. 361; Greece, Dec. 22, 1837, arts. 1-5, 8
id. 498.500; replaced Aug. 3, 1951,arL 21,S UST 1829, 1889,224 UNTS 279,324; Guatemala, Mar. 3, 1849,arts. 3, 6,10
Stat. 873, 874, 876; Haiti, Nov. 3, 1864, arts. 6, 12, 13 id. 711,713,716; Hanover, May 20,1840, arts. 1-2,8 id. 552; July
10,1846, arL 1,9 id. 857; Hanseatic Republics, Dee. 20, 1827, arts. 1,6,8 id. 366,368; Hawaii, Dec. 23, 1826, arL 2, 8
BEVANS 861 (entry of US ships into Hawaii); Dec. 20, 1849,arts. 2, 5-7, 9id. 977-78; Honduras,July4, 1864,arL 2, Bid.
699,700; superseded Dec. 7, 1927, arts. 1, 7,11,45 id. 2618-19,2622,2625; Iraq, Dec. 3, 1938,arL 3, 54id.1790, 1792;
Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, arL 18, 1 UST 785, 798, 206 UNTS 269,290; Israel, Aug. 23, 1951, arL 19,5 id. 550,570,219
UNTS 237, 276; Italy, Feb. 26, 1871, arts. 1,7,17 StaL 845, 848; replaced Feb. 2, 1948, arts. 19,22,63 id. 2255,2284,
2286,79 UNTS 171,200,204; Japan, Mar. 31, 1854, arL 2,11 StaL 597 (designated ports in Japan, no reciprocity);
modified June 17, 1857, arL 1, id. 723 (Nagasaki opened); July 29,1858, art. 3, 12 id. 1051,1052 (more ports opened);
Nov. 22, 1894, arL 2, 29 id. 848-49 (full, reciprocal commerce, navigation rights); Feb. 21, 1911, arL 4, 37 id. 1504-05
(same); replaced Apr. 2, 1953, arL 19,4 UST 2063,2077, 206 UNTS 143,214; Korea,May 22,1882, arL 5, 23 StaL 720,
722,replacedNov. 28, 1956, 8 UST 2217,302 UNTS 281; Lagos,July31, 1854,9 BEVANS 513-14; Latvia, Apr. 20, 1928,
arts. 7, 12,45 StaL 2641, 2643, 2645; Liberia, OCL 21, 1862, art. 2,12 id. 1245; replaced Aug. 8, 1938, arts. 7, 21, 54 id.
1739,1742,1747,201 LNTS 163,168,176; Loochoo [Ryukyu],July 11, 1854, lOid.ll01; Luxembourg, Feb. 23, 1962,
arL 13, 14 UST 251, 260,474 UNTS 3, 22; Madagascar, Feb. 14,1867, arts. 2-3, 15 StaL491-92, replaced May 13, 1881,
arL 4(1), 22 id. 952,955; Mecklenburg·Schwerin,Dec. 9, 1847, arts. 1-2, 9 StaL 910, 912; Mexico, Apr. 5-Dec.17, 1831,
arL 3, 8 id. 410, replaced Feb. 2, 1848, arL 17,9 it!. 922,935; Morocco, June 23-July 15, 1786, arts. 7, 14, 8 id. 100-02,
replaced SepL 10 & OCL 1, 1836, arts. 7, 14, it!. 484-85; Muscat, SepL 21, 1833, arts. 2, 6, id. 458; Netherlands, OCL 8,
1782,arts.2-3,id. 32;supersededJan.19, 1839,arL 1,it!. 524; Aug. 26, 1852, arts. 1-2,4, 10 it!. 982-84; Mar. 27, 1956,arL
19 & Protocol 11 17,8 UST2043,2073,2089,285 UNTS231,259,273; Nicaragua, June 21, 1867, arL 2, 15 Stat. 549-50;
Jan. 31, 1956,arL 19, 9UST 449,463, 367 UNTS 3,26; Norway, June 5, 1928, arts. 7, 15,47 Stat. 2135, 2140,2146, 134
LNTS 81, 86, 92; Oman, Dec. 20, 1958,arL 10, 11 UST 1835, 1840,380 UNTS 181,206; Ottoman Empire, May 7, 1830,
arts. 1, 5,8 StaL 408-09; Paraguay, Feb. 4,1859, arL 2, 12 id. 1091-92; Persia/Iran, Dec. 13, 1856, art. 3, 11 StaL 709;
superseded Aug. 15, 1955,arL 10,8 UST 899, 907,284 UNTS 93, 122; Peru,July 26,1851, am. 2, 12, 10 StaL 926, 931;
replacedJuly4, 1854, 11 id. 725; Sept. 6, 1870, arts. 2,8, 18id. 698-99,701; Aug. 31, 1887, arts. 2, 7,25 id. 1444-45,1447;
Peru·Bolivia Confederation, Nov. 30, 1836, arts. 2.3, 8 id. 487,488; Poland, June 15, 1931, art. 6,48 id. 1507, 1512;
Portugal, Aug. 26, 1840,arts.l, 7, 8 id. 560,564; Prussia,July9, 1785, arts. 2-3, id. 84; supersededJuly 11, 1799, arts. 2-3,
id. 162; May 1, 1828, arts. 1, 7, it!. 378,380; Russia, Apr. 5/17, 1824, arts. 1-2, id. 302; replaced Dec. 6/18, 1832, arL 1, id.
444; Samoa, Jan. 17,1878,arL2,20id. 704; Sardinia, Nov. 26,1838,arts.1, 7,8id. 512,514; Saudi Arabia, Nov. 7, 1933,
arL 3, 48 id. 1826; Serbia, OCL 14, 1881, arts. 1,13,22 StaL 963,966; Spain, OCL 27, 1795, arts. 15-16, 8 id. 138,146 (by
implication), replaced July 3, 1902, arts. 2, 9, 33 id. 2105,2106, 2110; Sweden, Apr. 3, 1783, arts. 7-8, 8 id. 60,64;
superseded SepL 4, 1816 (Sweden & Norway), arts. 1, 12, id. 232,240 & July 4, 1827, arts. 1,6,17, id. 346,348,354;
Thailand (formerly Siam), Mar. 20, 1833, arL 2,id. 454 (entry into Thai ports only); replaced May 29, 1856, 3rL 4,11 it!.
683,684 (same); replaced Dec. 16, 1920, arts. 3, 9, 42 id. 1928,1929-30 (reciprocity), Nov. 13, 1937, arL 1,53 id. 1731
(same); May 29, 1966,arL 10, 19 UST 5843,5855,652 UNTS253,282; Togo, Feb. 8, 1966,arL 11, 18id.l, 8,680 UNTS
159,174; Tonga, OCL 2,1886, arts. 4, 6-8, 25 StaL 1440-41; Tripoli, Nov. 4,1796 & Jan. 3, 1797, art. 9, 8 id. 154-55;
replaced June 4,1805, arL 11, id. 214-15 (same); Tunis, Aug. 28, 1797, arL 12, id. 157,159 (rights for US ships only);
replaced Feb. 24,1824, arL 12, it!. 298-99; Turkey, OCL 1, 1929,arL 3,46 StaL 2743,2744; Two Sicilies, Dec. 1, 1845,arL
1, 9id. 833; replaced OCL 1, 1855,arL 8, 11 id. 639,645; Venezuela, Jan. 20, 1836,arts. 2-3, 8id. 466; replaced Aug. 27,
1860, arts. 6-7, 12 id. 1143, 1147-48; Yemen, May 4, 1946, arL 3,60 id. 1782, 1783. See also nn. 488-90 for recent treaties
with Bulgaria, Poland, PRC, and the former USSR
435. While MFN clauses usually appear in bilateral treaties, they can be in multilateral agreements, e.g., the
GATT, n. III. 949. These contrast with national treatment, reciprocity or preferences clauses. McNAIR ch. 15; 1
OPPENHEIM § 669; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 801 & cmts. a·d, r.n.l,2.
436. For a sampling, see 6E BENEDlcr, Docs. 18B-I-18B-4 (selected bilateral treaties, including FCN, consular
treaties).
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437. Treaty, July 3, 1844, China-US, arts. 3-5, 8 Stat. 592-93, supplemented by Treaty of Peace, Amity &
Commerce, June 18, 1858, China-US, arL 14, 12 id. 1023,1026; supplemented, Treaty for Extension of Commercial
Relations, Oct. 8, 1903, China-US, arL 3, 33 id. 2208, 2209; superseded, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce &
Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, arts. 2, 21, 24, 63 id. 1299,1301,1316,1318,25 UNTS 69, 92,128,132. The later agreements
opened doors to other Chinese ports, first on an MFN basis and later to all Chinese ports and all US ports. The first
agreement with Hawaii, Article of Arrangement, Dec. 23, 1826, Hawaii-US, art. 3, 8 BEVANS 861, applied only to US
vessels; the second, Friendship, Commerce & Navigation Treaty, Dec. 20, 1849, Hawaii-US, arts. 2,6-7,9 Stat. 977,
978, extended reciprocal rights but confirmed the Hawaii practice of limiting access to designated ports as in the case
of China. Agreements with Japan followed a similar pattern. Treaty of Peace & Amity, Mar. 31, 1854,Japan-US,arL 2,
11 id. 597 (designated ports inJapan); Convention,June 17, 1857,Japan-US,art.l,id. 723 (Nagasaki opened); Amity &
Commerce Treaty, July 29, 1858, Japan-US, art. 3, 12 id. 1051, 1052 (additional ports); Commerce & Navigation
Treaty, Nov. 29, 1894, Japan-US, art. 2, 29 id. 848,849 (full reciprocal commerce, navigation rights); Commerce &
Navigation Treaty, Feb. 21, 1911, Japan-US, art. 4, 37 id. 1504,1505 (same). Thailand, formerly Siam, had the same
arrangement until 1920. Amity & Commerce Treaty, Mar. 20, 1833, Siam-US, art. 2, 8 id. 454, (entry into Siamese
ports); Amity & Commerce Treaty, May 29, 1856, Siam-US,arL 4,11 id. 683,684 (same); Amity & Commerce Treaty,
Dec. 16, 1920, Siam-US, art. 3, 42 id. 1928, 1929 (reciprocity); Friendship, Commerce & Navigation Treaty, Nov. 12,
1937, Siam-US, art. 10, 53 id. 1731, 1736 (same); Treaty of Amity & Economic Relations, May 29,1966, Thailand, art.
10, 19 UST 5843, 5855, 652 UNTS 253, 282 (same).
438. Lowe,RighlofEnlry, n. 382, 619.
439. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-14; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) &cmL f.JESSUP,
THE LAW, n. 267,xxxii, 60, 192-93 asserts these treaties were not norm-creating, being mere attempts to obtain mutual
benefits by a bargaining process. Lowe,Righl ofEntry, n. 382, 619, argues that these bilaterals "lack the 'fundamentally
norm-creating character' necessary for the transition!;] the mere repetition of rights ofentry ... could not constitute a
rule of customary international law."

440. Compare custom's impact through the bilaterals, n. 434, Wilh Lowe, Right ofEntry, n. 382, 607.
441. LOS Convention, arL 126; see also Transit Trade Convention, arts. 10, 15, (same; Convention applied on
reciprocity basis); see also 3 Nordquist '11'11 X.5, 126.1-126.8(d); nn. 409-18.
442. Institute de Droit Internationale, 17 ANNUAIRE 274 (1898), in REsOLIITIONS OF THE INSTITIITE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 Games Brown 'Scott ed. 1916).

443. Id., 35 ANNuAIRE736(1928),in James Brown Scott, TheInstiluleo/InternalionaILaw, 22 AJIL 844, 847 (1928).
444. Lowe, RighI ofEntry, n. 382,602.
445. ICJ Statute, art. 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. 10 and accompanying te.-.:L
446. Convention & Statute on International Regime ofMariJimePorts, Dec. 9, 1923, Statule, arts. 2-3, 5-7,10-13,
58 LNTS 285 (Ports Convention). MFN status is not permitted.Id., Statute, art. 15,58 LNTS 305.

447. Id., Statute, arts. 13-14,58 LNTS 305.
448. Id., Statute, arts. 9, 14, 58 LNTS 303·05.
449. Id., Statute, arL 17,58 LNTS 305.
450. Id.,Statute, art. 8; 58LNTS 303;seealsoid., arts. 21-22,58 LNTS 307·09. TheICJhassucceeded thePCI].

451. Id, Statute, arL 12, 58 LNTS 305, cited in Saudi-Arabia v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 27 ILR 117, 212 (1955),
criticized by Lowe, RighI ofEntry, n. 382, 598-600, 606.
452. Ports Convention, n. 446, Statute, arL 18,58 LNTS 307; for further analysis, see CoLO.IIBOS §§ 182,418; 1
OPPENHEL\I § 204.

453. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1),25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2),14(4),16(3), 22(2);
see also nn. 111.952-67, VI.I0-25 and accompanying te.-.:L
454. LOS Convention, arL 311(2); see also n. 45 and accompanying text.
455. Vienna Convention, arts. 30,59; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 624-25; McNAIR 215-33; 1 OPPENHEL\\ § 591;
REsTATEAIENT{THlRD) § 323; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 156; SINCLAIR 184-85.
456. Ports Convention, n. 446, art. 2, 58 LNTS 295, declares it is subject to the Treaty ofVersa illes, which included
the League ofNations Covenant, succeeded by the UN Charter in 1945; the Convention, Statute,arL 24, 58 LNTS 309,
declares the Convention may not be construed to affect parties' rights and duties under the CovenanL Since
self·defense was recognized as an inherent right under the Covenant, there would have been no inconsistency between
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the Convention and the Covenant on that score. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; nn. llI.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67,
IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
457. 1999 UN Treaties 961-62; see also Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.

458. Compare Convention & Statute Concerning Freedom of Transit, Apr. 20, 1921, art. 1 & Statute, arts 1-15,7
LNTS 11, 19,27-33, with Ports Convention, n. 446, discussed nn. 446-57 and accompanying te.xL
459. 1999 UN Treaties 957-58, 961-62; see also n. 446 and accompanying te.XL An Additional Protocol, Apr. 20,
1921,7 LNTS 65, extends certain obligations to navigable waterways normally notofinternational concern. There are
23 parties, none of them Gulf States. 1999 UN Treaties 959. Treaty succession principles may bind more States. See
Symposium, Treaty SuccessIon; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
460. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; see also nn.llI.10-11,47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL
461. Inter-American Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne Transportation (Convention of
Mar del Plata), June 7, 1963, TIAS 12064, in 6E BENEDICT, Doc. 19-12, arts. 1-3, id. 19-104 -19-105.

462. Id., arts. 4-5, 6E BENEDICT 19-105.

463. Id., arL 6(a), 6E BENEDICT 19-106.
464. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1),25(3),311(2); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2), 14(4),16(3),
22(2); see also Vienna Convention, arts. 30, 59; nn.llI.952-67, IV. 10-25, 455 and accompanying te.xt.
465. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn.llI.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL
466. TIF 404.
467. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmL f.

468. Compare Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime Traffic, Apr. 9, 1965, arts. 1-3, 18 UST 410,
412,591 UNTS 265, 266-68, with Convention of Mar del Plata, n. 461, arts. 1-3, 6E BENEDICT 19-104.
469. Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, n. 468, arL 2(3), 18 UST 412, 591 UNTS
266·68.

470. Id., arL 5, 18 UST 414, 591 UNTS 268. The International Maritime Organisation (lMO) plays a similar role
for achieving standards through proposals or conferences as the OAS Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference
does for the Convention of Mar del Plata, n. 461. Compare Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime
Tramc, n. 468, arts 4, 6·8, 18 UST 414-16, 591 UNTS 268-72, with Convention ofMar del Plata, arts. 4-6, 6E BENEDICT
19-105 -19-106. For amendments and annexes to the Convention on Facilitation ofInternational Maritime Traffic,
sec generally 6E BENEDICT, Doc. 19-11; see also 1 OPPENHEIM § 204.
471. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1),25(3), 311(2); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2(2),14(4),16(3),
22(2); see also Vienna Convention, arts. 30, 59; nn. Ill.952-67, IV.I0-25, 455 and accompanying texL
472. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn.llI.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL
473. TIF 404; 6E BENEDICT 19·93, which does not list Iran. Treaty succession principles may add to the total for the
former USSR and Yugoslavia. Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
474. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmL f.
475. Saudi-Arabia v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 27 ILR 117,212 (1955), citing inter alia Ports Convention, Statute, n.
446, arL 12,58 LNTS 305; criticized, Lowe,Right ofEntry, n. 382, 598-600, 606.

476. See n. 434.
477. The Kronprins Gustaf Adolf (Swed. v. US), 2 UNRIAA 1239, 1256 (1932).
478. 1 HYDE § 187.
479. Institute ofInternational Law, Resolutions Adopted at Its Session ofAmsterdam: Distinction Between the Regime of
the TcrriJorial Sea and the RegimeoflnternalWatm, preamble, SepL 18-27,1957,1957[2] ANNUAIRE,reprinred in 52 AJIL
103 (1958).
480. CoLOMBOS § 181; sec also it!. §§ 273-75; for analysis of port access for ships in distress or forced in by force
majeure, see nn. 492, 494-506 and accompanying texL
481. 4 WHITEMAN 258·60, quoting Boas Memorandum, n. 381; see also 1 HYDE § 187.
482. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 50, cmt. 3.
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483. Id. § 49, cmt. a. Perhaps significantly, REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512 does not cite these references in analyzing
the law of ports.
484. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 848; see also Lowe, Right ofEntry, n. 382, 598-600, 606.
485_ REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512, cmt_ c, citing id. r.n.3_

486. Id. r.n_ 3, citing inter alia Convention on Liability of Nuclear-Powered Ships, May 25. 1962, in 57 AJIL 268
(1963); see also 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 848.
487_ REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513, cmt_ h & r.n.2; see also nn_ 337-50 and accompanying text_
488. Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters, June 1, 1990, USSR-US, TIAS 11541, reprinted in 6E
BENEDICT, Doc. 18B-IO, art. 3, 6E BENEDICT 18-300 - 18-301 (2 days' notice) (USSR Agreement); Agreement on
Maritime Transport, Dec. IS, 1988, China-US (China Agreement), Supplemental Agreement on Entry of Vessels of
Either Party into Ports of the Other Party, ~ 3, TIAS 12026 (Supplemental Agreement),reprinted in 6E BENEDICT, Doc_
18B-11, at 18-314; Agreement on Maritime Matters: Port Access Procedures, Sept. 27, 1973, Pol.-US, 24 UST 2271
(Poland Agreement), no longer in force. USSR Agreement superseded Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime
Matters, Oct. 14, 1972, USSR-US, art. 4, 23 id. 3573, 3578, imposing a four-day notice period. China Agreement
superseded Agreement on Maritime Transport, Memorandum of Conditions Applicable to Entry of Vessels of Each
Party into Ports ofthe Other Party, Sept. 17, 1980, China-US, ~~ 1-2,33 id. 3595,3597, e.xtended, Sept. 1 & 10, 1983, 35
id. 2314, which imposed four to seven days' notice requirements. Other US treaties with other former Soviet bloc
nations do not have these requirements and are more like typical bilateral arrangements,e.g., Agreement on Maritime
Transport, Bulg.-US, Feb. 19, 1981, 33id.1116, 1281 UNTS9(BulgariaAgreement),c.xtendedFeb_7 & 13,1984,35id.
4400; Agreement on Maritime Transport, June 4, 1976, Rom.-US, 27 id. 1416 (Romania Agreement), no longer in
force. The USSR agreements may be in force through treaty succession principles. Symposium, Treaty Succession;
Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
489. USSR Agreement, n.488, art. 1, 6E BENEDICT 18-300; China Agreement, n. 488, art. 1, id. 18-309; cf. Bulgaria
Agreement,n.488, art_I,33 UST 1117; Romania Agreement,n.488,art. 1,27 id. 1417; Poland Agreement,n. 488,24
id. 2271 (by implication).
490. USSR Agreement, n. 488, art. 2 & Annexes I-II, 6E BENEDICT 18-300, 18-303 - 18-305; China Agreement,
Supplemental Agreement, n. 488, ~~ 1,3 & Annexes A-B, id. 18-314 - 18-316 (listing China ports open, US ports
forbidden).

491. See nn. 488-90 and accompanying text.
492. See nn. 494-506 and accompanying text.
493. LOS Convention, arts. 17-32; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14-23; see also nn. 437-50 and accompanying
text. Some countries would dispute this. See n. 352 and accompanying text.
494. COLOMBOS § 181; see also Lowe, Right ofEntry, n. 382,607-19.
495. JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267, 194; 1 OPPENHEIM § 204; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512, r.n.5.
496. The Fortuna, 164 Eng. Rep. 685-86 (Adm. 1803);seealso The Eleanor,id. 1058,1067 (Adm. 1809); CoLOMBOS §
181 n.2; JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267, 200-01; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 853-54.
497. Hallet & Bowne v. Jenks, 7 US (3 Cranch) 210, 219 (1805); see also JESSUP, THE LAW, n. 267,194-97; 2 MOORE
399-42; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 853-54.
498. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 854.
499. Act of May 15, 1820,3 Stat. 597.

500. See nn. 433-37 and accompanying text.
501. Many early treaties have two provisions, one promising assistance if a vessel enters in distress and another
renouncing claims to wrecked goods and a pledge of restoration to owners. Others included only one provision, but
these have been included to show the universal obligation to assist and protect ships forced to enter because ofdistress
orforce majeure, e.g., Algiers, Sept. 5, 1795, art. 6, 8 Stat. 133, 134, superseded June 30 & July 5,1815, arts. 9-10, id. 224,
225, renewed and modified, Dec. 22-23, 1816, arts. 9-10, id. 244,245; Belgium, Nov. 10, 1845, art. 16, id. 606,610,
superseded July 17, 1858, art. 14, 12id.l043, 1047; Mar. 8, 1875, art. 13, 19id. 628, 632,superseded, Feb. 21, 1961, art.
14,14 UST 1284, 1303,480 UNTS 149, 169; Bolivia,May 13, 1858,arts. 9-10, 12 Stat. 1003, 1009; Brazil,Dcc. 12, 1828,
arts. 8, 10, 8 id. 390,392; Brunei,June23, 1850, arts. 8, 10, lOid. 909,910; Bulgaria, Feb. 19, 1982, art. 7, 33 UST 1116,
1120,1281 UNTS 9; Central American Federation, Dec. 5, 1825, arts. 8, 10, 8 Stat. 322, 326; Chile,May 15, 1832, arts. 6,
8, id. 434,435; China,July 3,1844, art. 27, id. 592,598 (refuge anywhere on China coast despite prohibition on trading
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except in five designated ports), supplemented June 18, 1858, art. 13, 12 id.l023, 1026, superseded Nov. 4,1946, art.
22(5),63 id. 1299, 1317,25 UNTS 69, 130; China Agreement, n. 488, art. 6, 6E BENEDICT 18-311; New Granada
(Colombia), Oct. 3, 1824, art. 8,8 Stat. 308, 309, superseded Dec. 12, 1846, arts. 9, 11, 9 id. 881,885-86; Dominican
Republic, Feb. 8, 1867, art. 11, IS Stat. 473, 479; Ecuador, June 13, 1839, arts. 9, 11, 8id. 534,538; San Salvador, Jan. 2,
1850,arts. 9, 11, 10 id. 891, 893, superseded Dec. 6, 1870, arts. 9, 11, ISid. 675,677; Germany, art. 28, 44id. 2132,2156,
superseded for FRG,Oct. 29, 1954, art. 21,7 UST 1839,1861,273 UNTS 3,28; Fiji,June 10, 1840, art. 3, 7 BEVANS 684;
France, July 18, 1966, art. 32, 18 UST 2939, 2950, 700UNTS 257, 282; Great Britain, Nov. 16, 1794, art. 23,8 Stat. 116,
127 (protection for US vessels only); Greece, Dec. 22, 1837, art. 14, id. 498, 506, superseded Aug. 3, 1951, art. 22, 5 UST
1829, 1893,224 UNTS 279, 326; Guatemala, Mar. 3, 1849, arts. 8, lO, 10 Stat. 873, 876-77; Haiti, Nov. 3, 1864, arts.
15-16,13 id. 711,716 (applied in John I. Snow claim, 2 MOORE 349); Hanover, May 20,1840, art. 8, 8 Stat. 552,558,
supersededJune 20,1846, art. 4, 9 id. 857,859; Hawaii, Dec. 23, 1826,art. 4, 8 BEVANS 862 (US ships' entry into Hawaii),
superseded Dec. 20, 1849, arts.12-13, 9 Stat. 977,981 (reciprocal rights); Hungary, July 7, 1972, art. 52,24 UST 1141,
1179; Italy, Feb. 26, 1871,art. 9, 17 Stat. 845,849;Japan,Mar.31, 1854,arts.3-5, 10,11 id. 597-98 (applicable only to US
ships in distress),superseded Nov. 22, 1894,art.ll, 29 id. 848, 851(full reciprocity), superseded Mar. 23,1963, art. 23,
IS UST 768, 804, 518 UNTS 179,288 (see also Convention for Reimbursement of Shipwreck E,"penses,May 17, 1880,
22 Stat. 815); Korea,May22, 1882,art.3,23 id. 720, 721,supersededJan. 8, 1963, art. 7, 14 UST 1637, 1643,493 UNTS
105,130; Latvia, Apr. 20, 1928, art. 28,45 Stat. 2641, 2651; Liberia, Oct. 21, 1862, art. 5, 12 id. 1245, 1246) Loochoo
(Ryukyu), July 11, 1854, 10 id. 1101; Madagascar, Feb. 14, 1867, art. 7, IS id. 491,493 (applies to US vessels only),
superseded May 13, 1881, art. 8, 22 id. 952,960; Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Dec. 9, 1847, art. 4, 9 id. 910,912; Mexico,
Apr. 5·Dec.17, 1831,arts.lO, 12,8 id. 410,414,superseded Feb. 2, 1848, art. 17, 9id. 922,935; Morocco, June 23-July
IS, 1786,arts.8·9,8id.l00, 101,supersededSept.16&Oct.l, 1836,arts. 8-9,id. 484,485; Muscat, Sept. 21,1833,art. 5,
id. 458; Netherlands,Oct. 8, 1782,arts.16-17,id. 32,42,supersededJan 19, 1839,art.5,id. 524,526,supersededMar. 27,
1956, art. 19 & Protocol '1]1116-17, 8 UST 2043, 2073, 2089, 285 UNTS 231, 259, 273; Nicaragua,June 21,1867, art. 13,
15 Stat. 549, 557; Norway, June 5, 1928,art. 27,47 id. 2135,2156; Ottoman Empire,May 17, 1830, art. 9, 8 id.408,409;
Peru, July 26, 1851,arts.16-17, lOid. 926, 933, superseded Sept. 6, 1870, 13-14, lO Bc'VANS 1038, 1042, superseded Aug.
31,1887, arts. 12-13,25 Stat. 1444, 1449-50; Peru-Bolivia Confederation, Nov. 30, 1836, arts. 5, 7, 8 id. 487,488-90;
Poland,May31, 1972,art.34,24 UST 1231, 1268; Portugal, Aug. 26, 1840,art. 9, 8 Stat. 560, 564; Prussia, July 9, 1785,
arts. 9, 18, id. 84,88,92, superseded July 11, 1799, arts. 9,18, id. 162,166,172, & May 1, 1828, art. 12, id. 378,384;
Romania, July 5, 1972, art. 13,24 UST 1317, 1327; Sardinia, Nov. 26, 1838, arts. 11-12,8 Stat. 512, 516; Siam (now
Thailand), Mar. 20, 1833, art. 5,id. 454,455 (protection for US ships in Siamese waters), superseded Dec. 16, 1920, art.
10,42id. 1928, 1931 (full reciprocity), superseded Nov. 12, 1937, art. 12,53 id. 1731, 1737 (same); Spain, Apr. 3, 1795,
arts. 8, 10, 8 id. 138, 142,supersededJuly3, 1902,art.l0,33id. 2105,2110; Sweden, Apr. 3, 1783, arts. 20-21, 8id. 60,72,
superseded Sept. 4, 1816, arts.l0, 12, id. 232,238-40, superseded July 4,1827 (Sweden & Norway), arts. 15, 17,id. 346,
354; Tripoli,Nov.4, 1796 &Jan. 3, 1797,arts. 6-7,id. 154 (apparently only applicable to US ships), supersededJune4,
1805,arts. 8·9,id.214,215; Tunis, Aug. 28, 1797, arts. 8-9,id. 157,158; Two Sicilies, Dec. 1, 1845,arts. 9-10,9id. 833,
839,supersededOct.l, 1855,arts.16-17, 11 id. 639,648-49; USSR,June 1, 1964,art.14, 19U5T 5018,5029,165 UNTS
121,144; Venezuela, Jan. 20,1836, arts. 9-10, 8 Stat. 466, 470, superseded Aug. 21, 1860, art. 11, 12 id. 1143,1149.See
also Docs. 18B-l - 18B-4, 6E BENEDICT, referring to US, UK, USSR and other bilaterals.
502. See nn. 433-40 and accompanying text.

503. Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 141-42.
504. E.g., lOp. Att'yGen. 509 (1821); US Secretary of State John Forsyth June 23, 18351etterto William Hunter,
Jr., Charge d'Mfaires to Brazil, 2 MOORE 342; US Secretary of State Daniel Webster Jan. 29,June 28, 1842 letters to
Edward Everett, US Minister to England,id. 353-54; Webster Aug. 1, 1842 letter to British Minister Plenipotentiary
Lord Ashburton, id. 353; US Secretary of State William Henry SewardJune4 & 13, 1864 letters to Russian Minister to
the US M. Stoeckl, id. 343 (identical Russian practice); US Secretary of State Bayard Nov. 6,1886letter to Mr. Phelps,
id. 343-45, 1886 FRUS 362, 364-65; US Secretary ofState Report, Feb. 26, 1887, S. Exec.Doc.l09,49th Cong.,2d Sess.,
in 2 MOORE 345-46; Acting US SecretaryofStateJames G. Blaine Feb. 13, 1892letterto US Minister ofArgentinaJohn
R.G. Pitkin and Pitkin May 27 & July 7, 1891 letters to Blaine, id. 349, 1891 FRUS 4, 10-12.
50S. See 2 MOORE 350-52, 355-62; 2 MOORE, ARBITRATIONS 1016-18,4 id. 4349-72; 5 id. 4609,4623; 2 O'CONNEt.L,
LAW 01' THE SEA 854-56.

506. See generally BROWN 39; NWP I-14M Annotated '1]'1]2.3.1, at 2-7, 3.2, 7.3.2; NWP 9A Annotated '1]'1]2.3.1, 3.2,
7.3.2, at 7-12; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 512 r.nS; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 853-58.
507. NWP I-14M Annotated '1]2.3.2.5; NWP 9A Annotated '1]2.3.2.5.
508. The US Department of State believes a customary right of aircraft entry into territorial seas under these
circumstances is not as well developed as that for ships. NWP I-14M Annotated '1]2.3.2.5 n.35, citing inter alia US
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Department of State et aI., Statement of Policy Oune 27-Aug. 8, 1986), id. 2-48; NWP 9A Annotated 112.3.2.5 n.34,
citing inter alia US Department of State et al., at AS2-1-1.
509. LOS Convention, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); nn. 349, 378 and accompanying te.xt.
510. LOS Convention, art. 125(a)(3); see also nn. 409-18 and accompanying text.
511. LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2);scealso nn.
IlI.953·67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text.
512. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; nn. 111.928-29, 938-49, IV.26-27, 29 and accompanying text.
513. UN Charter, arts. 2(4),51, 103; see also nn. 1I1.l0-11,47-630, 916-18, 952·67, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL
514. The see-saw nature ofthe conflict meant that from time to time Iraq had access to its coast and the Shalt before
the end of the war in 1988.

515. See generally LOS Convention, arts. 124-32, nn. 409-18 and accompanying text.
516. LOS Convention, art. 124(I)(a); see also nn. 409-18 and accompanying text.

517. See nn. lI.111-14 and accompanying texL
518. LOS Convention, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1), 31; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2); sec also nn.
IlI.953-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text. For analysis of this issue under the LOAC, sec Parts V.A.-V.E,
V.J.I-V.J.5.
519. Vienna Convention, arts. 61-62; nn. IlI.928-29, 938-49, IV.26-27, 29 and accompanying texL

520. See nn. lI.250-59 and accompanying texL
521. UN Charter, arL 2(4); S.C. Res. 552 (1984), in WELLENS 473; see also nn. lI.250-59, 111.47-157 and
accompanying text. To the extent the Iranian action involved hostilities in neutral territorial waters, there was also a
violation oftraditional neutrality law principles. See Parts V.F.l, V.F.2, V.F.5, V.].6.
522. Not every strait geographers recognize is a strait in international law. 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 299.

523. See Lewis M. Alexander, International Straits, in Robertson 91, 104-05; nn. lI.69-73 and accompanying te."t.
524. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 16(4); 2 Nordquist 1111 1I1.1-llI.8.
525. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14-23. Because id., arL 25 declares the Convention does not affect treaties
already in force, those straits governed by international agreements are not regulated by the Convention. See also nn.
555-57 and accompanying texL
526. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) § 45(3)(b) & r.n.l, 2, citing Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14-15, Corfu Channel,
1949 IC] 28.
527. 3 Nordquist 11 lII.7; see also nn. 268-94, 314-22, 328-34 and accompanying text.
528. BROWN 80; 3 Nordquist'll 111.7; see also nn. 285, 301-13, 337-53, 367, 369 and accompanying te."L

529. See nn. 83-157 and accompanying te.xt.
530. See nn. lI.51, 67, 81, 119, 163,379-81, IV.333, 363 and accompanying texL
531. 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 299; but see BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 284; for a trend study, sec
O'CoNNELL 301-31. For analysis of LOS Convention negotiations, see BROWN 81-86; 2 Nordquist'll'!! 111.9-111.15; 1
O'CoNNELL 328-31. Commentators say the LOS Convention navigational articles, which include straits passage
principles, reflect customary norms. See nn. III. 963 and accompanying texL BROWN 96 agrees that the LOS
Convention reflects customary straits passage principles, except for warship transit passage.

532. See Fig.A2-4: StraitofHormuz,in NWP I-14M Annotated,at 2-74; Fig. SF2-5: Strait ofHormuz,in NWP9A
Annotated.
533. LOS Convention, arts. 86-87; High Seas Convention, arts. 1-2; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 2.3.3.2; NWP 9A
Annotated 112.3.3.2; 1 OPPENHEIM § 210; Alexander, n. 523, 99-100;see nn. 68-79 and accompanying text for analysis of
the high seas regime. It is, of course, possible that the strait State(s) may claim EEZ, fishing zone, continental shelfor
contiguous zone rights for the ocean area beyond the territorial sea(s) in the strait. In that case those regimes' LOS
rules would also apply to the belt of waters within the strait beyond the territorial sea.

534. See nn. 268-94, 314-22, 328-34 and accompanying text.
535. NWP 9A Annotated 'II 2.3.3.2 n.43 & Annex AS2-4: International Straits: Least Width, seemingly
erroneously listing Strait ofHormuz as having a least width of more than 24 miles; Annex AS2·6: Straits, Less Than
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24 Milcs in Least Width, in Which There E.'(ists a Route Through the High Seas or an E.'(c\usive Economic Zone of
Similar Convenience with Rcspect to Navigational or Hydrographical Characteristics, in id. AS2-4-1 - AS2-6-1;
compare id., Fig. SF2-4: Strait of Hormuz, in id.
536. NWP I-14M Annotated 'iI 2.3.3.2 n.46 & Table A2-5: International Straits: Least Width, seemingly
erroneously listing Strait ofHormuz as having a least width of more than 24 milcs; Table A2-6: Straits, Less Than 24
Milcs in Least Width, in Which There Exists a Route Through the High Seas or an Exclusive Economic Zone of
Similar Convenience with Respect to Navigational or Hydrographic Characteristics, in id. 2-86 - 2-88; compare id., Fig.
A2-4: Strait ofHormuz, at 2-74.
537. NWP 9A Annotated, '112.3.3.2 n.43 & Anne.'( AS2-6. By 1997 Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE had claimed greater
territorial seas, n. 533; only the area around Abu Musa Island might be considered as falling within this category.
NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.3.2 n.46.

538. See nn. 11.51, 67, 81, 119, 163, 379-81, 410 and accompanying texL
539. Sec Fig. A2-4: Strait ofHormuz, in NWP I-14M Annotated, at 2-74.
540. Table A2-5: International Straits: Least Width,NWP I-14M Annotated, at 2-87; Table AS2-4: International
Straits: Least Width, NWP 9A Annotated, at AS2-4-2; see also nn. 11.51, 67, 81, 119, 163, 379-81, 410 and
accompanying te.,(L
541. Territorial Sea Convention, arL 16(4),25; see also nn. 524-25, 555-57, 566-81 and accompanying texL

542. See nn. 566-81 and accompanying te.'(L
543. LOS Convention,arL 36;seealso BROWN 88; NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.3.2; NWP9AAnnotated '112.3.3.2; 1
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 330; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 r.n.3; ROACH & SMITH '1111.4.
544. ROACH & SMITH '1111.2,283; see nn. 582-607 and accompanying text for transit passage analysis.

545. See Fig. A2-4: Strait of Hormuz, in NWP I-14M Annotated, at 2-74.
546. See nn. 337-50 and accompanying te.'(L
547. LOS Convention,arL 45; see also 2 Noidquist 'iI'1145.1-45.8(c); NWP I-14M Annotated 'il2.3.3.1,at2-16;NWP
9A Annotated '112.3.3.1, at 2-23; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 45(3)(b); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 r.n.3; ROACH & SMITH,
'1111.3; Ale.'(ander, n. 523, 103; John Norton Moore, The Regime ofStraits and the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law ofthe Sea, 74AJIL 77,112(1980).
548. NWP I-14M Annotated '112.3.3.1 n.45; NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.3.1 n.42.

549. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 17-20,45, with Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 14, 16(4); see also nn. 301-13,
337-50 and accompanying te.'(L Article 16(4) was drafted with Case 2 straits in mind. BROWN 80; 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOF
THE SEA 331; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 43(3)(b); Alexander, n. 523,99.
550. Ale.'(ander, n. 523, 99.
551. LOS Convention, arL 38(1).

552. !d., arts. 44-45(1)(a); see also BROWN 92; 2 Nordquist '11'1138.1, 38.8(b), 44.1-44.8(c), 45.1-45.8(b); NWP I-14M
Annotated '112.3.3.1 n.36; NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.3.1 n.36; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513 r.n. 3 (ArL 45 responds to
Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 28-29); ROACH & SMITH '1111.3; Ale.'(ander, n. 523, 100-01;5ee nn. 337-50 and accompanying
lext for territorial sea innocent passage analysis.
553. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 38(1),45, with Territorial Sea Convention, arL 16(4). No 1958 Convention
addresses EEZ claims.
554. The Strait of Messina between the Italian mainland and Sicily is a familiar example. See Table A2-2: Straits
Formed by an Island ofa Nation and the Mainland Where There Exists Seaward of the Island a Route Through the
High Seas or an E.'(c\usiveEconomic Zone of Similar Convenience, NWP I-14M Annotated, at 2-84; id., '112.3.3.1 n.36.
Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs are more than 24 miles from the mainland. See nn. 11.51, 67, 81, 119, 163,
379·81,410 and accompanying te.,(L

555. Compare LOS Convention,arL 35(c)with Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 16(4),25;5eealso BROWN 86; NWP
I-14M Annotated '112.3.3.1 n.36; NWP 9A Annotated '112.3.3.1 n.36; 1 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 322-24; ROACH &
SMITH §§ 11.8.4,11.8.8; Alexander,n. 523, 101-02; Moore, Regime ofStraits, n. 547, 111; Daniel Vignes,Commentary, in
LAwOl'NAVAL WARl'ARE,468,479-81.
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556. LOS Convention, art. 311(2); see also BROWN 86-88, citing Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Israel, an.
5(2),18 ILM 362, 365,392 (1979); NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.3.1 n.42; NWP 9A Annotated II 2.3.3.1 n.42; ROACH &
SMITH 1111.8.15; n. 45 and accompanying text.
557. The Bosphorus and Dardanelles are generally considered LOS Convention an. 35(c) exceptions; see
Convention Regarding Regime of the Straits,July 20,1936,173 LNTS 213 (Montreux Convention); as is the Beagle
Channel, BoundaryTreaty,July 23,1881, Arg.-Chile, art. 5, 159 crs 45; Treaty of Peace & Friendship, Nov. 29, 1984,
Arg.-Chile, 24 ILM 11, 13 (1985). Other treaties or statememts affecting straits include Treaty Concerning
Sovereignty & Maritime Boundaries in the Area Between the Two Countries, Dec. 18, 1978, Austl.-Papua N.G., 18
ILM 291 (1979) (Torres Strait); Treaty of Peace, Mar. 28, 1979, Egypt-Isr., 1136 UNTS 100, 1138 itI. 59; Agreement
Relating to Delimitation of Territorial Sea in the Straits of Dover (With Joint Declaration & Map), Nov. 2, 1988,
Fr.-UK, 1547 id. 47,54 ("unimpeded transit passage •.. of merchant ships, government ships and especially warships
in their normal mode of navigation, and also the right of overflight by aircraft" recognized; passage must be
"continuous and expeditious."); Statements by Malaysia et al. Relating to Article 233 of the Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea in Its Application to the Strait ofMalacca & Singapore, UN Doc. NCONF.62/L.145, Annex & Adds.
1-8 (1982), in 4 Nordquist II 233.8 (US a party to statement); Delimitation Treaty, Mar. 31, 1978, Neth.-Venez., 1140
UNTS 311 (strait between Netherlands Antilles, Venezuela); Agreement on Delimitation of Marine & Submarine
Areas, April 18, 1990, Trin. & Tobago-Venez., 19 L. of the Sea Bull. 22 (Oct. 1991), cited in 2 Nordquist II 111.20 n. 49
(strait between Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela). These treaties may apply to third States through the erga omnes
principle. 1 OPPENHEIAI §§ 234, 275;seealso 2 Nordquist 11 111.20; 1 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 322-24; 1 OPPENHEIAI §
213; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 336 r.n.2; Vignes, Commentary, n. 555.
558. See LOS Convention, arts. 17-26, 52, 53(4), 54; see also 2 Nordquist 1111 51.1-54.7(b); NWP I-14M Annotated,
11'112.3.3.1 n.36, 2.3.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated, 1111 2.3.3.1 n.36, 2.3.4.1; Alexander, n. 523, 95·96; Thomas A. Clingan,
Freedom ofNavigation in aPost·LOS Convention III Environment, in Symposium, The Law oftheSea: WhereNow, 46 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 117 (1983); Bruce Harlow, Comment, in Symposium 125, 126; Oxman, The Regime, n. III.956,
851·61; William J. Schachte, International Straits and Navigational Freedoms, 24 ODIL 179, 181·84 (1993); see nn.
337·50 (territorial sea innocent passage), 546·54 (nonsuspendable straits innocent passage).
559. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 16(4), 25.
560. See Table Al·7: Archipelagos; Table Al·8, & Table Al·9: States with Acceptable WaterlLand Ratios for
Claiming Archipelagic Status, in NWP 1·14M Annotated, at 1·85 ·1·87; Table STl·7: Archipelagos; Table STl·8, &
Table STl·9: States with Acceptable Water/Land Ratios for Claiming Archipelagic Status, in NWP 9A Annotated, at
1-17·1·18.
561. See nn. 524·30 and accompanying text.
562. See nn. 268·94 and accompanying text.
563. See nn. 68·79 and accompanying text.
564. See nn. 268·94 and accompanying text.
565. See nn. 533-45 and accompanying text.
566. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(4); accord, REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 45(1) & cmts. a,b.
567. Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 16(3)·16(4); accord, REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 45(3Xb); compare LOS
Convention, art. 25(3); see also nn. 301·13 and accompanying text.
568. Territorial Sea Convention, an. 16(1); accord, REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 45(2)(a) & cmt.b;seealso nn. 381·521
and accompanying text.
569. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(3); accord, RESTATEAlENT(SECOND) § 45(2Xb) & cmt.b;see also nn. 302,492,
494·95, 500·01, 507 and accompanying text.
570. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); accord, REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 45(1); see also nn. 301·13 and
accompanying text.
571. 1 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 331. Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 29·33, which spoke in terms of "innocent
passage," influenced the Convention drafters. BROWN 78·79; 2 Nordquist \I III.5; O'CoNNELL 314-16; Alexander, n.
523,96·99. Promoting territorial sea innocent passage in the straits context as a rule ofinternationallaw continues. See
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 281, 284 (Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16[4] the straits passage rule; the LOS
Convention "a substantial departure from .•• customary law"); 1 OPPENHEIAI § 210; but see id. § 211, recognizing the
LOS Convention transit passage regime. In later LOS discussions, maritime States made it clear that maintaining an
unrestricted ships straits passage regime was essential for a future LOS treaty. 2 Nordquist' 111.6.
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572. See Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(5); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 45, cmt. f; by contrast, LOS Convention,
art. 19(2)(i) declares that "any" fishing is considered under id., art. 19 as prejudicial to a coastal State's peace, good
order or security; see also nn. 301-02, 337, 340-41 and accompanying text.
573. Cf, Territorial Sea Convention, artS. 1-2; see also nn. 304-05 and accompanying text. In later LOS discussions
maritime States made it clear that maintaining an unrestricted straits aircraft overflight passage regime was essential
for a future LOS treaty. 2 Nordquist 11 111.6.
574. Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6); see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 45 cmt. g; but see id. § 48; nn. 302-03
and accompanying te."t. In later LOS discussions maritime States made it clear that maintaining an unrestricted
submarine straits passage regime was essential to a future LOS treaty. 2 Nordquist 11 III.6.
575. LOS Convention, art. 19(2) declares these activities and others in an all-inclusive list are considered underid.,
art. 19 to be prejudicial to a coastal State's peace, good order or security;seealso nn. 338-41 and accompanying te."t.

576. Cf, Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 18-23; see also n. 313 and accompanying text.
577. Territorial Sea Convention, arts.1(2),l4{4),17, 22(2) (application of "other rules of international law"); see
also nn. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text.
578. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10-11, 47-630, 916-18, 952-67,lV.6-25 and accompanying text.

579. E.g., UN Charter, arts. 2(4),103. LOS Convention, art. 19(2)(a) declares "any threat or use offorce against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of
the principles ofinternationallawembodiedin the Charter" is considered underid., art. 19 as conduct prejudicial to a
coastal State's peace, good order or security. See also nn. III.I0-11,47-630, 916-18, 952-67,lV.6-25 and accompanying
te.xt.
580. Territorial Sea Convention, artS. 1(2), 14(4). For example, REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 45 cmt. i, following the
Convention, declares a "coastal state may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage that is not
innocent, regardless of the type ofvessel involved," adding that the vessel's immunity is not affected. While the latter
covers warship immunity, reading the "necessary steps" language broadly without considering warship immunity
could lead to an erroneous conclusion that warships can be treated like merchantroen for straits passage.

581. Sec MAcDONALD 170 for Saudi Arabia's position on innocent passage through straits under the 1958
Convention.
582. Others include the Straits of Gibraltar, berween the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean; Bab el
Mandeb, between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean; Malacca, berween the Indian Ocean's Andaman Sea and the
Pacific Ocean's South China Sea. See Fig. A2-2: Strait of Gibraltar; Fig. A2-3: Strait ofBab el Mandeb; Fig. A2-5, in
NWP I-14M Annotated,at2-72, 2-73, 2-75;seealso 1 O'CoNNELL, LAwOFmESEA 318-22; Alexander,n. 523,104-05.
583. LOS Convention, artS. 36-38(1), 44; see also 2 Nordquist '11'11 36.1-36.7(e), 37.1-37.7(c), 38.1-38.8(c),
44.144.8(c); NWP I-14M Annotated'll 2.3.3.1, at2-15; NWP 9AAnnotated 'II 2.3.3.1, at 2-23; Ale.xander, n. 523, 91, 94.
584. LOS Convention, art. 38(2); see also BROWN 89 (transit passage is "a right akin to freedom of the high seas but
for one purpose only-••• continuous and expeditious transit"); 2 Nordquist 11'11 38.1-38.8(b), 38.8(d)-38.8(e); NWP
I-14M Annotated 112.3.3.1, at 2-15; NWP 9A Annotated 112.3.3.1, at 2-23; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 513(3) & cmt. j,
r.n.3 (right of unimpeded transit passage a customary norm); Alexander, n. 523, 91-93; for analysis of conditions of
entry, see nn. 381-513 and accompanying text.
585. NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.3.1 n.37, citing US Navy Judge Advocate General message 061630ZJune 198811
4, at 2-59; NWP 9A Annotated 11 2.3.3.1 n.37; ROACH & SMlTIIlIll.2, 286, quoting Dec. 21, 1984 telegram to US
Embassy, Santiago, Chile.
586. LOS Convention, arts. 58, 87-115; High Seas Convention, artS. 1-2; see also nn. 68-79, 147-57 and
accompanying text.
587. LOS Convention, art. 38(1).
588. Since waters in and around these straits are necessarily part ofcoastal State territorial seas, an EEZ or the high
seas, the other rules clauses of id., arts. 2(3),19(1), 21(1), 31, 58(3), 87(1) apply; see also High Seas Convention, art. 2;
Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1(2),l4{4),17, 22(2). LOS Convention, art. 34(2) declares straits-bordering States'
sovereignty or jurisdiction is exercised subject to id., arts. 34-45, and "other rules of international law." Other rules
clauses refer to the LOAC. See 2 Nordquist 1111 34.1-34.8(g); Akira Mayama, The Influence o/the Straits Transit Passage
Regime on the Law 0/Neutrality at Sea, 20 OOIL 1 (1995); nn. IlI.953-56,IV.I0-25 and accompanying text.

589. E.g., UN Charter,arts.2(4),5I,103; LOS Convention, arts. 39(1)(b),301;seeaiso nn. IlI.I0-l1,47-630, 916-18,
952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
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590. MACDoNALD 183·84; see also 2 Nordquist 1111 III.9-III.14.
591. LOS Convention, art. 39(1); see also 2 Nordquist 1111 39.1-39.10(h); NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.3.1, at 2-15;
NWP 9A Annotated 112.3.3.1,at2-22; 1 O'CONNELL,LAWOFTHE SEA 331-336; Moore,RegimeofSlraits, n. 547,95-102.
592. LOS Convention, art. 39(2); see also 2 Nordquist II 39.10(j); nn. VI.136-40 and accompanying text.
593. LOS Convention, art. 39(3); see also 2 Nordquist 1111 39.10(k)-39.1O(l).
594. 2 Nordquist II 39.10(k); NWP I-14M Annotated II 2.3.3.1, at 2-15; NWP 9A Annotated II 2.3.3.1, at 2-22;
Alexander, n. 523, 93; Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318, 119.
595. LOS Convention, art. 40; see also iJ., art. 19(2)(j) (territorial sea research, survey activities considered
prejudicial to coastal State's peace, good order or security if conducted by ships otherwise in id., art. 19(1) innocent
passage); 2 Nordquist 1111 4O.1-40.9(e); Alexander, n. 523, 92-93. However, research may be conducted in a
strait-bordering State's territorial waters within the strait if that State consents. 2 Nordquist 1I40.9(d). Research does
not include transiting platforms' normal mode of operations while going through a strait, e.g., sonic depth sounding
by fathometer or position plotting by radar, elC. These activities are not prohibited if legitimately incidental to
continuous, expeditious transit in the normal mode.ld. 111139.10(1), 40.9(c).
596. LOS Convention, art. 39(1)(c); see also nn. 591, 595 and accompanying text.
597. 2 Nordquist II 39.10(e); NWP I-14M Annotated II 2.3.3.1, at 1-15; NWP 9A Annotated II 2.3.3.1, at 2-22;
Alexander, n. 523, 91; William T. Burke,SubmergedPassage ThroughSlraits: Interprelations oflhe ProposedLawoflhe Sea
Treaty Texl, 52 WASH. L. REv. 193, 212-14 (1977); Ronald Clove, Submarine Navigalion in Internalional Slralts: A Legal
Perspeclive, 39 NAV. L. REv_ 103 (1990); Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318, 120, 122; Horace B. Robertson, J r.,Passage
Through Internalional Slraits: A RighlPreserved in the Third Uniled Nalions Conference on the Law oflhe Sea, 20 VJIL 801,
843-44(1980); Schachte,InlernalionaISlraits, n. 558, 184-86; bUlsee Lowe, The Commander's, 122; W. Michael Reisman,
The Regime of Straits and Nalional Security: An Appraisal of Internalional Lawmaking, 74 AJIL 48, 71-75 (1980). By
contrast, under territorial sea innocent passage rules submarines must transit surfaced, fiying the ensign. LOS
Convention, art. 20; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(6);seealsonn.302,338,342,493,574and accompanying te.':t.
598. For special maritime vehicles, e.g., hovercraft or hydrofoils, normal mode transit passage means the mode
normal to them under the circumstances. For aircraft normal mode is altitude and speed appropriate under the
circumstances. 2 Nordquist 1111 39.10(e), 40.9(c); US Navy Judge Advocate General message, n. 586, 11115, 9, in NWP
I-14M Annotated, at 2-60 - 2-61; 1 O'CONNEt.t., LAW OF TIlE SEA 333; Alexander, n. 523, 92; bUI see Lowe, The
Commander's, n. III.317, 122. As the Navy Message 115 makes clear, this is for navigation safety and ships' protection,
i.e., self-defense_ UN Charter, arts. 51, 103;seealso nn.l0-11,47-630, 916-18, 952-67,IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
599. LOS Convention, art. 39(I)(b); see also 1 Nordquist 207,450; 2 id. II 39.10(c); 5 id., 11301.5; discussing LOS
Convention, art. 301.
600. BROWN 78. If prior notification or permission is unnecessary for warship territorial sea innocent passage, as
argued nn. 337-52 and accompanying text concerning LOS Convention, arts. 17-32 and Territorial Sea Convention,
arts. 14-23, surely there is no prior notification or permission requirement for straits transit passage where a strait
includes territorial seas.
601. Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes must conform to generally accepted international regulations. If two
or more States border a strait, they must cooperate in formulating proposals to IMO. LOS Convention, art. 41; see also
id., art. 22(1) (coastal State may prescribe sea lanes, traffic separation schemes for its territorial sea); 2 Nordquist Ill!
41.1-41.9(h); NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.3.1,at2-26; NWP 9AAnnotated 11 2.3.3.1,at2-23; Alexander, n. 523, 94-95.
602. NWP I-14M Annotated 112.3.3.1 n.43, referring to Fig. A2-4, at id. 2-74; NWP 9A Annotated 112.3.3.1 n.41,
referring to Fig. SF2-4.
603. LOS Convention, arts. 42(1), 42(3); see also 2 Nordquist 1111 42.1-42.10(e), 42.10(h); Alexander, n. 523,94-95;
nn. VI.122, 136-40, 175 and accompanying text.
604_ LOS Convention, art. 43; see also 2 Nordquist 11'11 43.1-43.8(e).

605_ Compare LOS Convention, art. 42(2)wilh id., art. 25(3) (no discrimination in form or fact when territorial sea
innocent passage temporarily suspended); see also nn. 301-13,337-50 and accompanying text.
606. LOS Convention, art. 44; see also 2 Nordquist II 44.8(b); Alexander, n. 523, 94-95.
607. LOS Convention, arts. 42(4)-42(5); compare id., arts. 21, 31 (similar rules for territorial sea innocent passage);
see also 2 Nordquist 11'11 42.10(i)-42.10(l); Alexander, n. 523, 94-95; n. 350 and accompanying text.

608. See nn. II.104-06, 220, 277, 290, 325, 357, 375, 379-81, 463 and accompanying text.
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609. LOS Convention, am. 36, 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 533-45, 561-65 and accompanying
text.
610. LOS Convention, am. 38(1),44; see also nn. 566-607 and accompanying text.

611. Sec nn. 11.325 and accompanying text.
612. Lowe, The Commander's, n. 111.318, 120.
613. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10-11, 48-626, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
614. Sec n. 11.102 and accompanying text.
615. See n. 600 and accompanying text.
616. See, e.g., nn. 11.357 (mines), 457 (Iran'S Larak oil terminal by air attack), 463-64 (speedboat attacks) and
accompanying text.
617. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10-11, 48-630, 916-18, 952-67, IV.6-25 and accompanying text.
618. Sec nn. 11.459-69 and accompanying text.
619. Cf. LOS Convention, arts. 41-44; see also n. 11.357 and accompanying te.xt.

620. See WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT l\1ARINE, n. 11.59, ch. 7.
621. See GILMORE & BLACK 188; SCHOENBAUM § 8-33; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. 11.59, 201-02.
622. See GILMORE & BLACK 14, 144; SCHOENBAUM § 8-33; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT l\1ARlNE, n. 11.59, 202.
623. PHIUP C. J ESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956) coined the phrase, now in general use, to define private parties'
and governments' relationships in the international conte.xt. Transnational law is a mix of public international law,
e.g., the LOS or the LOAC with which this study is primarily concerned, and conflict oflaws, also known as private
international law.
624. US Const., art. I, § 8 gives Congress power to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," i.e., authorizing
Congress to approve privateering. The general view is that privateering is outlawed, despite US equivocations half a
ccnturyor more ago. CoLOMBOS §§ 536-38; 2 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 1102-03, 1106; TUCKER40-41; Harvard Draft
Convention on Naval & Aerial War, art. 50 & cmt.; Hisakazu Fujita, Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 66, 68.
Sec Paris Declaration, 'II 1. Whatever its weight as a customary norm, the Declaration's 53 original and acceding
parties, except the United States, which has not ratified thc Declaration, represent nearly all nations if treaty
succession principles are taken into account. SCHINDLER & TOMAN 789-90; Symposium, State Succession; Walker,

Integration and Disintegration.
625. See NWP I-14M Annotated '112.1.3; NWP 9A Annotated '112.1.2.3; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT l\1ARlNE, n.
11.59, ch. 11 (US National Defense Reserve Fleet, Military Sealift Command, naval fleet auxiliaries, RDJTF, Ready
Reserve Fleet); e.xcept as a "fleet in being," RDJTF played no active role in the Tanker War. See nn. 11.40, 77, 80, 175,
219 and accompanying te.xt. Insofar as the record indicates, no State employed naval auxiliaries during the war.
Properly speaking, under the LOS, naval auxiliaries are State-owned vessels operated for noncommercial purposes
that are not warships and, in territorial waters, are governed by LOS Convention, arts. 31-32; Territorial Sea
Convention, art. 22. On the high seas they enjoy immunity as well. LOS Convention, aIL 96; High Seas Convention,
art. 9. Sec generally 2 Nordquist '11'11 31.1-32.7(b), 3 id. 96.1-96.96.10(d); NWP I-14M Annotated'll 2.1.3; NWP 9A
Annotated '112.1.3; I OPPENHEIM § 565. Where the law of armed conflict applies through the other rules clauses of the
LOS conventions, they would be considered under LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE principles applicable to naval auxiliaries.
Applicable international agreements include 1936 London Naval Treaty, art. 1(B)(6); Montreux Convention, n. 557,
Annex II, art. B(6), 173 LNTS 237; Convention on Maritime Neutrality, arts. 12-13. However, because there were
apparently no naval auxiliary issues, as distinguished from issues of government-owned or operated vessels for
commercial purposes, during the Tanker War, Chapter V will not analyze this difficult issue.
626. 1962 Oil Pollution Convention Amendments, art. 2(2)(b); compare MARPOL 73n8, aIL 2(4); 1960
COLREGS, Rule l(c)(i). Some ILO conventions offer partial definitions. 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 749.
627. Ship Registration Convention, n. 11.61, aIL 2(4), 26 ILM 1237, (1987) excluding vessels under 500 gross
rcgistered tons (GRT). See also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 501 r.n.1.

628. See Part C.4 for analysis of the definition of a warship.
629. By 1995 MARPOL 73n8 had been accepted by countries, including the United States, representing 92
percent of world merchant fleets, measured in GRT. BOWMAN & HARRIs 292-93 (1995 Supp.); TIF 400-01.
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630. See, e.g., 16 USC § 916(e); 33 USC §§ 1471(5),1502(19);46 usc § 23 (inc1udesseaplanes on the water); Stt also 2
O'CoNNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 747-50.
631. SAN REMO MANUAL, cmt. 13.23.
632. NWP I-14M Annotated '!l2.1.3n.13; NWP 9A Annotated '!l2.123 0.13; SANREMOMANuAL 11 13(i) & Commentary.

633. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); see also nn. 111.953·67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying texL
634. See Parts V.C.-V.E, V.J.3-V.J.5.
635. GILMORE & BLACK 12.

636. See, e.g., First Charter of Virginia, Apr. 10/20, 1606, arts. 1-2.
637. GILMORE & BLACK 12.
638. ALFORD, n.III.833, 84-88. The USSR, a command economy State, has since collapsed and is moving to a free
enterprise economy. However, other command economies and those transitioning to a capitalist system may still use
these. Many free enterprise-based economies also have the form,e.g., Israel and its State-owned ZIM shipping line.
639. Table 2.2: Non-Communist Countries with Government Owned Shipping Fleets, in LAWRENCEJUDA, THE UNCfAD
LINER CoDE: UNITED STATES MARITIME POUCY AT THE CROSSROADS 46 (1983).
640. GILMORE & BLACK 13-14, 197; SCHOENBAUM § 8-5,491; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, nn. 11.59, chs.
8-9.
641. GILMORE & BLACK 12, 990-95; JUDA, n. 639, ch. 1; LAWRENCE, n. 11.60, 14-16,30, 198-202,289-91,293-95;
DANIELMARx,JR, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS: A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL SELF.REGULATION BY SHIPPING CoNFERENCES
(1953); WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. 11.59, 35.
642. See, e.g., arrangements in In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F.Supp. 228 (S.D.N. Y.1968),rcv'd, 409 F.2d 1013
(2d Cir.1969), (1967 Torrey Canyon oil spill disaster); In re Amoco Transp. Co. (Amoco Cadiz), 1979 AMC 1017 (N.D.
Ill. 1979), affd, 954 F.2d 1279, 1302-04 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Frankel, n. 11.60, 66; GIL\lORE & BLACK 841-43;
SCHOENBAUM § 13-2 n.4; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. 11.59, 225; Andreas Lowenfeld, Public Law in the
InternationalArena: Conflict o/Laws, InternationalLaw, and Some Suggestions/or their Interaction, 163 RCADI 311, 322-26
(1979); nn. 664, V.12-15 and accompanying text.

643. "Charter party" derives from the Latin charta partita (divided document), the ancient custom of splitting a
ship rental document drafted in duplicate, so that only the whole could give rise to rights and remedies. Each party
kept a part; comparing the halves proved the document's authenticity. SCHOENBAUM § 9-1 n.1.

644. See, e.g., Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. MIS Norse Commander Corp., 264 F.Supp. 625 (S.D. Tex. 1966); see
also SCHOENBAUM § 8·6,492.
645. GILMORE & BLACK 194. Ifan owner provides master and crew, tendering them as the charterer's agents, the
charter is a demise, although not technically a bareboat charter. SCHOENBAUM § 9-3 n.1-2.
646. GILMORE & BLACK 194; SCHOENBAUM § 9-1,631.
647. GILMORE & BLACK 193; SCHOENBAUM § 9-1,631-32.
648. GILMORE & BLACK 195.
649. Id. 197-98; SCHOENBAUM § 9-2. Satellite-based communications through INMARSAT (International Maritime

Satellite Communications), established by Convention on International Maritime Satellite Organization, Sept. 3,
1976, 31 UST 1; Operating Agreement on International Maritime Satellite Organization, Sept. 3, 1976, id. 135,
accomplishes this for many ships. WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. 11.59, 152.See, e.g., DominantNavig. Ltd.
v. Alpine Shipping Co., 1982 AMC 1241 (R Glenn Bauer, Manfred W. Arnold, Jack Berg, arbs.).
650. GILMORE & BLACK 202-07; SCHOENBAUM § 9-10.
651. The Gazelle, 186 US 474 (1902); see also SCHOENBAUM § 9-10,654.
652. SCHOENBAUM § 9-10,653-54.

653. Id. § 9-10,654.
654. GILMORE & BLACK 209-10; SCHOENBAUM § 9-14.
655. GILMORE & BLACK 223-28; SCHOENBAUM §§ 9-14, 9-16; George K. Walker, T1telnterfaceo/CriminalJurisdiction
and Actions Underthe United Nations Charter, 20 TULANE MARITlME L.J. 217, 241 (1996).
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656. E.g., Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Scott, 345 US 427, 439-40 (1953); Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, 272 F.2d 253 (2d
Cir.1960) (voyage charter); Navious Corp. v. The Ulysses II, 161 F.Supp. 932 (D. Md.), affd, 260 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1958); The Claveresk, 264 F. 276,281-82 (2d Cir.1920) (time charter); Denali Seafoods, Inc. v. Western Pioneer,492
F.Supp. 580 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (voyage charter); see also GIU.IORE & BLACK 240.

657. Bottomry bonds, loans on the securiIy of a ship and its cargo, and respondentia bonds on cargo are now
obsolete. Although they created liens on vessel or cargo, the liens (i.e., the securiIy) were discharged if a ship did not
complete a voyage, i.e., if it sank. GILMORE & BLACK 632, 690; SCHOENBAUM § 7-5 n.2.

658. E.g., Ship Mortgage Act, 46 USC §§ 31322, 31325.
659. Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens & Mortgages, Apr. 10, 1926, 120
LNTS 187; Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Maritime Liens & Mortgages, May 27, 1967, in 6E
BENEDICT, Doc. 15-5; Convention on Maritime Liens & Mortgages, May 6, 1993, 33 ILM 353 (1994). Each supersedes
the previous one; the 1993 IMO-sponsored convention is not in force for many States, the siIuation for earlier treaties.
Sec Jan M. Sandstrom, The Changing Inlemalional Concepl oflhe MarilimeLien as a Securiry RighI, 47 TULANEL. REv. 681
(1973). The United States is not party to any maritime lien treaty. See JohnM. Kriz,ShipMOTIgages, Marilime Liens and
Their Enforcement: The Brussels Convenlions of 1926 and 1967, 1963 DUKE L.J. 670, 674-75.

660. E.g., Ship Mortgage Act, 46 USC 31328, requires US Department of Transportation approval of trustees
holding a US ship mortgage in trust for the benefit of a foreignor who cannot hold a US ship mortgage; see also
SCHOENBAUM § 7-5.
661. US law, e.g., subordinates foreign preferred ship mortgages in US courts to repair facilities' lien claims. 46
USC § 31326(b); sccalso GILMORE & BLACK 709-12; SCHOENBAUM § 7-6.
662. Sec generally GIl.MORE & BLACK 702-06; SCHOENBAUM § 7-5,444.
663. Sec generally GIl.MORE & BLACK 702-06.
664. Sec, e.g., In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., n. 642; see also n. 642 and accompanying text.

665. Sec generally Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Limitation of Liability of Owners of
Sea-Going Vessels, Aug. 24, 1924, 120 LNTS 123 (1924 Limitation Convention); Convention Relating to Limitation
of Liability of Owners of Seagoing Ships, Oct. 10, 1957,6 BENEDICT, Doc. No. 5-2 (1957 Limitation Convention);
Protocol, Dec. 21, 1979,id., Doc. No. 5-3; Convention on LimiIation ofLiability ofMaritime Claims, Nov. 19, 1976, 16
ILM 606 (1977) (1976 LimiIation Convention); SCHOENBAUM ch.13; In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., n. 642; n. 642 and
accompanying texL The UniIed States is not party to these treaties; Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act, 46 USC
§§ 181-89, governs in US courts.
666. See nn. VI.I4-15, 160-65, 195-97 and accompanying texL MariIime liens, inchoate (i.e., hidden) in rem
interests in a ship because of collisions with other merchantmen, personal injury and death aboard ship, contracts for
vessel repair, charter claims, towage, pilotage, wharfage, cargo damage claims, eIC., add still another dimension (and
therefore more possible claiman IS) relating to the vessel. See generally GILMORE & BLACK 586-688; SCHOENBAUM ch. 7.
667. See LOS Convention, arL 91; High Seas Convention, arL 5; see also Part B.3. The vessel's flag governs its
nationality for LOAC siIuations. SAN REAlo MANUAL 1111 60 & cmL 60.4; 112-14 & cmts.; see also Parts V.B-V.E,
V.J.2-V.J.5.
668. Much of what follows has been distilled from SCHOENBAUM § 8-1, who publishes a helpful diagram of typical
maritime sale, financing and transportation contracts.
669. Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980,-UST-, 19 ILM 668 (1980),
increasingly governs maritime transactions' sales aspects. At least 52 countries, including the United States and more
if treaty succession principles apply, are parties. TIF 459; Symposium, S,a,e Succession; Walker, Inlegration and
Disintegralion. See also JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS
CoNVENTION (1982); Symposium on the Intemational Sale of Goods Convention, 18 INT'L LhW. 3 (1984).
670. This was the transaction in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 US 398 (1964).
671. See generally SCHOENBAUM § 8-4; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. II.59, ch.17.
672. See nn. 635-67 and accompanying texL

673. Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 StaL 233, 120
LNTS 155 (COGSA Convention), modified by Protocol to Amend 1924 Convention for Unification of Certain Rules
ofLaw Relating to Bills ofLading, Feb. 23, 1968,in 6 BENEDICT,Doc.I-2, and UN Convention on Carriage ofGoods by
Sea, Mar. 31, 1978, 17 ILM 608 (1978); neither of the latter are in force for the UniIed States. US trading partners are
parties to the modifications, albeit with reservations or domestic law gloss. Comparative Table of Ratifications of the
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Hague Rules and the Hamburg Rules (1996), Doc. 1-3A, 6 BENEDlCf; see also SCHOENBAUM § 8-14. The US COGSA
Convention reservation, 51 Stat. 252, declares US law, i.e., the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 USC §§ 1300-15, is
paramount to the Convention for cases in US courts, thereby perhaps creating different results in US courts from cases
in other countries' couns. Parties can modify the contract of carriage to a certain extent, perhaps incorporating US
COGSA rules, such that even more parties, such as shoreside freight handling companies, also may be involved.
SCHOENBAUM §§ 8-15 - 8-41.
674. SCHOENBAUM § 9-6. Parties' choice oflaw, stated in a contract clause, can also be applied in salvage, towage,
marine insurance and carriage of goods contracts. See also id. §§ 8-20, 10-11; Walker, Interface, n. 655, 245-46.

675. Cj. COGSA Convention, arts. 4(2)(b)-4(2)(c), 4(2)(e)-4(2)(g), 4(2)(k)-4(2)(l), 4(4),51 SIaL 251-52, 120 LNTS
167; see also, e.g., 42 USC app. § 182,42 USC §§ 1304(2)(b)-1304(2)(c), 1304(2)(e)-1304(2)(g), 1304(2)(k)-1304(2)(l),
1304(4) for application in US law,and GILMORE & BLACK §§ 3-31- 3-34; SCHOENBAUM §§ 8-27 - 8-29; Walker,Interfacc,
n. 655, 239-41. The COGSA Convention and US COGSA parallel public law obligations to save life atsea by granting a
civi! case liability exception. LOS Convention, arL 98; High Seas Convention, art. 12; Second Convention, arts. 12-13;
see also Parts V.H.2, V.J.S, nn. VI.l2-15 and accompanying texL
676. Besides these treaty-based exceptions, the maritime law of average, in which a pany sustaining loss from a
peril during a voyage (e.g., of the sea) may collect pro rata from other parties in the maritime venture ifloss of that
party's property (e.g., by pushing it overboard) saves the ship, can involve more claimants, i.e., those forced to
contribute to the party losing property. See generally GILMORE & BLACK 252-54; SCHOENBAUM ch. 15.

677. Cj. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co., 488 US 428 (1989), where jurisdiction over a shipping
company's claim for loss of its vessel when a dud bomb lodged in the ship during the Falklands/Malvinas War and
could not be dislodged safely resulting in the scuttling of the ship was denied because of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 USC §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11. The Public Vessels Act,46 USC §§ 746-90, and
the Suits in Admiralty Act,id. §§ 741-52 govern liability of the United States for acts ofits pubhcships,c.g., warships,
and ships the government operates commercially. See also SCHOENBAUM §§ 17-1,17-3. This parallels LOS immunities.
LOS Convention, arts. 32,58,95-96,11 0(1),236; High Seas Convention, arts. 8-9; Territorial Sea Convention, arL 22;
see also nn. 77, 312, 337, 809 and accompanying text. Just because warships have immunity in civil litigation and from
boarding, etc., on the ocean does not necessarily mean that a ship's government escapes liability. E.g., LOS
Convention, art. 31 (State's liability to a coastal State for damages its warship causes in territorial sea.) A ship's
commanding officer can be liable for hazarding a vessel and other charges under military law. C[. Uniform Code of
Military Justice, an. 110, 10 USC § 910.
678. As a general rule only the State of an individual's nationality, or the State of a company's incorporation, can
claim against another government; treaties may modify these principles. Nottebohm (Liech. v. GuaL), 1955 ICI 4;
Mavromattis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction) (Greece v_Gr. BriL), 1924 PCIJ, Ser. A, No.2, at 11-12; Barcelona
Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 ICJ 3; United States ex reI. Merge v. Italian Republic, 14 UNRIAA
236 (Ital.-US Conci!. Comm'n, 1955); BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 407-23; 1 OPPENHEtM §§ 378-80; REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) §§ 26-27,201-13; it!. (THIRD) § 902. LOS Convention, arts. 31-32 is an example ofa treaty's confirming the
principle of government liability.

679. See nn. II.338-40, 459-69 and accompanying text.
680. Cj. Convention Respecting Shipowners' Liability in Case of Sickness, Injury or Death of Seamen, Oct. 24,
1936, arts. 2-7, 54 StaL 1693,1695-99,40 UNTS 169,172-76. National maritime standards may be more favorable; the
Convention states a minimum. Warren v. United States, 340 US 523 (1951).
681. E.g., recovery under an employers liability act, unseaworthiness or product liability under US maritime law,
46 USC § 688; Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 US 96, 103-04 (1944); East River S.S. Co. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Inc., 476 US 858 (1986). See also SCHOENBAUM §§ 3-6 - 3-7, chs. 4, 6.
682. LAwRENCE,n. II.60, 287-88, 292-93; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. II.59,35-36, 225; n. II.359 and
accompanying text (UK seafarer unions opposed arming merchantmen).
683. Convention Relating to Carriage of Passengers & Their Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, arts. 3, 6-9, in 6
BENEDICf, Doc. 2-2, at 2-9, 2-11 - 2-13; Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Carriage of Passengers
by Sea, Apr. 29, 1961, arts. 4, 6, 1O,in id., Doc. 2-1,at 2-1, 2-3 - 2-5, state presumptionsoffault ifinjury or death occurs
because ofshipwreck, collision, stranding, explosion or fire (which might be caused by external forces), or defect in the
ship, subject to a comparative fault defense and recovery caps. Few States are parties. See also 2 O'CONNELL, LAWOI'THE
SEA 780-81. The United States is not a but achieves similar results through legislation and a comparative negligence
theory. See Death on the High Seas Act, 46 USC §§ 761-68; SCHOENBAUM §§ 3-5,6-1- 6-3, 6-5 - 6-6.

684. See nn. 677-79 and accompanying texL
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685. Sec generally GILMORE & BLACK 91-92; E.R. HARDY IVAAIY, MARINE INSURANCE 481-86 (3d ed. 1979); R.J.
LMIBHH, TEMPLEMAN ON MARINE INSURANCE 392-408 (5th ed. 1981).
686. Edinburgh Assoc. Co. v. R.L. Burns Corp., 479 F.Supp 138, 144-45 (C.D. Cal. 1979),aff'd, 669 F.2d 1259 (9th
Cir. 1982) describes the Lloyd's system; sec also n. 11.65 and accompanying text.
687. GU....IORIl & BLACK 55, 60. The American Hull Insurance Institute includes many foreign insurance
companies. LESLlEJ. BUGLASS, MARINE INSURANCE AND GENERAL AVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2d ed. 1981).
688. BUGLAss, n. 687, 291.
689. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 US 764 (1993) considered UK reinsurance agreements in the US
antitrust law conte.xt. See also Part VI.B.4.
690. Sec generally Ale.-;: L. Parks, The New London Hull Clauses, 15 J. MAR.L &Co.\ll (1984).
691. Sec generally Samir Mankabady, The New Lloyd's Policy and Cargo Clauses, 13 id. 527 (1982).
692. Sec generally Mark Tilley, The Origin and Developmenl of lhe MUlual Shipowners' Protection and Indemnity
Associalion, 17 id. 261 (1986).
693. GILMORIl & BLACK 75; WILLIAAID. WINTER,MARINEINSURANCE 193 (3d ed.1952); MilfordL. Landis,AllRisks
Insurance, 1951 INS. L.J. 709; see also Morrison Grain Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1980).
694. 2 ARNOULD'sLAWOFMARINEINSURANCEAND GENERAL AVERAGE 'ill! 880-906 (MichaeIJ. Mustillel al. eds., 16th
ed. 1981); GILMORE & BLACK 71-72; WINTER, n. 693, 325; Haehl, The Hull Policy: Coverages and Exclusions Frequently
Employed, 41 TULANE L. REv. 277 (1967).
695. This was the Tanker War practice. Sec generally MICHAELD. MILLER,MARINEWARRiSKS 18-22,270-72 (1992);
Chaser Shipping Corp. v. United Slates, 649 F.Supp. 736, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); n. 215 and accompanying text.
696. 46 USC app. § 1282(a).
697. Secgcnerally BOCZEK, FLAGs,n. 11.60; CARLISLE, n. 11.60; FRANKEL,n. 11.60,74-77; LAWRENCE,n. 11.60, 101-04,
182-89; WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. 11.59, ch.18; Wiswall,Fiags, n. 11.60.
698. E.g., 46 USC app. § 1283.
699. Sec, c.g., id. § 1284.
700. E.g., 42 USC app. § 1287.
701. E.g., 42 USC app. § 1293. The legislation has been renewed periodically. Cf. id. § 1294; GILMORE & BLACK 981
n.130.
702. GILMORE & BLACK 980-81.
703. See nn. 302-13, 337-50 and accompanying te.xt.
704. The terms passport, sea brief, sea letter or pass have been used interchangeably. See 2 MooRE, DIGEST 1046 and
id. 1066.68, reprinting Morton P.Henry Apr. 1887 opinion letterto US Department ofState Solicitor and E.xaminerof
Claims Francis Wharton. Fora represenlativeform, see id. 1058. US and other countries' legislation might distinguish
between ships built in the Slate and those owned by nationals, also eligible for registration, and ships built abroad by
nationals and eligible for a certificate but not registration. See, e.g., Paper Preparedfor Use oflhe U.S. Delegalion 10 lhe
1958 Geneva Conference on lhe Law ofthe Sea, 9 WIIlTEMAN 1,3-4. See also 46 USC §§ 12102-05,12112-14.

70S. See, e.g., these representative treaties between the United Slates and other countries: Algiers, Sept. 5, 1795, art.
4,8 StaL 133; June30·July 3, 1815,arL 7,id. 224,225; Dec. 22-23, 1816,art. 7,id. 244,245; Argentina,July27, 1853, art.
7, lOid.l005, 1008; Belgium, Nov. 10, 1845, art. 12, 8 id. 606, 610; July 17, 1858, art. 10, 12id.l043, 1046; Mar. 8, 1875,
art. 9, 19id. 628,631; Bolivia,May 13, 1858,art. 22, 12id. 1003,1015; Brazil, Dec. 12, 1828,artsA,21,8id. 390,391,395;
Central American Federation, Dec. 5, 1825, art. 21,id. 322,332; Chile, May 16, 1821,art.19,id. 434,438; China, Nov. 4,
1946, art. 21(2), 63 id. 1299,1316; Colombia, Oct. 3, 1824, art. 19, 8 id. 306,314; Dec. 12, 1846, art. 22, 9 id. 881,892;
continued, Sept. 13, 1935,art.11,49id. 3875,3887; Dominican Republic, Feb. 8, 1867, art. 16, 15 id. 473,482; Ecuador,
June 13, 1839, art. 22, 8 id. 534,544; EISalvador,Jan.2, 1850,art. 22, lOid. 891,896; Dec. 6, 1870,art.25, 18id. 698,710;
Feb. 22, 1926, art. 10, 46id. 2817,2825; Finland, Feb. 12,1934, art. 15,49 id. 2659,2669,152 LNTS 45, 56; France, Feb.
6, 1778, an. 27, 8 Slat. 12, 28, abrogated by Actofjuly7, 1798, 1 id. 578; Sept. 30, 1800, art. 17, 8 id. 178,186; Germany,
Dec. 8, 1923, art. 10,44 id. 2132,2140; replaced Oct. 29, 1954, art. 1,7 UST 1839, 1841,253 UNTS 89,90; Guatemala,
Mar. 3, 1849, art.21, 10 Slat. 873,883; Haiti, Nov. 3, 1864, art. 23, 13 id. 711,720; Honduras, Dec. 7,1927, art. 10,45 id.
2618,2626; Italy, Feb. 26, 1871, art. 17, 17 id. 845,853; Feb. 2,1948, art. 19(2), 63 id. 2255,2284; Japan, Feb. 21, 1911,
3rt. 10, 37id. 1504,1507; Liberia, Aug. 8, 1938, art. 15, 54id. 1739, 1745; Morocco, Sept. 16&Oct. 1, I, 1836,art.4,8id.
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484; Netherlands, Oct. 8, 1782, art. 10, Uf. 32, 38; Jan. 19, 1839, art. 4,id. 524,526; Mar. 27, 1956, art. 19, 8 UST 2043,
2073,285 UNTS 231, 259; Norway,June 5, 1928, art. 10,47 Stat. 2135,2143; Ottoman Empire, Feb. 25, 1862, art. 10, 18
id. 585,588; Paraguay, Feb. 4,1859, art. 7, 12 Uf. 1091,1094; Peru, July 26, 1851, art. 28, lOid. 926,940; Sept. 6, 1870, art.
25,18 id. 698,710; Aug. 31, 1887, art. 23,25 id. 1444,1456; Peru-Bolivia Confederation, Nov. 30, 1836, art. 18, 8id. 487,
492; Prussia,July9 & Sept. 10, 1785, art. 4,id. 84, 86; July 17, 1799, art. 14, it!. 162,168; Spain, Oct. 27, 1795, art. 17, it!.
138,148, confirmed Feb. 22, 1819, art. 12, Uf. 252,262; Sweden, Apr. 3, 1783, arts. 11-12, it!. 60,66; Sweden & Norway,
SeptA, 1816, art. 12,Uf. 232,240;July4, 1827, art. 17, it!. 346,354; Tripoli, Nov. 1796 -Jan. 3, 1797,art.4,id.154;June4,
1804, art. 6, it!. 214,215;Tunis,Aug. 28, 1797, artA, it!. 157;TwoSicilies, Oct. 1, 1855, art. 9,11 it!. 639,646; Venezuela,
Jan. 20, 1836, art. 22, 8 id. 466,476; Aug. 27, 1860, arts. 15-16, lZid. 1143,1151-52. US Department of State Solicitor &
Examiner ofClaims Francis Wharton, Opinion (Nov. 30, 1885),2MoORE 1063·66 omits some prior agreements, as does
BOCZEK, n. II.60, 94-98, who divides the era into two periods: bilateral recognition of a stronger power's ships'
nationality based on its internal laws with a weaker power's rights stated in the treaty; beginning in 1830, equal
reciprocity.

706. See nn. 434-36 and accompanying text.
707. E.g., Peru-Bolivia Confederation, Nov. 30, 1836, art. 18, 8 Stat. 487,492 (name, property, ship's burthen;
name, residence of master or commander; certificates describing cargo, port of origin); Prussia,July 11, 1799, art. 14,
id. 162, 168 (sea-letter; passport with name, property and ship's burthen, plus master's name and dwelling; charter
party or bills of lading; list of ship's company). These documents might serve other purposes, e.g., identifying
deserters by comparing the crew manifest, e.g., Protocol to Friendship, Commerce & Navigation Treaty, July 11, 1862,
Denmark-US, art. 2, 13 Uf. 605,606.
708. MOORE 1048.1 OPPENHEIM n. 382, § 262 had practically the same list. A US circular(1815) listed certificate of
registry for US built or owned vessels, a sea-letter or passport and a Mediterranean passport. 2 MOORE 1059.

709. E.g., Treaty, China-US, n. 437, art. 10, 8 Stat. 594; Treaty of Peace, Amity & Commerce, China.US, n. 437, art.
19, 12 id. 1023, 1027.
710. Sixteen conventions were ratified: Belgium, Dec. 9, 1925, art. 2(1), 45 Stat. 2456, 2457, 72 LNTS 171,173;
Chile, May 27, 1930,art. 2(1),46Uf. 2852,2853, 133 LNTS 141,143; Cuba (with exchange of notes & memorandum of
understanding),Mar.4, 1926,art. 2,44id. 2395,2396, 61 LNTS 383,385; Denmark,May29, 1924, art. 2(1),43 it!. 1809,
1810,27 LNTS 361,363; France, June 30, 1924,art. 2(1),45 Uf. 2403,2404,61 LNTS 415,417; Germany,May 19, 1924,
art. 2(1),43id.1815, 1816; Great Britain, Jan. 23, 1924, art. 2(1),it!.1761,27LNTS 181, 183; Greece, Apr. 25, 1928,art.
2,45 it!. 2736,2737,91 LNTS 231, 233; Italy,June 23,1924, art. 2(1),43 Uf. 1844,1845; Japan (with memorandum of
understanding), May 31, 1928, art. 2(1),46 id. 2446, 101 LNTS 63, 64; Netherlands, Aug. 21, 1924, art. 2( 1),44 it!. 2013,
2014,33 LNTS 433,435; Norway, May 24, 1924,art. 2(1),43id. 1772,1773,26 LNTS 43,45; Panama,June6, 1924,art.
2(1), id. 1875,1876,138 LNTS 397, 399; Poland,June 30,1930, art. 2(1),46id. 2773,2774,108 LNTS 323,325; Spain,
Feb. 10, 1926, art. 2, 44id. 2465,2466,67 LNTS 131, 133; Sweden, May 20, 1924, art. 2(1), 43 id. 1830,1831,29 LNTS
421,423. All are in force except those with Germany and Italy. TIF 22, 52, 66, 72, 97, 111, 155, 203, 213, 222, 236, 263,
270,304.
711. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAt.LAW 5, 13-14; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmt. f.
712. Symposium, Treaty Succession; Walker, In/egration and Disintegration.
713. Ohl v. Eagle Ins. Co., 18 F. Cas. 630, 631(C.C.D. Mass. 1827) (Story,J., on Circuit, citing English precedent);
Weston v. Penniman, 29 id. 815,819 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (same).
714. 2 MOORE, DIGEST 1046. See also US Treasury Secretary Bantwell May 23, 1871 letter to US Ministerto France
Elihu B. Washburne, id. 1062.

715. !d. 1046.
716. Id. 1002.
717. It!. 895-96.
718. 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 340, 343 (1874).
719. US Secretary of State Hamilton Fish Nov. 14, 1873 telegram to US Minister to Spain Daniel E. Sickles,

reprinted in 2 MOORE, DIGEST 896.
720. Protocol of Conference, Spain·US, Nov. 29, 1873, it!. 896·97; Fish Dec. 31, 1873 telegram to US Charge
d'Affaires to Spain Alvey A. Adee, it!. 899; see also Claims Agreement, Feb. 27, 1875, Spain-US, 11 BEVANS 544.
721. BOCZEK, n. II.60, 108, citing Institut de Droit Internationale, 15 ANNUAIRE 202 (1896).
722. The Montijo (US v. Colom.), 2 MooRE, ARBITRATIONS 1421, 1433-34 (1905).
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723. MuscatDhows(Fr. v. Gr. BriL), 1 Hague Ct. Rep. 93, 96, 99,2AJIL 923, 924, 928 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1905);seealso
BOCZEK, n. II.60, 100·01.
724. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEt. 753.
725. See nn. 704-12 and accompanying texL
726. See generally BOCZEK, n. II.60; CARLISLE, n. II.60.
727. BOCZEK, n. II.60, 8; CARLISLE, n. II.60, xiii.
728. See generally BOCZEK, n. II.60, 9-12; CARLISLE, n. II.60, 2-18. The anti-smuggling treaties, n. 710, which
included an agreement with Panama, were a response.
729. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A), No. 10, at 25.
730. Convention on Private International Law, Feb. 20, 1928, General Rules, arL 274, 86 LNTS 111, 326
(Bustamante Code).
731. 1929 SOLAS, n. 19, art. 2(3)(a), 50 Stat. 1130, 136 LNTS 90.
732. International Load Line Convention,]uly 5, 1930, arL 3(a),47 id. 2228, 2240, 135 LNTS 301, 312 (1930 Load
Line). Its successor, Convention on Load Lines, Apr. 5, 1966, arL 4(1)(a), 18 UST 1857, 1860,640 UNTS 133,136
(1966 Load Line), also applies the registration formula. Over 140 States are party to iL TIF 404-05.
733. 1948 SOLAS, n. 19, art. 2, 3 UST 3450, 164 UNTS 124.
734. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; 1 OPPENHEIM § 10,28; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 102(3) & cmt. f.
735. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 US 571, 584 (1953), citing inter alia the Vrrginius incident, nn. 717-20 and
accompanying texL Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 US 306, 308-10 (1970) amplified Lauritzen's Jones Act, 46 USC §
688, seaman test but did not qualify Justice Jackson's statement, 345 US 584. See also SCHOENBAUM § IS-II.
736. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 IC] 4; see also BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 407-20; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW
OFTH!! SEt. 757; 1 OPPENHEIM § 37S; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) §26; id. (THIRD) § 211.
737. High Seas Convention, arts. 5·6; see also Agreement Regarding Financial Support of North Atlantic Ice
Patrol, Jan. 4, 1956, arL 2, 7 UST 1969, 1970, 256 UNTS 171,174. See generally 9 WHITEMAN 7-15, (summarizing
genuine link debate before Convention negotiations); BOCZEK, n. II.60, 119-24; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
424-26,493-94; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEt. 755-57; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 2S7-88, 290; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 28;
REsTATE.IIENT(THIRD) § 501; WilfredA. Hearn, The Law oftheSea: The 1958 Geneva Conference, JAG]. 3,6 (Mar.-Apr.
1960); Myres S. McDougal, Foreword, BOCZEK xii-xiv.
738. Constitution ofMaritime Safety Committee ofthe Inter-GovernmentalMaritime Consultative Organization,
1960 ICJ 150, 170-71, constrUing Convention for Establishment of Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, art. 28(a), 9 UST 621, 629, 289 UNTS 48, 60-62. See also BOCZEK, n. II.60, 125-55;
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 407, 426; 9 WHITEMAN 20-25.
739. 1960 SOLAS, art. 16.
740. 1974 SOLAS, arL 2.

741. E.g., 1969 Civil Liability Convention, art.l(4); 1971 Fund Convention, art. 1(2); 1972 Dumping Convention,
art.15(1)(a); 1973 Pollution Convention, art. 3(1). ILO-sponsored conventions state the same requirements. BOCZEK,
n. II.60, 114-15.
742. BOCZEK, n. II.60, 288; COLOMBOS § 309; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 28.
743. BOCZ!!K, n. II.60, Ill.
744. Convention on Facilitation ofMaritime Traffic, n. 468,Anne.", § 2, IS UST 436-48,591 UNTS 300-10; see also
nn. 468-74 and accompanying te."L

745. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 91-92, 94(1), with High Seas Convention, arts. 5-6.
746. LOS Convention, arL 94(2)(a).

747. ld., arts. 94(3)-94(5).
748. Flag States also must conduct inquiries into high seas marine casualties or incidents of navigation involving
their ships and cooperale with other States involved. Id., arts. 94(6)-94(7); compare High Seas Convention, arL 10. See
also BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 424-26; 493-94; 2 Nordquist 111191.1-92.6(f), 94.1-94.8(1); O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE
SEt. 755-57; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 287-88, 290; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 501-02. NWP I-14M Annotated 112.i.3, n.13 and
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NWP 9A Annotated ~ 2.1.2.3 n.13 do not discuss characterization of merchantmen under the genuine link or other
theories, saying that in international law a merchant ship is any vessel including a fishing vessel not entitled to
sovereign immunity, i.e., a privately or publicly owned or controlled ship that is not a warship and that is engaged in
commercial activities. See also SAN RaIO MANUAL II 13(i) & cmL 13.23.
749. Ship Registration Convention, n. II.61; see also 1 OPPENHEIM § 288.

750. See 6E BENEDICT 15-20.
751. Compare Ship Registration Convention, n.II.61, art. 4(2), 26ILM 1238 (1987), with LOS Convention, arL
91(1); High Seas Convention, arL 5(1). Provisions for landlocked States' rights, ships flying two flags and changes of
flag or registry are identical. Compare Ship Registration Convention, arts. 4(1), 4(3)-4(5), 26ILM 1238 (1987), with
LOS Convention, arts. 90, 92; High Seas Convention, arts. 4, 6.
752. Ship Registration Convention, n. II.61, art. 5, 26ILM 1238 (1987).

753. Compareid., arL 5,26ILM 1238-39 (1987),with LOS Convention, arL 91(2); High Seas Convention, art. 5(2).
754. Compare Ship Registration Convention, n. II.61, arL 8, 26ILM 1239 (1987), with LOS Convention, arts. 91(1),
94; High Seas Convention, arL 5(1).
755. Ship Registration Convention, n. II.61, arts. 7, 9(1)-9(3), 26ILM 123940 (1987); see also id., arL 9(6)(b), 26

ILM 1240.
756. ld., arts. 9(5)-9(6), 26ILM 1240 (1987).
757. ld., arL 10, 26ILM 1240·41(1987).
758. ld., arts. 11-12, 26ILM 124142 (1987).
759. ld., arL 13, 26ILM 1242-43 (1987).
760. ld., arL 14, inCOrPorating Resolution 1, 26ILM 1243, 124546 (1987).
761. /d., arL 15, inCOrPorating Resolution 2, 26ILM 1243, 1246 (1987).
762. See nn. 745-48 and accompanying text. International Institute for Unification of Private Law, Draft
Convention on Registration & Nationality of Air-Cushion Vehicles, 1976, arts. 1, 5-6, 8, in 6E BENEDICT, Doc. 15-2, at
15-22 - 15-23, repeat familiar rules of requiring registration, leaving details to flag States; it does not apply to military
or State owned or operated ACVs.
763. See nn. 625, 643-56, 664-65, 674, 686, 702, 707-08 and accompanying texL
764. US Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes May 31,1921 telegram to US Consul, Canton, China; Hughes
OCL 7, 1921letterto US Secretary of the Navy Denby; US Assistant Secretary of State Leland HarrisonJune 15, 1923
letter to US Ministerin ChinaJacob G. Schurman; Harrison Oct. 7, 1924letterto US Charge d' Affairesadintcrim Bell,
2 HACKWORTH 732-34.
765. High Seas Convention, art. 6; LOS Convention, arL 92; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) § 28; REsTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 501.
766. Ship Registration Convention, n. II.61, art. 12(1), 26ILM 1242 (1987).

767. ld., art. 12(5), 26ILM 1242 (1987), requiring deleting the chartering-out State's registry. The practice began

in 1951 with the FRG's economic rebirth. Wiswall,Fiags, n. II.60, 109-111.
768. See n. 678 and accompanying text.
769. Intervention Convention, arL 3; Intervention Protocol, arL 1(3).
770. Civil Liability Protocol, arL 4(2) (no claim against charterer allowed); 1924 Limitation Convention, n. 665,
art. 10, 120 LNTS 133 (charterer steps into owner's shoes); 1957 Limitation Convention, n. 665, art. 6(2), in 6
BENEDICT, Doc. 5-2, at 5-15 (same); 1976 UN Limitation Convention, n. 665,art.l(2), in id., Doc. 54, at 5-32.1 (same);
see also Limitation of Liability Act, 46 USC App. § 186 (bareboat charterer equated to owner); n. 665 and
accompanying texL

771. See, e.g., COGSA Convention, n. 673, art. l(a),51 StaL 251, 120 LNTS 163; see also 46 USC § 1301(a).

772. E.g., LOS Convention, preamble, arts. 2(3), 19(1),21(1), 31 (territorial sea), 33 (contiguous zone, an area
contiguous to the territorial sea and subject to the high seas regime except as modified by the LOS Convention for the
continental shelf, fishing zones or EEZ), 34(2) (straits), 58(1), 58(3) (EEZ), 78(2) (continental shelf), the 87(1) (high
seas), 138 (Area), 303(4) (archeological property); High Seas Convention, preamble, arL 2; Territorial Sea
Convention, arts. 1(2),14(4),17,22(2); see also Continental Shelf Convention, arts. I, 3, 15 (waters above shelf high
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seas); Fishing Convention, arts. 1-8, H(waters are high seas); Territorial Sea Convention,arL 24(1) (contiguous zone
considered part of high seas); nn.I1I.953-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying te.xt.
773. Hague VII, arts. 1-6.
774. The United States never was a party; France and Great Britain denounced it. Thirty States are party, perhaps
more through treaty succession principles. SCHINDLER & TOMAN 794-96; Symposium, Treary Succession; Walker,

IntegratIon and DISintegration.
775. 7 HACKWORTH 445-46; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 1106-07; 2 OPPENHEIM § 84; 2 SCHWARZENBERGER375-76;
Gabriella Venturini, Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 120, 122-23; War Claims Arbiter Functioning Under
Settlement of War Claims Act ofl928, Administrative Decision III (Mar. 29, 1929), 23 AJIL 673, 676 (1929); cf. NWP
I-14M Annotated'll 2.1.1 n.l; NWP 9A Annotated'll 2.1.1 n.1. In 1913 the Naval War College would have limited
conversions to a belligerent's or an ally's territorial waters, or waters "occupied by one of these," and would have
provided that such a conversion lasted until war's end. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW TOPICS AND
DISCUSSIONS 1913, 148, 154 (1914). Absence ofa requirement for conversion in a belligerent's territorial waters, as
Hague VII, preamble notes, was a reason the United States did not sign Hague VII. 7 HACKWORTH 446; Venturini 122.
Convention on Maritime Neutrality, arL 13 allows naval auxiliaries' reconversion to merchant ships if; inter alia,
conversion is in the flag State's or an ally's port or jurisdictional authority. The Convention is in force for the United
States and seven Western Hemisphere countries. TIF 443. See also 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1107.
776. 1909 London Declaration, arts. 49-50, 62 mentions warships but offers no definitions. Conferees divided on
whether conversion could take place on the high seas. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1107.
777. OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, art 2.
778. Verri, n. 71, 331.
779. US Secretaty of State Memorandum, Apr. 27, 1916, 1916 FRUS 244, 247, 7 HACKWORTH 445.
780. 1930 London Naval Treaty, art. 14, incorporating by reference id., art. 8, which incorporates by refcrenceid.,
Anne.x III. All of the Treaty except arts. 22-23 (submarine warfare) e.xpired Dec. 31, 1936. The United States and 48
other countries, including Iran, Iraq and other Tanker War participants,e.g., France, Italy, Netherlands, Panama, the
United Kingdom and the USSR, are parties. TIF 443. Treaty succession principles applying to the USSR and
Yugoslavia may increase the number. Symposium, State Succession; Walker, Integration and Disintegration.
781. 1936 London Naval Treaty, arts. l(A)-l(C), no longer in force.
782. !d.,arts. l(B)-l(G), 19.
783. Montreux Convention,n. 557, art. 8,AnnexII, 173 LNTS 221, 235-37, citing 1936 London Naval Treaty, arts.
l(A)-lCC), to that extent preserving the 1936 definition. Nyon Supplemental Agreement '!I 2 refers to "surface
vessel[s]" but means surface warships in addition to submarines.
784. High Seas Convention, art. 8(2); see also NWP I-14M Annotated '112.1.1; NWIP 10-2, art. 500(d); NWP 9A
Annotated '112.1.1; 2 Nordquist '1129.2; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 1106; 1 OPPENHEIM § 201,620. Third Convention
(1949), arts. 14-15,28,32 refer to warships without defining them.
785. High Seas Convention, preamble. 2 SCHWARZENBERGER376; id. 377-78 notes the Convention, art. 8(2) adopts
the definition for the purpose of that treaty only and that article 2(1) says freedom of the seas is also subject to other
rules ofinternationallaw,e.g., the UN Charter and the LOAC. See also, e.g., High Seas Convention, art. 2; Lighthouses
Case, 12 UNRIAA 161, 205; nn. III.963-67, IV.IO-2S.
786. Convention on Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, n. 486, art. 1(11), 57 AJIL 269, not in force for the
United States.
787. INCSEA Agreement, art. l(l)(a).
788. Treaty Concerning Permanent Neutrality & Operation ofthe Panama Canal, with Anne.xes & Protocol, Sept.
7,1977, Panama-US, Anne.x A, '112, 33 UST 1,22,1161 UNTS 177,187. Although the Treaty binds only Panama and
the United States to a neutralized Canal, the Protocol can bind third States. At least 36 countries and perhaps more
through treaty succession rules for the former USSR are Protocol parties. TIF 219; Symposium, Treary Succession;
Walker, Integration and Disintegration. Erga omnes may apply Treaty terms to third States. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 623-24; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 583, at 1205; 626, at 1261.
789. The US Coast Guard is an armed force of the United States. 10 USC §101. Coast Guard vessels designated
"USCGC" under the command of a commissioned officer are warships. NWP I-14M Annotated '112.1.1. The Coast
Guard becomes a part of the Navy when Congress declares war or the President so directs. 14 USC § 3.
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790. High Seas Convention, art. 8(2) refers to "these articles," i.e., the Convention, and there is no definition,
strictly speaking, for the territorial sea. LOS Convention, art. 29, although in the territorial sea provisions, says the
definition is "For the purposes of this convention," i.e., for the entire treaty. Compare LOS Convention, art. 29 with
High Seas Convention, arL 8(2); see also 2 Nordquist ~~ 29.1-29.8(b); NWP I-14M Annotated ~ 2.Ll; NWP 9A
Annotated ~ 2.1.1; 1 OPPENHEtM §§ 201 at 620, 561; Oxman, The Regime, n. III.956, 813. Another result ofthe 1958
Conventions is that States that have not ratified the High Seas Convention with its warship definition but which
ratified other 1958 Conventions-there are a few in that category,see TIF 374, 402-03-are left with customary LOS
definitions, without the persuasive authority ofhaving ratified the High Seas Convention and its definition. The LOS
Convention solves the problem with a single, unified agreemenL
791. Joint Interpretation, n. 341, '112,28 ILM 1446 (1989); NWP I-14M Annotated 'II 2.1.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11
2.1.2.1; cf. LOS Convention, arts. 21(1), 22(2)-23, which by special provisions under these circumstances support a
view that nuclear-powered vessels have equal status with conventionally powered ships on the high seas and in other
circumstances unless otherwise limited, e.g., by other agreements not incompatible with the LOS Convention; see also
2 Nordquist 'II'!I21.1-21.11(e), 21.12; 22.1-23.9; but see Lowe, The Commander's, n. III.318, 115.
792. NWP I-14M Annotated '112.1.1 n.2; NWP 9A Annotated

~

793. NWP I-14M Annotated ~ 2.1.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated

2.1.2.2; 1 OPPENHEIM § 560.

~

2.Ll n.2.

794. LOS Convention, arts. 32, 58(2), 95, 236; High Seas Convention, arL 8; COLOMBOS § 277; 2 Nordquist 1111
32.1-32.7(b); 58.1-58.9, 58.lO(d), 95.1-95.6(c) (reaffirms "longstanding principle"), 236.1-126.6(1) (ships, aircraft);
NWP I-14M Annotated 112.1.2; NWP 9A Annotated 112.1.2; 1 OPPENHEIM § 560.

795. E.g., LOS Convention, arL 87(1); see also nn. 111.953·67, IV.IO·25 and accompanying te.XL
796. NWP I-14M Annotated

~

8.2.1 n.36; NWP 9A Annotated ~ 8.2.1 n.34; NWIP 10-2, art. 503(a)(2).

797. See generally BOTHE et al. 233-39; PILLOUD CoMMENTARY 506-14; cf. IntroducllJry Note, SAN RalO MANUAL 5.
798. Protocol 1 also requires a party to a conflict to notify parties to a conflict if it incorporates a paramilitary or
armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces. Compare Protocol I, art. 43 with LOS Convention, aIL 29; High
Seas Convention, art. 8(2); see also BOTHE et al. 233-36, 240-41; PILLOUD. COMMENTARY 517-18.

799. See nn. 784, 790 and accompanying texL
800. 2 SCHWARZENBERGER 376-77; see also nn. 111.953-67, IV.1O-25 and accompanying text.
801. E.g., LOS Convention, arL 87(1).
802. NWP I-14M Annotated
13.21.

~

2.1.1; NWP 9A Annotated'll 2.Ll; SAN REAIO MANUAL, '!J13(g) & Commentary

803. LOS Convention, arts. 31-32, 96; High Seas Convention, arL 9; Territorial Sea Convention, arL 22(1).
804. LOS Convention, arts. 31-32, 96; High Seas Convention, arL 9; Territorial Sea Convention, arL 22(1); see also
n. 77 and accompanying texL
805. See n. 625 andaccompanyingtext;seealso Parts V.B., V.C.l, V.D.l, V.F.l, V.F.2, V.F.5., V.J.2,-V.J.4, V.J.6.
806. Cf. LOS Convention, arts 27-28; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 19-21.
807. LOS Convention,arL 93, referring to e.g., id., arts. 91-92; compare High Seas Convention,arL 7,referring to id.,
arts. 1-6. The result was the same as the warship definition in id., aIL 8(2); the id. definition applies only to the high
seas because of a decision to split the 1958 LOS draft into four treaties. 3 Nordquist ~ 93.7(a); see also n. 805 and
accompanying texL For general analysis of aIL 93, see 3 Nordquist ~~ 93.1-93.7(g); 1 OPPENHEIM § 289,734.
808. Protocol I, aIL 38(2); see also BOTHEet al. 207-11; 3 Nordquist ~ 93.7(g); NWP I-14M Annotated ~ 12.4 (US
concurs with Protocol I, art. 38[2], extends its application to maritime operations as policy); NWP 9A Annotated 11
12.4; PILLOUD COMMENTARY 446-60.
809. 3 Nordquist ~ 93.7(e).
810. Protocol I, art. 38(1); see also, e.g., First Convention, arts. 36-39,43-44; Second Convention, arts. 3841,43-45
(distinctive emblem for medical transports, hospital ships, etc.); BOTHEet al. 207-11; NWP I-14M Annotated '1111.9.1;
NWP 9A Annotated ~ lLlO.l; 1 PICTET 280-308, 322-39; 2 id. 212-32,240-49; PILLOUD COMMENTARY 446-60.
811. See nn. 347 (territorial sea), 601 (straits transit), 640, 649 (independent steaming on high seas except as
directed by ship owner or charterer) and accompanying text.
812. Cf. Broms, The Definition, n. 111.62, 350-51, 365; Walker, Maritime Neutrality, n. III.828, 134, 136-37.
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813. Sec nn. 111.957·60, IV.15·18, 582·600 and accompanying text.
814. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2. The due regard principle applies to other
aspects of the law of the sea. Sec n. 75 and accompanying text
815. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); see also nn. 111.952·67, IV.I0·25 and accompanying text.
816. Sea services, e.g., the US Navy and Coast Guard, as well as other ships or aircraft, go to the assistance of, and
may accompany, mariners in danger of being lost at sea. International and national law mandates this in peace and
war; there are certain conditions to saving life at sea, e.g., the rescuer must do so if it would not endanger the rescue
ship. LOS Convention, art. 98; Convention on Salvage, Apr. 28, 1989, arts. 4,10, TIAS --,in 6 BENEDICT, Doc. No.
4-2A, at4-13,4-14,4-17 (not applicable to warships unless State party applies treaty to them), to supersede Convention
for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Assistance & Salvage at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910, arts. 11, 14, 37 Stat. 1658, 1672
(not applicable to warships); 1974 SaLAS, Regulations 2, 10, ch. V; Convention for Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to Assistance & Salvage of Aircraft or by Aircraft, at Sea, Sept. 28, 1938, art. 2, 6 BENEDICT, Doc. No. 4-5, at
4-21 (not in force but United States a signatory); High Seas Convention, art. 12; Second Convention, arts. 12, 18, 21;
Hague X, art. 16; see also COLOMBOS § 369 (ancient duty of masters); 3 Nordquist 1111 98.1·98.11(g) (general tradition
and practice); NWP 1·14M Annotated 1111 3.2.1·3.2.1.2 (same), 11.4; NWP 9A Annotated 1111 3.2.1·3.2.1.2, 11.6; 1
OPPENHEIM § 298; 2 id. §§ 204-05; 2 PICnIT 84-92,129·36,150·53; SCHOENBAUM § 14-8. The author recalls his destroyer
escort's (i.e., frigate's) going to the assistance of a merchant ship and accompanying it to safe haven during the 1962
Ash Wednesday Storm off the Virginia Capes and picking up Cuban refugees fleeing the Castro regime on another
occasion in 1962. They were in open boats on the high seas, outoffuel, and would have drifted in the Gulf Stream until
they died or were picked up. They were taken to Port Everglades, Fla.
817. Cf, UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; seealso nn. III.I0·ll,48·630, 916·18, 932·67, IV.6·25 and accompanying text.
818. 1 O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 533; see also nn. 80·157 and accompanying text for EEZ and fishing zone
analyses.
819. See Parts V.B, V.C.3, V.J.2, V.J.3.
820. See n. 678 and accompanying text.

821. See, e.g., Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1962), decided 22 years after a cargo loss
caused by Greece's requisition of the ship during World War II. The trial court ruled on the claims in 1959, 173
F.Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
822. Sec n. 11.519 and accompanying tc.xt.
823. Sec, c.g., nn. 11.338-40 (U.s.S. Stark), 368·72 (Iraniljr), 459·69 (Vincennes incident), 430·33 (U.S.S. SamuelB.
Roberts), 281, 393·99 (oil platforms).

824. See, e.g., nn. 11.210·11 (Iraqi attack on Iranian Nowruz facility) and accompanying text; see also ch. VI for
further analysis of the law of the environment.
825. Registry changes to other, e.g., Norwegian or UK, ensigns likely met LOS standards. Weinberger, Report, n.
11.52, 1448, 1450·52, 1458 1461·63; Caron, n. 11.328, 161·66; Davidson, n. 11.332, 387; Nordquist & Wachenfeld, n.
11.332, 138; Peace, Major Maritime Events, n. 11.90, 553·54; Phillipps, n. 11.332,275; Wolfrum, Ref/agging, n. 11.332,
387; Menus, n. 11.332, 207; Wachenfeld, n. 11.332, 202; Murphy statement, n. 11.332, 58·60; (1987). Armacost
statement, n. 11.332, 1431 said Kuwait had reflagged two tankers under the UK ensign. In fact there were many more.
Second Report, 11116.14-6.15, reporting that at one time 50 to 60 Norwegian ships may have switched to the UK flag.
Some in the United States opposed the transfer. See generally Gamlen & Rogers, n. 11.326, 133·35;seealso nn. 11.326·33,
394 (US national as master blinded in Iranian attack) and accompanying text.
826. See nn. II. 343-45,348,350·52,358·59,361·62,382,437,446-47,453,472,IV.811-19andaccompanyingtexL
827. See, e.g., nn. 11.178·80, 210-14,250·60,272,281,306,309, 334, 338-40 (U.S.S. Stark), 354, 357, 362, 367, 368-72
(Iran Ajr), 373, 393·99, 401·02, 410·12, 421, 430·33 (U.S.S. SamuelB. Roberts), 434, 446, 457, 459·69 (Airbus, Iranian
speedboat survivors), 470, IV.816 and accompanying text.
828. Sec nn. 11.364, 379, 411, 459·69.
829. LOS Convention, art. 29; High Seas Convention, art. 8(2); nn. 772-802 and accompanying text.
830. See n. 11.355 and accompanying text.

831. LOS Convention, art. 29; High Seas Convention, art. 8(2); see also nn. 772-813 and accompanying text.
832. Cf, LOS Convention, arts. 31-32; High Seas Convention, art. 9; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 22(1); see also
PartB.4.
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833. LOS Convention, art. 91; High Seas Convention, art. 5(1); see also nn. 737, 745-48 and accompanying texL
834. SeePartsV.B, V.C.3, V.C.5, V.D, V.J.2-V.J.4.

835. See nn. II.153-55.
836. See nn. 825-26 and accompanying texL
837. See n. 827 and accompanying text.
838. See n. II.250, 260, 334, 354, 361, 373, 393-94, 412, 421, 446, 469, 519 and accompanying text.
839. See, e.g., National Petrochem. Co. ofIran v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988) (diversion ofvessel
from Iran destination).
840. See nn. II 215, 519, IV.685-702 and accompanying texL
841. See n. 678 and accompanying te.>:t.
842. LOS Convention, art. 91; High Seas Convention, art. 5(1); see also nn. 737, 745-48 and accompanying texL

843. See nn. II.326 and accompanying texL
844. See nn. II 215, 519, IV.685-702 and accompanying texL
845. See n. 678 and accompanying te.>:t.
846. See nn. II.215, 334, 250, 260, 334, 354, 361, 373, 393-94, 412, 421, 446, 469, 519 and accompanying te.xt; see also
nn. 685-702 and accompanying text.

847. Gf. The August, 1891 A.C. 328.
848. See n. 678 and accompanying te.>:t.
849. See generally SCHOENBAUM § 8-2,472; 9 WHITEMAN 264-83. US legislation is 10 USC § 2631.
850. E.g., 46 USC § 883; see also GILMORE & BLACK 963 (US policy since 1817); SCHOENBAUM § 8-2,472.
851. Gf. nn. II.103 (Iranian convoys), 262 (Saudi corridor) and accompanying text.
852. There was also a Kuwait to Yanbu, Saudi Arabia pipeline to pump outbound oil, the sale of which may have
financed the Iraqi war effort. See nn. II.182-83 and accompanying texL

853. See n. 678 and accompanying te.>:t.
854. See nn. II 215,519, IV.685-702, and accompanying texL
855. See, e.g., MOORE, ARBITRATIONS; the UNRIAA series.
856. See n. 678 and accompanying text.
857. See nn. II.250, 260, 334, 354, 361, 373, 393-94, 412, 421, 446, 469, 519 and accompanying texL
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